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Abstract 
 
This work illustrates reform approaches in Africa using an international legal comparative 
approach. The research uses Tanzania and Senegal as the primary case studies and France, the 
United Kingdom and Germany as secondary case studies to illustrate how Europe reformed data 
protection regimes through the transposition of the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995.  
 
Chapter one introduces the work; explaining the forces towards data protection regulations and 
their basis. Chapter two provides for a ‘back-to-back' comparison in three countries (France, 
Germany and United Kingdom) against the 1995 Data Protection Directive. The idea behind this 
chapter is to draw a picture on how the legal culture and the pre-existing notions of the right to 
privacy inform on data protection legal reforms and determines the nature, contents, context and 
interpretation of adopted regime for data protection. Eventually, all these aspects affect the 
nature and extent of protection offered regardless of the substance of the law adopted. 
 
Chapter three gives a narrative explanation of nature and perceptions of the right to privacy in 
Africa and how this may affect data protection reforms in Africa. In the same disposition, 
African customary legal systems and practices are explained providing a reader with a picture of 
the overall nature of African systems that makes up an African legal culture. The overview of 
African privacy perception and legal system is necessary for assessing the workability of any data 
protection regime to be adopted in Africa which in effect answers the first research question. 
The chapter draws its rationale from chapter two. In understanding African perceptions of 
privacy and the African legal culture, one can be able to predict the content and context of the 
reforms and maybe how the judiciary might interpret the laws based on local perceptions and 
supporting systems. 
 
An overview of the African data protection architecture or rather human right architecture is 
provided in chapter four; ideally to provide a reader with a picture of the enforcement systems in 
Africa as a continent. This is followed by chapter five discussing the two major legal systems in 
Africa; the civil law and the common law system. The chapter also illustrates the position of 
African landscape in relation to legal harmonization/unification. This aspect is considered 
necessary because data protection regimes are more focused on legal harmonization and hence 
the question of how well or to what extent Africa as a continent can bring about harmonization 
in law became inevitable. Eventually, the chapter offers a comparative mirror analysis of the 
 xi 
 
primary case studies, i.e. Senegal and Tanzania. The analysis is made on the reform approach 
taken, motivation behind the reforms and on the regime erected (this is done through textual 
analysis of the law and the draft bill respectively).  
 
Chapter six concludes the work by answering research questions based on findings and scrutiny 
from each chapter. It is concluded that there is a very slim chance for the African States to cling 
on the cultural defence against the adoption of the Western frameworks for data protection. It is 
also concluded that, lest Africa becomes an active participant in the global process that informs 
on data protection challenges and regulations, it faces a danger of becoming a puppet of foreign 
data protection regulation, which may or may not fit African legal culture. The chapter also 
illustrates how Africa as a continent and the African States individually have taken up data 
protection reforms blindly. The motivations for the reforms are vaguely stated and unclear. In 
the majority of legal instruments, the reforms are not taken as a move towards securing and 
protecting individual rights rather a purely political move influenced by economic motivations. 
The reforms are to a large extent, a mere impression to align with global data protection regimes 
and hence lack the political will to enforce the laws. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Arbeit beleuchtet Reformansätze in Afrika im Rahmen eines internationalen 
rechtsvergleichenden Ansatzes. In der Studie werden Tansania und Senegal als primäre 
Fallbeispiele und Frankreich, United Kingdom und Deutschland als sekundäre Fallbeispiele 
verwendet, um aufzuzeigen, wie in Europa die Datenschutzregelungen durch die Umsetzung der 
EU Data Protection Directive aus dem Jahre 1995 reformiert wurden. 
 
Kapitel eins beinhaltet eine Einführung in die Arbeit; dabei wird der Druck zur Einführung von  
Datenschutzvorschriften und deren Grundlage erklärt. Kapitel zwei bietet einen direkten 
Vergleich   dreier Länder (Frankreich, Deutschland und United Kingdom) mit der EU Data 
Protection Directive, 1995. Der diesem Kapitel zugrundeliegende Gedanke war, sich ein Bild 
davon zu machen, inwieweit die Rechtskultur und vorgefassten Meinungen zum Recht auf 
Schutz der Privatsphäre Auskunft geben über Datenschutzrechtsreformen und wie dadurch 
Charakter, Inhalt,  Kontext und Auslegung des verabschiedeten Regelwerks zum Datenschutz 
bestimmt werden. Letztendlich haben all diese Aspekte Auswirkungen auf den Charakter und 
das Ausmaß des gewährten Schutzes, unabhängig vom Inhalt des verabschiedeten Gesetzes. 
 
In Kapitel drei werden der Charakter und die Sichtweise des Rechts auf Schutz der Privatsphäre 
in Afrika beschreibend erläutert, und inwieweit dies Datenschutzreformen in Afrika beeinflussen 
könnte. Gleichzeitig werden in Afrika gebräuchliche Rechtssysteme and Praktiken erläutert, 
damit sich der Leser ein Bild machen kann vom allumfassenden Charakter der afrikanischen 
Systeme, welche die afrikanische Rechtskultur ausmachen. Diese Übersicht über die afrikanische 
Sichtweise zum Thema Schutz der Privatsphäre und zum afrikanischen Rechtssystem ist 
notwendig, um beurteilen zu können, inwieweit ein Datenschutzregelwerk, welches in Afrika 
gesetzlich verabschiedet werden soll, überhaupt praktikabel ist, was im Endeffekt die erste 
wissenschaftliche Fragestellung beantwortet. Die logische Grundlage des Kapitels stützt sich auf 
Kapitel zwei. Indem man die afrikanische Sichtweise von Privatsphäre und die afrikanische 
Rechtskultur versteht, kann man sowohl zu Inhalt und Kontext der Reformen Prognosen 
abgeben als unter Umständen auch dazu, wie das Justizwesen diese Gesetze basierend auf der 
lokalen Wahrnehmung und den unterstützenden Systemen interpretieren wird.  
 
Eine Übersicht über die afrikanische Datenschutzstruktur oder besser gesagt über die 
Menschenrechtsstruktur wird in Kapitel vier gegeben; idealerweise sollte damit dem Leser ein 
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Bild von den Systemen zur Rechtsdurchsetzung in Afrika als Kontinent vermittelt werden. 
Hierauf folgt Kapitel fünf, in welchem die beiden größten Rechtssysteme in Afrika erörtert 
werden, das Zivilrechtssystem und das Gewohnheitsrechtssystem. In diesem Kapitel wird auch 
die Position der afrikanischen Landschaft im Hinblick auf rechtliche 
Harmonisierung/Vereinheitlichung dargestellt. Dieser Aspekt wird als notwendig erachtet, da der 
Fokus von Datenschutzregelwerken eher auf einer rechtlichen Harmonisierung liegt und daher 
auf der Frage, wie gut oder in welchem Ausmaß Afrika als Kontinent eine rechtliche 
Harmonisierung umsetzen kann die unvermeidbar geworden ist. Schlussendlich bietet dieses 
Kapitel auch noch eine vergleichende Spiegelsichtanalyse der Primärfallstudien, d.h. Senegal und 
Tansania. Die Analyse erfolgte hinsichtlich des gewählten Reformansatzes, der Beweggründe auf 
welchen die Reformen basierten und des errichteten Systems (dies geschieht durch eine 
Textanalyse des Gesetzes beziehungsweise des Gesetzentwurfs). 
 
In Kapitel sechs wird die Arbeit mit der Beantwortung der wissenschaftlichen Fragestellung 
basierend auf den Erkenntnissen und einer genauen Untersuchung aller vorangehenden Kapitel 
abgeschlossen. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass nur eine sehr geringe Chance für die afrikanischen 
Staaten besteht, dass diese sich kulturell verteidigen werden können gegen eine Übernahme des 
westlichen Rechtsrahmens für Datenschutz. Ferner wird zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass – 
sofern Afrika nicht aktiv an dem globalen Prozess teilnimmt, welcher Informationen zu den 
Herausforderungen des Datenschutzes und zu Datenschutzbestimmungen liefert der Kontinent 
in Gefahr läuft, zu einer Marionette ausländischer Datenschutzvorschriften zu werden, ganz 
gleich ob diese zur afrikanischen Rechtskultur passen oder nicht.  Das Kapitel zeigt auch auf, wie 
Afrika als Kontinent und die afrikanischen Staaten jeweils für sich genommen 
Datenschutzreformen blindlings übernommen haben. Die Beweggründe für die Reformen sind 
nicht genau benannt und nicht klar. Bei der Mehrheit der Rechtsvorschriften wurden die 
Reformen nicht durchgeführt um die Rechte Einzelner zu schützen und abzusichern, sondern als 
rein politischer Schachzug basierend auf wirtschaftlichen Beweggründen. Die Reformen sind 
größtenteils lediglich ein bloßer Eindruck sich an globale Datenschutzregelwerke anzupassen 
und es fehlt daher am politischen Willen, diese Gesetze auch durchzusetzen. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
For decades, the Constitutional right to privacy has played a vital role in privacy protection in 
many African countries. However, only two countries, namely Kenya and South Africa managed 
to judicially interpret and define the scope of the right to privacy.1 Meanwhile, the adoption and 
use of ICTs including cloud computing are increasing by the day. In 1999, only 10% of the 
African population had access to ICTs2 (at least a connected mobile phone), ten years after, in 
2009 it was 38.0%, and in 2016 it was 80.8% per 100 inhabitants.3  Furthermore, between 2014 
and 2015 when the international internet capacity in Europe, US and Canada had slowed at 33% 
compounded annually, international internet capacity connected to Africa grew by 41% to 51% 
compound annually between the year 2011 and 2015. (TeleGeography) In fact, in 2012, there 
were 650 million mobile subscriptions in Africa, exceeding the statistics in the US or the 
European Union, making Africa the second fastest growing region in the world after South 
Asia.4 This is said to be just the beginning of the growth curve in ICT usage.5 In contrast with 
the Western world, in Africa, mobile devices are mostly used to access different services than 
fixed broadband. Mobile connectivity is in Africa, preferred due to low- cost handsets and 
business models that lower the cost access such as pre-paid air time.6  
ICT connectivity and usage continue to grow in the absence of proper regulation in place to 
regulate user pattern, safeguard individual privacy and protect personal data. In 2001 Cape Verde 
became the first African State to adopt a comprehensive framework for data protection, yet, to 
date there is no established supervisory authority for the enforcement of the law. The African 
Union adopted the Convention on Cyber Security and Data Protection (The Malabo 
Convention) in June 2014. Malabo Convention is a closed Convention and requires ratification 
and accession of at least fifteen (15) Member States to come into force. So far, as of 26th April 
2017, only eight (8) out of 54 Member States has signed,7 none of the AU Member States have 
ratified the Convention.  
Regardless of the Malabo Convention’s unpopularity, States had and continued to reform their 
legal system by establishing data protection regimes. 18 out of 54 States have adopted data 
protection legal frameworks while 19 States have either Bills or draft Bills pending before their 
                                                          
1 See e.g.; Makulilo, A.B., ‘Myth and reality of harmonisation of data privacy policies in Africa’, Computer Law & 
Security Review, 2015, Vol.31, No.1, pp.78-89, at pp.80-81. 
2 Donovan, K. P and Martin, A. K., ‘The Rise of African SIM Registration: the Emerging Dynamics of Regulatory 
Change’, First Monday, 2014, Vol. 19, No. 2-3, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v19i2.4351.  
3http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx accessed on 20.04.2017  
4 Kearney, A. T., ‘African Mobile Observatory 2011: Driving Economic and Social Development through Mobile 
Services’; Prepared for GSM Association, http://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Africa-
Mobile-Observatory-2011.pdf accessed 07/06/2016. 
5 Yonazi, E et al(Eds)., ‘The Transformational Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Africa’, 
eTransform Africa, p. 33. 
6 Castells, M et al., Mobile communication and society: A global perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007. 
7 Benin, Chad, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone and Zambia. 
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legislative bodies or are undergoing internal review respectively.8 It is imperative to note that out 
of the 18 African countries with data protection laws, only a few of them have brought their laws 
into force and full enforcement.  
Lack of data protection regulation means sensitive information such as criminal, health and 
sensitive financial data are shared across institutions and mobile operators with no 
comprehensive regulation on ground.9 The growing social and economic dependence on ICTs 
and the ease cross-border communications, financial transactions, and sharing of data and 
information in Africa creates vulnerability on personal privacy and data security. 
European Union has now adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)10 to replace 
the Data Protection Directive of 1995 (DPD).11 The DPD has been a ‘model law’ for data 
protection legislation in Europe since its adoption in 1995. It contains rules regulating a specific 
type of data; from the way such data is collected, registered, stored, shared and used. The DPD 
was a result of the growth in information technologies and globalization process which 
threatened personal privacy. The DPD establishes a system to regulate personal data as a distinct 
legal regime from the general right to privacy.  
The establishment of a separate legal regime to regulate data privacy was suggested as early as 
1890 by Brandeis and Warren by serious proposals were made in the 1970s.12  Reasons advanced 
for the inevitability of data protection regulation includes the emergence of networks that 
simplifies data sharing and allowing access to wider range of personal data;13 enhancing 
organizational efforts, profitability, collection, collation, dissemination, use and reuse of personal 
data across organizational boundaries,14 all of which increased vulnerability in data.  
Perhaps, for purposes of general understanding, it is imperative to elaborate how personal data 
can lead to security and privacy issues. The collection and processing of personal data are not a 
problem by itself;15 but it increases data vulnerability, threatens its security, potentially violate the 
right to privacy and damage data subject’s confidence especially in online transactions. As 
explained by Bygrave and Clarke, this new pattern in usage and sharing of personal data 
increased fear on individual privacy and on personal data security exuberated with technological 
                                                          
8 African countries with data protection laws are Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar , Sao Thome and 
Principe, Republic of South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, Benin, Angola, Lesotho and Mali. African countries with either data protection Bills or draft Bills are 
Algeria, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghambia, Guinea Bisau, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.  
9 For comprehensive discussion about this, see e.g; Makulilo, A. B., The Right to Privacy Relating to Credit 
Reporting: A Critical Review of the Emerging Africa’s Credit Reference Market, Journal of Internet Law, 2016, Vol. 
19, No. 9, pp. 3-17. 
10 Adopted by the EU Parliament on 14/06/2016. 
11 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data Official Journal L 
281 , 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050. 
12 Birnhack M. D., ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime’ Computer & Security 
review, 2008, Vol.24, No.6, pp. 508-520, at p. 511.  
13 Roos, A., ‘Data protection’ in  van der Merwe, D., Information Communication Technology Law, LexisNexis, 
South Africa, 2008, p. 314. 
14 Bygrave, L.A., Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective, Oxford University Press, UK, 2014, p.9. 
15 See generally Lee, D. J et al., ‘Managing Consumer Privacy Concerns in Personalization: A Strategic Analysis of 
Privacy Protection’, MIS Quarterly, 2011, Vol. 35, No.2, pp. 423-444. 
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and organization developments in processing personal data.16 Individuals worry about loss of 
control over their data once subjected to automated systems, possible abuses by government 
institutions with established centralized data banks.17 Roos elaboration of what Bygrave and 
Clarke terms as a ‘new pattern’ in the usage of personal data gives a clearer picture. She says; 
‘….with the development of personal computers (the PC) linked by means of 
communication networks, including the Internet, it was no longer necessary for an 
institution to keep all its information on a particular machine, at a particular place or 
even in a particular country. Networks enabled more users to gain access to a wider 
range of personal information. In theory, all the information kept by different 
organisations (such as financial, medical, educational or employment records) can be 
shared by different computer users across networks. The notion of information that is 
stored in a file, therefore, became outdated. The emphasis moved from the threat posed 
by computers to the threat posed by the much wider concept of Information 
Communications Technology (or ICT). ICT technology makes it possible for vast 
amounts of personal information to be collected, stored indefinitely, processed in 
various ways and disseminated to an unlimited number of third parties’18 
The risks go beyond the sharing or unauthorized access to personal data; it includes the 
possibility of processing of inaccurate, incomplete and/or irrelevant personal data. With 
automatic processing, the risks are inflated; as Merwe narrates, ‘it is very difficult to check the 
contents of a storage system because information is stored in a form which is not immediately 
intelligible.  The volume, range and nature of the data stored may be enormous. [It also] 
increases the possibility of intercepting, storing, matching, sharing, mining.’19  With the use of 
internet, data subject leaves ‘footprints’ which can enable collection of further data on data 
subject. Also, tracking technologies can be very intrusive to individual privacy.20 To secure 
individual privacy, autonomy and integrity as the basis for democratic, pluralistic society in the 
face of massive growth in data processing, specific data protection regulations became 
indispensable.21  
Pre-existing rules or the blanket Constitutional privacy rights are therefore considered 
insufficient and unfitting to address the intricacies of privacy issues raised by these 
developments.22 The law of tort, common law principles of the law of trust and contractual 
obligation are no longer well fitted to address such challenges with an adverse impact on 
personal privacy.23 Warren and Brandeis elaborate; 
                                                          
16 Bygrave(n14), p.10; Clarke, R., ‘Information Technology and Datavaillance’, Communications of ACM, 1988, Vol. 
31, No. 5, pp.498-512, at pp.505-508 
17 Roos, A., ‘Privacy in the Facebook Era: A South Africa Legal Perspective, South African Law Journal, 2012, Vol. 
129, No. 2, pp. 375-402 at  p. 377 
18 Ibid. 
19 Roos (n 13). 
20 Ibid, p. 315. 
21 Bygrave (n 14), p. 8. 
22 Warren, S.D and Brandeis, L.S., ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 1890, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 193-220.  
23 Ibid, pp. 198-199, ‘the injury inflicted bears a superficial resemblance to the wrongs dealt with by the law of 
slander and of libel, while a legal remedy for such injury seems to involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, 
as a substantive cause of action. It deals only with damage to reputation, with the injury done to the individual in his 
external relations to the community, by lowering him in the estimation of his fellows’.  
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 ‘The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the 
community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and 
undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from 
having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their 
will.’24 
Warren and Brandeis argument was that the law in the protection of personal privacy and data 
could be made ‘by the analogue in the law of libel and slander, of cases which deals with a 
qualified privilege of comment and criticism on a matter of public and private general interest’.25 
Indeed, analysts such as Makulilo26 suggest this to be the birth of the modern conception of data 
protection. Bygrave27 supports this on account that privacy and data protection law is a result of 
pre-existing rules more obvious are the rules on right to privacy and protection of personality 
but also rules on defamation, as was suggested by Warren and Brandeis. 
In 1945, the CoE decided to make the UNDHR right to privacy a distinct right. Consequently, 
nations established legal regimes to protect individual privacy. This, according to Scott Rempell 
was taken as means for the protection of private affairs of the citizens in the aftermath of the 
Second World War to restrict public officials on the degree of scrutiny previously afforded by 
the Nazi party leadership.28   
In the wake of 1960’s, the right to privacy became a major concern, with technological 
innovation and development making personal data easily collectable, stored and shared. 
International organizations and institution started to devise means to control the effect of 
technology on privacy by devising rules and regulations. And with the wisdom of scholars such 
as Alan Westin, privacy came to be formulated as a legal right which a person can claim. Westin 
redefined privacy as a ‘right in which a person has the ability to control how much about oneself 
can be revealed to others’29 the concept which Marc Rotenberg, the executive director of the 
Electronic Privacy Information considers it to be the cornerstone of the modern right to privacy.  
Eventually, the concept of privacy progressed into a form of positive informational rights tasking 
information handlers with certain responsibilities in situations implicating individuals’ right to 
privacy.30 This was the birth of data protection regulation as a separate legal regime; as previously 
stated. During this period, researches31 in this field emerged as well.  
 
                                                          
24 Ibid, pp. 214-215. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Makulilo, A.B., ‘Protection of Personal Data in Sub-Sahara Africa’, PhD thesis, Universität Bremen, 2012, p.1. 
27 Bygrave (n14). 
28 Rempell, S., ‘Privacy, personal data and subject access rights in the European Data Directive and implementing 
UK statute: Durant v Financial services authority as a paradigm of data protection nuances and emerging dilemmas’, 
Florida Journal of International Law, 2006, Vol. 18, pp. 807-840 at p. 814. 
29 Alan, F.W., Privacy and Freedoms, Atheneum, New York, 1967, p. 7. 
30 Rempell (n28). 
31 The first research on the topic was conducted in 1970 by the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law 
aiming at issues of ‘Computer and Law’. The result of this research was a seminar qualified by the Centre as ‘day of 
birth,’ http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/about/organization/nrccl/ accessed on 02/05/2014 
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Apart from technological development, Banisar32 considers this evolution as resistance against 
governmental abuses and prevention of such abuses that implicates citizens’ privacy manifesting 
in personal information. Also is the strategy to ensure the swift and safe approach to embracing 
technological development while ensuring compatibility with international and regional 
standards. This regime for the protection of personal privacy in data emerged with the adoption 
of data protection laws which Bennett33 refers to as ‘group of policies designed to regulate the 
collection, storage, use and transmittal of personal information’. 
The German State of Hesse was the first to enact Data Privacy Act (Hessiches Datenshutzgesetz) on 
30 September 1970,34 followed by other German States. In 1973 the world witnessed the first 
national wide data protection law enacted in Sweden, the Swedish Data Act (Datalagen). The 
Swedish Data Act provided what we currently recognize as a basic set of protection principles. 
Later on, other countries in the Western world enacted data protection laws. However, it is 
worth noting that, Germany was the first country to interpret and implement data protection 
principles in its strictest sense. This happened in 1983 in Volkszählungsurteil (Population Census 
Case) when the Germany Federal Court interpreted the Federal Data Protection Act of 1978 in 
restricting potential violation of statistical census. The Court in interpreting provisions of the 
Federal Data Protection Act and Article 1 and 2 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) on 
general human freedoms formulated fundamental and general requirements for data collection 
and processing. The formulation led to the emergence of the fundamental right to information 
self-determination (Informationelle Selbstbestimmung). According to the Court, this right can only be 
curtailed if legally permitted by the Constitution and the laws but in compliance with the 
principle of ‘proportionality’.35  
The other States in Europe followed the trend by enacting domestic legislation to protect 
personal data and privacy. These domestic legislations were adopted in an uncoordinated 
manner, resulting in laws with varied standards, some with stricter principles and enforcement 
mechanisms than others. As a consequence, there was uneven protection, which also affected 
realization of internal markets and growth of European computer industry.36 This, as explained 
by Rampell, threatened member states’ integration efforts,37 hence called for a Europe-wide 
harmonized regime.  
In 1980 OECD adopted Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of 
Personal Data.38 The aim was to harmonize data protection practices and offer guidelines in data 
                                                          
32 Banisar, D., ‘Privacy and Data Protection Around the World’, Conference Proceedings of the 21st International 
Conference on Privacy and Personal Data Protection, Hong Kong, 13th September 1999, pp.1-5, at p.1, available at 
http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/infocentre/conference.html  accessed 20/05/ 2014. 
33 Bennett, C.J., Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and United States, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca/London 1992, p. 13. 
34 At Federal level, the first data protection law in Germany was adopted in 1977 and came into force on 1 January 
1978. 
35 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 15 December 1983, Case No. : 1 BvR 209/83, 1 BvR 269/83, 1 
BvR 362/83, 1 BvR 420/83, 1 BvR 440/83, 1 BvR 484/83. 
36 Bygrave (n 14),  p. 55;  See also, Schoeman, F.D., Privacy and Social Freedom, Cambridge University Press, USA, 
1992, Chapter 7. 
37 Rempell (n 28). 
38 The OECD Guidelines contain eight data protection principles including collection limitation principle, purpose 
specification principle, use limitation principle, data quality principle,  security safe guard principle, openness 
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protection legislation. As the name suggests, they are mere guidelines with no binding force; 
although highly recommended by CoE as a model when member countries develop domestic 
legislation.39 According to Michael Kirby, the chairman of OECD Expert Group in a 
formulation of the Guidelines, these Guidelines were meant to address the challenges of 
evolving technology to privacy and data security and the need to harmonize trans-border data 
flow rules.40 41  
These efforts led to the adoption of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS 108 or Convention 108)by CoE in 1981. 
Convention 108, unlike the Guidelines, is binding on Member States but has a limited scope of 
application than the Guidelines. Convention 108 is based on resolutions and recommendations 
by the CoE made in late the 1960s and early 1970s; specifically Resolutions (73)22 and (74)29 on 
the Protection of the Privacy of Individual vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in private and public 
sectors respectively.42 Commentators suggest that the Convention borrowed from pre-existing 
data privacy laws such as the Hessian Data Protection Act of 1970,  Swedish Data Act of 197, 
Draft Legislation for Belgium in 1972 and the US Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.43 The 
Convention mainly focused on the weaknesses in the protection of privacy on personal data in a 
computer evolution era.44 Makulilo suggests, its adoption is not only an indication of member 
states lack of adequate laws in protection of personal privacy and data45 but also a phenomenon 
Fleischer terms as a mission to rescue uncoordinated and uneven nature of EU Member States 
rules in data protection.46 Perhaps this explains the fact that it has been ratified by 45 out of 47 
CoE Member States. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
principle, individual participation principle and accountability principle. It also contains a requirement for 
establishment of a supervisory authority to oversee and implement the principles. 
39 Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the protection of Privacy and Trans-border 
Flow of data, (adopted 23 September 1980); (C(80)58/FINAL). 
40 Kirby, M., ‘The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy’ International 
Privacy Law, 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 6-14 at pp. 6-8. 
41 The explanation memorandum 25 to the Guidelines states the objectives as: 
a) Achieving acceptance by Member countries of certain minimum standards of protection of privacy and 
individual liberties with regard to personal data; 
b) Reducing differences between relevant domestic rules and practices of Member countries to a minimum; 
c) ensuring that in protecting personal data they take into consideration the interests of other Member 
countries and the need to avoid undue interference with flows of personal data between Member countries; 
and 
d) Eliminating, as far as possible, reasons which might induce Member countries to restrict trans-border 
flows of personal data because of the possible risks associated with such flows. 
42 Council of Europe, Resolution (74) 29 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-a-vis Electronic Data 
Banks in the Public Sector (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 September 1974); Council of Europe, 
Resolution (74) 22 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-a-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public 
Sector (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 1973). 
43 Bygrave (n 14), p. 33; Makulilo (n 26), p. 145. 
44 ETS 108 came as a necessary measure to reconcile fundamental values of the respect for privacy and the free flow 
of information between peoples. ETS108 contextualized right to privacy by defining personal data, automatic 
processing, storage of data, carrying out of logical and/ or arithmetical operations on data, their alteration, erasure, 
retrieval or dissemination. See Additional Protocol to the Convection for the protection of individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Persona Data regarding supervisory authority and transborder data flow; November 8 
2001. C.E.T.S. No. 181. 
45 Makulilo (n 46). 
46 Fleischer, P., ‘The Need for Global Privacy Standards’ UNESCO Conference, Ethics and Human Rights in 
Information Society, 13-14 September 2007, Strasbourg. 
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The Convection contains the same privacy and data protection principle as the OECD 
Guidelines, although the former deals only with data in computerized (automated) systems. Its 
Article 3 (2)(c) encourages an application of the same principles even to manually processed data 
and employing additional measures in safeguarding privacy in personal data (Article 11); while 
permits departure from its principles when a country meets criteria under Article 9 and 11 of the 
said Convection. Bygrave submits that the Convection was intended to act as a catalyst and a 
guide for national legislative initiatives not to short-circuit them. Hence he cautions against 
taking the Convention as a finished package with directly applicable rules.47  
In 2001 CoE complemented Convention 108 with an adoption of the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data regarding supervisory authorities and trans-border data flow. The amendments were aimed 
at calling the Member States to put in place an independent data protection authority.48 Perhaps 
it is worth noting that CoE, has, through the Convention 108, adopted several sector-specific 
Recommendations to address emerging risks and uniqueness of different sectors.49 In its present 
status, the Convention binds Member States, although article 23 mandates the CoE Committee 
Ministers to invite non-member States to accede to upon request. 
The need for a European harmonization of the data protection regime resulted in the 1990 draft 
data protection framework adopted in 1995 as a Directive.50 The Directive (DPD) drew 
inspirations from the OECD Guidelines and Convention 108. Like Convention 108, the DPD is 
legally binding but unlike Convention 108, is enforced by the ECJ making it the first 
international instrument with the strongest data privacy enforcement mechanism. The DPD, as 
Greenleaf puts it, came to strengthen the previous codes; the OECD Guidelines and Convention 
108.51 This is also evidenced by the instrument itself which under Recital 11 admits to having 
                                                          
47 Bygrave (n 14), p. 36. 
48 See Additional Protocol to the Convection for the protection of individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Persona Data regarding supervisory authority and transborder data flow; November 8 2001. C.E.T.S. No. 181. 
49 Recommendation No. R (81) 1 on regulation for automated medical data banks (23 January 1981 and later 
replaced by Recommendation No. R (97) 5; Recommendation No. R (83) 10 on the protection of personal data used 
for scientific research and statistics ( 23 September 1983 which was later replaced by Recommendation No. R (97) 
18 with regard to statistics; Recommendation No. R (85) 20 on the protection of personal data used for purposes of 
direct marketing (25 October 1985); Recommendation No. R (86) 1 on protection of personal data for social 
security purposes (23 January 1986); Recommendation No. R (87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in police 
sector (17 September 1987); Recommendation No. R (89) 2 on the protection of personal data used for employment 
purposes (18 January 1989); Recommendation No. R (90) 19 on protection of personal data used for payment and 
other operations (13 Septenber1990); Recommendation No. R (95) 10 on communications to third parties of 
personal data held by public bodies (9 September 1991);Recommendation No. R (95) 4 on the protection of 
personal data in area of telecommunication services, with particular reference to telephone services (7 February 
1995); Recommendation No. R (97) 5 on the protection of medical data (13 February 1997); Recommendation No. 
R (97) 18 on the protection of personal data collected and processed for statistical purposes (30 September 1997); 
Recommendation NO. R (99) 5 on the protection of privacy on the internet (23 February 1999); Recommendation 
No. R (2002) 9 on protection of personal data collected and processed for insurance purposes (18 September 2002); 
Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 13 of the Committee of Ministries to member states on the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data in context of profiling (23 November 2010). 
50 The Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, was based on the directives of the European parliament and of the council of 
European Union of 24 October 1995. The Directive sets out the first comprehensive framework for privacy 
protection in Europe.  
51 Greenleaf, G., ‘The influence of European data privacy standards outside Europe: Implications for Globalisation 
of Convention 108’, International Data Privacy Law, 2012, Volume 2, No. 2, pp. 68-92, at p. 68.  
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given substance to and amplified the privacy principles contained in the CoE Convention of 
1981.  
The DPD was adopted with two main objectives, to protect personal rights to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data, and to provide harmonization of rules relating to 
trans-border data flow.52 It is therefore not surprising that the DPD has consistent privacy 
principles, but somewhat stronger than, those in the OECD and CoE agreements. The DPD 
added much stronger enforcement requirements, including the establishment of an independent 
DPA and a right to have disputes determined by the courts’.53 DPD required its implementation 
by the Member States by 24 October 1998. It has also incorporated the 1992 Agreement on the 
Economic Area (EEA) hence binding all EEA Member States as well. 
The distinctive feature of the DPD includes the restrictions on data exports to third countries 
without ‘adequate protection’ for personal data, an aspect which Bygrave believe to be a 
predominant concern of the DPD. The DPD has also introduced special rules to relax the 
restrictions in previous instruments, harmonise national rules and provide for what Makulilo calls 
‘special rules’ for transfer of personal data to third countries.54 These rules also serve to control 
data controllers from shifting their operation to countries with lenient data privacy standards.55 
This framework for trans-border data flow found under chapter IV (Articles 25 and 26) of the 
DPD.  
Regardless of its intentions, the DPD has not been able to enforce uniformity in data protection 
laws within its Member States.56 Its application is fragmented among the Member States, making 
its enforcement difficult across Members. The DPD is also considered ill-equipped to address 
challenges of the growing technology.57 Consequently, the EU decided to replace the DPD with 
the General Data Protection Regulation to address the above-mentioned weaknesses. As pointed 
out by Viviane Reding, the DPD required reforms to address the challenges brought by 
development in modern technology, globalized data flows and access to personal data by law 
enforcement authorities, growth of modern devices, web-user generated contents, the outburst 
of social networking sites, cloud computing technologies all of which postdate the DPD.58 The 
GDPR has been created as a more cohesive instrument to provide a balanced framework of law 
which applies the same data protection rules to all fields of EU activities.59  
                                                          
52 Directive 95/46/EC; Article 1 (1) (2) and Recitals 8, 9, 10, 11. 
53 Greenleaf (n51).  
54 Makulilo (n 26), p 168. 
55 Der Datenschutz im grenzüberschreitende Datenverkehr: Eine rechtsvergleichende und kollisionsrechtliche 
Untersuchung,Baden-Baden: Nomos,  p. 87 cited in Makulilo( n 26)p.54 
56 Polcˇa´k, R., ‘Getting European data protection off the ground’, International Data Privacy Law, 2014, Vol. 4, No. 
4, pp. 282-289, at footnote 39; Koops, B., ‘The trouble with European data protection law’, International Data 
Privacy Law, 2014, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 250-261, at p. 260; LRDP KANTOR Ltd and Centre for Public Reform., 
Comparative Study of Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological 
Developments, Final Report, 20 January 2010, pp.27-42. 
57 See e.g., Reding, V., ‘The Upcoming Data protection Reform for the European Union’, International Data Privacy 
Law, 2011, Vol 1, No. 1, pp. 3-5, at p. 3.   
58 Reding (n 57); Reding, V., ‘The European data protection framework for the twenty-first century’, International 
Data Privacy Law, 2012, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 119-129; Rotenberg M and Jacobs D., ‘Updating the Law of Information 
Privacy:  The New Framework of The European Union’, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2013, Vol. 36, 
No. 2, pp. 605-652 at pp. 623-624; see also Makulilo(n 26), pp. 194-199. 
59 Rotenberg and Jacobs (n 58), pp. 630-631. 
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While these developments take place in the Western, that is, the recognition of right to privacy as 
a distinct legal regime around 1970’s,60 and regional harmonization in 1980’s and the current 
development with the GDPR in 2016; in Africa, most States still relies on the constitutional right 
to privacy as a regime for data protection. A few that have adopted the comprehensive data 
protection regimes have yet to implement these laws. The laws are also said to have been 
adopted hastily in responding to restrictions to trans-border data flow under DPD.61 In an 
inevitable effort to maintain international trade, information sharing and e-commerce; as a result, 
many of the reforms are a replication of the DPD in a ‘cut and paste’ basis.  
Moreover, domestic reforms have triggered reactions at regional and sub-regional level. The 
Malabo Convention of June 201462 establishes, under its part II, standards for a legal framework 
for the protection of personal data. The Malabo Convention is promulgated to address security 
challenges brought by development in technology; and aims at the protection personal data, 
harmonization of cyber laws across Africa and promotion of electronic commerce.63  
Sub-Regional frameworks on data protection started before the Malabo Convention. It started in 
2010 within ECOWAS,64 followed by EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws 2010, and SADC 
in 2012.65 These Sub-Regional instruments were not only adopted as a response to the extra-
territorial mechanism of the DPD but also copied the DPD, some mimicry (with exception to 
the EAC Frameworks). The assumption for this approach in reforms is perhaps their need to 
meet the adequate level of protection which is associated with transposition of the DPD.  
This approach, as clarified by Birnhack suggests the initiatives signify global ‘consensus’ towards 
data protection with a slow but steady process of globalization of data protection standards in 
expectation to meet the equivalence test by the EU.66 Unfortunately, Birnhack forgets that 
similarity in substance does not necessarily mean identical substance.67 Data protection legislation 
is more contextual than substance. Factors such as political environment, economical, legal and 
cultural aspects are vital. They affect how the substance/content is interpreted and applied and 
hence determine the adequacy of the overall protection framework.  
Diversity in legal culture and structures,68 perceptions and understanding of the right to privacy 
(or the concept privacy)69 has an impact on how a country interprets the basic content and core 
                                                          
60 Bygrave, L.A., Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limit, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 
p. 2.  
61 Birnhack (n 12), p. 513; Olinger, H. N et al., ‘Western Privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical Comments on the 
Influences in the forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in South Africa’, the International Information & Library Review, 
2007, Vol.39, No. 1, pp. 31-42; See also Makulilo, A.B., ‘Data Protection Regimes in Africa: too far from the 
European ‘adequacy’ standard?’, International Data Privacy Law, 2013, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 42-50, at p. 50. 
62  On the AU 23rd Ordinary Session in Malabo. 
63 AU Cyber Convention, Paragraph 3. 
64 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection, in Abuja on 16 February 2010. 
65 SADC Data Protection Model Law of 2012. 
66 Birnhack (n12), p.512.  
67 See e.g., Greenleaf (n51). 
68 According to Friedman, legal culture means ‘attitudes, values, and opinions held in society, with regard to law, the 
legal system, and its various parts’. It is ‘those parts of general culture – customs, opinions, ways of doing and 
thinking – that bend social forces toward or away from the law and in particular ways. Accordingly, the legal culture 
is the one which ‘determines when, why and where people use law, legal institutions or legal processes; and when 
they use other institutions or do nothing. In other words, cultural factors are an essential ingredient in turning a 
static structure and a static collection of norms into a body of living law. Adding the legal culture to the picture is 
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rules of the law and eventually the standards implemented within a specific local jurisdiction.70 
Given the fact that there is no definition or clear rule in determining the ‘adequate protection’,71 
suggests the need to look beyond the substance of the law.  
The adoption of the GDPR brings some new dimensions on cross-border data flow. Under the 
GDPR, all entities outside the EU that process data related to the EU entities or Residents are 
automatically subjected to the Regulation. The Regulation also makes it a mandatory requirement 
for data processors to conduct privacy impact assessment for activities likely to pose higher 
security risks. What does this mean for Africa as a continent and to individual states? Based on 
the fact that, the Regional instrument (Malabo Convention), Sub-regional and national laws (with 
exception to South African POPI) are a blue-print of the ‘outdated’ DPD, would the continent 
go through an overhaul of the created data protection regimes or seek compromise with the EU? 
How can Africa attain the sustainability and harmonization of the data protection regimes vis-a-vis 
fluidity in technological developments, global data protection standards and the African legal 
culture? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
like winding up a clock or plugging in a machine. It sets everything in motion; see Freedman, L.M., ‘Legal Culture 
and Social Development’, Law & Society Review, 1969, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 29-44, at pp.35-36. Basically legal culture 
is the totality of social attitudes, informed by culture and history and countries institutional characteristics and its 
legal traditions that give a certain rule a meaning and life.  
69 As an example on diverging understanding and treatment of ‘privacy’  which impacts the standards of regulations 
adopted by a certain community is given by Saad who compares the concept of privacy as perceived in Islamic 
communities as against the Westerners. In Islamic communities, privacy is aimed at prohibiting public humiliation of 
the individual even if it is something of a legitimate concern to the public. This is different from the Western 
concept of privacy which would seem to allow publication of information of a person’s private life if there is 
legitimate concern. He continues saying that, ‘even without the existence of law, privacy is a concept recognized in 
various cultures, but depending on cultural setting, each society has its own attitude and perception towards what 
amounts to privacy’. In illustrating this, the author proceeds with a comparative analysis of privacy perceptions 
among the Germans, Americans, French and English. He discovered that:…‘ the Germans marked of their private 
Lebebentsraum by closed doors, fences, and strict rules about trespass. German law, for instance, forbids the 
photographing of strangers in public places without their consent. Americans have open doors and no fences, but 
mark their social status with ‘private’ offices and ‘private’ secretaries. The French pack closely together in public, but 
rarely invite outsiders to their homes, even if they know them well. And the English, it seems rely mainly on their 
reserve: when an Englishman stops talking, that is a signal that he wishes to be left alone’, Saad, A. R.., ‘Information 
Privacy and Data Protection a Proposed Model for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (unpublished). In African context 
too, authors like Olinger et al (n 61), explain that, privacy has been affected by the African culture of collectivisms as 
opposed to individualism which is the case in the Western culture. This means, unlike in the West where 
individualism is a pre- condition for existence of attitudes and values for privacy, in African states an individual 
cannot claim right to privacy as an individual in Africa lives in associations. 
70 In this context, Tabalujan emphasizes that, legal culture has an impact on the way privacy is perceived and 
interpreted, which means social beliefs and norms of the receiving community and the people’s willingness and 
capacity to scour for, understand and obey new laws are important factors which help determine the success of law 
that is transposed; Tabalujan B.S, Legal Development in Developing Countries: The Role of Legal Culture, 
Singapore, 2001, p. 9. Allan Watson further elaborates on the role of legal culture in legal reforms when he said; ‘All 
lawmakers, including legislators, are controlled by their thinking about law, their knowledge of concepts, and the 
parameters of legal reasoning that they have unconsciously set for themselves. The different sources of law have 
different impacts on legal change, but at all times and in all places the approach of the lawmakers is affected by their 
particular legal culture… This culture has to be understood and injected into the equation before one can begin to 
erect a theory of law and society’. Watson, A., Legal Transplant: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd Ed, 
London, The University of Georgian Press, p.108. 
71 This is despite the fact that Article 25 (2) of the Directive establishes rules in assessing the ‘adequate level of 
protection’ stating, ‘regard shall be given to all circumstances surrounding data transfer operation or set of data 
transfer operations taking into account in particular the nature of the data, purpose and duration of the proposed 
processing operation(s), the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of laws, both general and 
sectorial in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are 
complied with in that country’. 
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1.2 Methodological Approach and Rationale 
1.2.1 Research Problem 
 
Initially the research was set to look at the lack of legal harmonization in data protection 
regulations in Africa and its effects on the protection of personal data. However, with the 
adoption of the Malabo Convention and GDPR in Europe, the research intends to assess data 
protection regimes in Africa (their approaches, the established frameworks and harmonization 
prospects) and the African place in the global data protection map. In doing so, the research 
looks into the challenges involved in developing balanced legislative frameworks in view of 
African local conditions and legal culture against globalized standards. This is done while 
focusing on the central theme of these reforms, i.e. data protection. The research looks into 
external motivations for reforms as well as internal environment for the reception and 
functioning of the data protection regimes in Africa. This is to enable a determination of the 
value and the future of data protection regimes within and beyond Africa. 
It is important to keep in mind that privacy and data protection regulation in the Internet age is 
not a simple task. Borena Berhanu et al,72 posit, ‘With the proliferation of global information 
systems, particularly SNS that collect trans-border data, the regulation process require an 
understanding and involvement of different parties and cultures. Implementing privacy 
regulations, with the commitment of every player (businesses, government, and citizens in 
different parts of the world), needs a compromise and a finding of a common ground’. Hence, 
establishing data protection regimes calls for a more holistic rather than a monolithic approach.73  
Furthermore, development in ICTs also alters standards of protection within trade networks. It 
means, a simple transplanting of a data protection regime in a ‘copy and paste’ basis may not 
yield the expected results. In fact, the APEC Framework is an example of this scenario. The 
APEC Framework transplanted the OECD Guidelines, at the time when it had more than 20 
years since its formulation. As a result, the Framework proved redundant in regulating data 
protection in the modern technologies and their usage patterns.74 Furthermore, the APEC 
framework (like many data protection laws in Africa) fails to recognize privacy safeguards as 
fundamental rights suggesting its unlikeliness to pass the ‘adequacy’ assessment.75 
Initially, the reforms in African States were a response to restrictions in cross-border data flow 
under Articles 25 and 26 of the DPD. These provisions requires third countries to either 
                                                          
72 Borena, B et al., ‘Information Privacy Protection Practices in Africa: A Review through the Lens of Critical Social 
Theory’, 2015 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. 
73 See commentators such as Bygrave, L.A., ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective’, 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2010, Vol. 56 , pp. 165-200, at p. 194; Svantesson, D.J.B., ‘A “Layered Approach” to 
the Extraterritoriality of  Data Privacy Law’, International Data Privacy Law, 2013, Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 278-286; 
Moerel, L., ‘The long arm of EU Data Protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing of 
personal data of EU citizens by website worldwide?’, International Data Privacy Law, 2011, Vol.1, No.1, pp.28-46; 
Moerel, L., ‘Back to Basics: When does EU Data Protection Law apply?’, International Data Privacy Law, 2011, 
Vol.1, No.2, pp. 92-110. 
74 Greenleaf, G., ‘Australia’s APEC Privacy Initiative: The Pros and Cons of the “OECD Lite”’, Privacy Law & 
Policy Reporter, 2003, Vol. 10, pp. 1-6; Greenleaf, G., ‘APEC Privacy Principles: More Lite with every version’, 
Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 2003, Vol. 10, pp. 105-111; Greenleaf, G., ‘APEC’s Privacy Framework: A New 
Low Standard’, Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 2005, Vol. 11, pp.121-124. 
75 Makulilo (n 26), p. 218. 
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implement their own personal data protection laws with adequate (similar) levels of protection; 
enter into standard compliant contract(s) or face data flow restrictions from EU Member States. 
The former option appears to be an easier and more forthcoming route. The latter option 
proves, from experience learned from the US-EU Safe harbor and the Privacy Shield, undesired 
option and can only be tolerated in compelling situations.76 
Consequently, data protection reforms in Africa took a form of direct importation of the DPD 
rather than adoption of a new law or refashioning of existing rules. In most States, no serious 
discussion or public consultations were conducted.77 It is possible this is caused by lack of 
expertise in the area of data protection, hence making the reforms a mere legal drafting process. 
The process ignored the crucial aspect of public consultation, a very important step in validating 
legal reform processes.78 More fascinating is the fact that the reforms in privacy and data 
protection were done through Ministerial Departments79 instead of the conventional route 
through law reform agencies. 
The ‘cut and paste’ of the DPD approach as a ‘strategy’ to reform data protection regimes in 
Africa may still not bring the expected results. Greenleaf in his analysis of the OECD 
                                                          
76 US-EU Safe Harbour was able to come to a conclusion first because both US and EU are powerful and highly 
independent economic entities hence have comparable bargaining power which eliminates the possibility of one 
party to dictate the terms leading to a ‘cooperative form of policy coordination’ and the fact that EU is the US 
biggest trading partner and this is evidenced by the fact that, a year after coming of the Directive 95/46/EC into 
force, US had 350 billion dollar in trade with EU. Long, W.J and Quek, M.P., ‘Personal Data Privacy Protection in 
an Age of Globalisation: the US-EU Safe Harbor Compromises’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2002, Vol.9, 
No. 3, pp. 325-344, at p. 326; see also, Roos, M., ‘Definition of the Problem: The Impossibility of Compliance with 
both European Union and United States’, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 2005, Vol. 14 No. 3, 
pp1137-1162.  
And against all odds, the EU (during negotiations) still insisted that the only way to provide adequate level of 
protection is through legislation. Farrell, H., ‘Negotiating Privacy  across Arenas: The EU-US “Safe Harbor” 
Discussions’ in Héritier, A.,(ed)., Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance, Rawman 
& Littlefield, Boulder/New York/ Oxford, 2002, pp.101-123 at p. 107. Yet despite passing the ‘adequate test in 
2000, Article 29 WP  insists that the approach does not provide adequate level of protection, and such 
determination was made as ‘affirmative action’ or ‘Adequacy without qualification’  resulting to the Commission itself 
drafting reports on its weakness to provide ‘adequate level of protection’, Makulilo(n 26), pp. 214-215; see also, 
Article 29 Working Party., ‘Working Document of Functioning of the Safe Harbor Agreement’, 11194/02/EN,WP 
62, (adopted on 2 July 2002); European Commission., ‘Commission Staff Working Document on the 
Implementation of the Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequacy protection of personal data provided 
by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the U.S Department of 
Commerce’, SEC82004) 1323, Brussels, 20.10.2004. 
77 This is except for South Africa which took about twelve years of serious discussion and considerations both of 
the law, its nature, effect and acceptance in the local environment based on the local understanding and 
circumstances before it was finally adopted in 2013. See also Makulilo, A.B., ‘Data protection and law reform in 
Africa: a systematic or flawed process?’, International Journal of Technology, Policy and Law, 2016, Vol. 2, Nos. 
2/3/4, pp. 228-241 at p.233. 
78 Commenting on Mauritius perspective, the EU consultant report noted lack of awareness in privacy and data 
protection from both private and public sectors and including the office of the Prime Minister who was front liner 
in adoption of the law, Confidential report, ‘Ensuring the compliance of the data protection legislation and 
principles of Mauritius with EU standards, 2011’; the fact that made Makulilo to assess enforcement practice and 
came up with a an observation that the Commissioner was accepting the defense of  ‘ignorance of law’ or ‘lack of 
awareness of law’ in determining complains lodged before her, Makulilo, A.B., ‘Mauritius Data Protection 
Commission: an analysis of its early decisions’, International Data Privacy Law, 2013, Vol.3, No.2, pp.131-139. Even 
the Mauritanian data protection Commissioner at one point suggested her office’s lack of expertise in the area by 
requesting the government to hire an international expert on data protection to assist her in the discharge of her 
everyday duties as a data protection Commissioner, Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the 
Data Protection Commissioner February 2009-February 2010, p.14. 
79 Makulilo (n 77), pp. 231-232. 
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Guidelines, Convention 108, the APEC framework and the EU Directive said, ‘similarity does 
not necessarily means identical substance’,80 81 and even the language difference used on similar 
rules can bring different results on the same subject matter.82 Moreover, adequacy determination 
basically assesses two aspects, the content of protection offered and the mechanism in place for 
the implementation of the law. Besides, based on the European Commission practice in 
assessing adequacy of protection it reveals that, the assessment goes beyond the above levels set 
by the DPD and Article 29 Working party in WP 12 and WP 4;83 it looks at what Makulilo refers 
to as ‘extraneous latent considerations’ not envisaged by WP 12 or WP 4 and the DPD. There 
are political considerations, the economic importance of the country to the EU and amount of 
data likely to be transferred between the third country and EU Member States.84  
Article 29 Working Party confirms this when it declared that the assessment criteria set should 
not be set in a stone; ‘in some instances there will be a need to add to the list, while for others it 
may even be possible to reduce the list of requirements.85 This eliminates the element of 
predictability and brings uncertainty even when third countries have imitated the accepted 
standards within the EU data protection instruments; good example is Tunisia. It also means, a 
country may not transpose the DPD (or any other framework) nevertheless she can pass the 
adequate protection determination; a good example being the State of Israel whose adoption of 
data privacy law pre-dates86 the DPD but has passed the ‘adequate protection’ standard.87  
The additional and quite mystified evaluation procedure and assessment criteria above the two 
known and publicized (within the DPD, WP 12 and WP 4), give third states under reform little 
reference in satisfying the ‘adequacy’ test. In fact, the ‘unknown’ methodologies applied in the 
assessment process have raised a lot of questions on their implication for policy making in third 
countries.88 One of such reports is the commissioned report to the Research Centre on IT and 
                                                          
80 Makulilo (n 77), p. 231.  
81 Taking an example of two African countries (South Africa and Mauritius) influenced by the EU Directive, 
adopted comprehensive data privacy law with similar principles but without substantial identical substance and 
scope. The South African law extends its protections to juristic persons with specific protections to personal data of 
children while Mauritanian law protects only natural persons without specific protections to children data. Further 
on export of personal data Mauritian law is premised on ‘adequacy’ standards set by article 25 of the EU Directive, 
South African Law made a sight departure, it is not based on ‘adequacy’ standard as provided under article 25 of the 
EU Directive rather standard provided under article 26 of the EU Directive applicable when a country fails to pass 
the ‘adequacy’ standard. Both approaches are economic based. See also Makulilo (n 26). 
82 “…in order to transport a single word without distortion, one would have to transport the entire language around 
it….. in order to translate a language, or a text, without changing its meaning, one would have to transport its 
audience as well’, Hoffmann, E., Lost in Translation, London, Minerva, 1991, pp. 272-275; see also Legrand, P.,  ‘ 
What ‘Legal Transplants’? in Nelken, D and Feest, J., (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures, HART Publishing, Oxford-
Portland-Oregon, 2001, pp. 55-69 at pp. 57-61; who explains the important role of a language in understanding, 
implementing and validity of a rule across cultures. 
83 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ‘Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 
26 of the EU data protection directive’ (WP 12, DG XV D/5025/98, adopted on 24 July 1998) and Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party ‘First orientation on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Possible Ways 
Forward in Assessing Adequacy’ (WP 4, DG XV D/5020/97-EN final, adopted on 26 June 1997) 
84 Makulilo (n 26), p. 177. 
85 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 83). 
86 Privacy Protection Act 5741-1981 (as amended). 
87 See Commission decision of 31 January 2011 on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third countries 
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC  available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm accessed on 20.04.2017 
88 Makulilo, A.B., “Data Protection Regimes in Africa: too far from European ‘adequacy’ standard?”, International 
Data Privacy Law, 2013, Vol.3, No.1, pp.42-50. 
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Law, University of Namur, Belgium by the European Commission in 2010. The EC wanted to 
assess the level of data protection in four African countries; these reports raise questions about 
the methodology used to make adequacy decisions, and its implications for policy making in 
third countries.  
The situation has set researchers and academicians in a goose chase with Graham Greenleaf and 
Lee Bygrave emerging with conclusions suggesting that, the less interaction with the third 
country, the more relaxed assessment rules.89 They offer an example of New Zealand’s clearance 
as providing ‘adequate level of protection’ despite obvious weaknesses of the law, saying the fact 
that New Zealand geographical isolation, unlikeliness of EU data transfer to New Zealand and 
the unexpected reciprocal of marketing with EU limiting data transfers between the two regimes 
is the reasons that facilitated the positive determination. The inference by Graham and Bygrave 
above clearly reflects the hard reality of article 25 (2) of the DPD which provides for criteria for 
assessment in somewhat ambiguous terms. It provides; 
‘The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in 
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data 
transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the 
purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country 
of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in 
force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures 
which are compiled within that country’. 
What the literature and practice suggests is that, ‘adequate protection’ assessment is not only 
unpredictable but also unrelated with the transplanting of the DPD. The ‘adequate’ finding is 
subjective and dependent on factors beyond the content of the law and authorities established 
therein. There are other likely patterns of influence as suggested by Makulilo, Greenleaf and 
Bygrave above such as country’s ‘significance’ to the EU and its social economic and political 
stance. Hence, the approach used in Africa to transpose DPD may seem to be a safe and cheap 
approach and likely to provide the ‘adequate protection’, but in reality this may be far from the 
truth. 
Secondly, apart from the fact that determination of adequacy goes beyond what is provided in 
the DPD and WP 12 and WP 4, still no satisfactory details are provided within DPD or 
elsewhere to offer assistance to that end;90 and worse still, Member States may as well have 
different judgment on adequacy requirement.91 This means a certain practice or law or regime 
may pass the ‘adequacy’ determination by the European Commission but fail the same by a 
particular country and hence restriction of cross border data transfers between such EU/EEA 
Member State and the third country. A good example here is the case of US-EU Safe Harbour 
Agreement (SH) which had passed the ‘adequacy’ determination by the Commission in 2000 but 
                                                          
89 Greenleaf, G and Bygrave, L.A., ‘Not entirely adequate but far away: Lessons from how Europe sees New 
Zealand data protection’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2011, No. 111, pp. 8-9 at p. 9. 
90 EU Commission ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union’ 
(Communication From the Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social 
Committee and The Committee of  the Regions), Brussels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final, 2.4.1. 
91 Greenleaf and Bygrave (n 89). 
 15 
 
received a different determination in Germany by the Düsseldorfer Kreis92 (‘Dusseldorf Circle’). The 
Düsseldorfer Kreis had decided that SH should not be relied upon by US data importers as meeting 
the ‘adequacy’ standards. The decision required German data exporters to carry out minimum 
checks to ensure that data importers are not only SH certified but also adheres to data protection 
principles therein.93 
Again, adequacy of protection may change with time and or circumstances. The Safe Harbour 
Agreement is yet an example for this. The agreement was considered to create adequate 
protection for trans-border data transfer between US and EU Member States. This was until on 
6 October 2015 when the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the Commission’s 
2000 Decision on EU-US Safe Harbour invalid. On 6 November 2015, the European 
Commission adopted a Communication on the Transfer of Personal Data from the EU to the 
United States of America under Directive 95/46/EC following the Judgement by the Court of 
Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems v Data Protection Commissione). The aim was to provide an 
overview of an alternative tool for transatlantic data transfers in the absence of an adequacy 
decision. The Agreement has now been replaced with the Privacy Shield Agreement. Yet, the 
validity of the Privacy Shield is being questioned. This came after the US president signed an 
Executive Order to enhance public safety within US. The Executive Order amends section 12 of 
the US Privacy Act and arguably weakens the EU citizens’ protection under the Privacy Shield. 
In the absence of clear rules, a positive ‘adequate protection’ determination on third countries is 
left to a chance and mercy of the Commission and individual EU/EEA Member States. 
Moreover, the ‘adequacy’ assessment, gives primacy to privacy and data protection to EU/EEA 
citizen over the citizen of third country in question 94(refer to the above scenario regarding the 
Privacy Shield). The approach is likely to undermine third countries’ citizens’ individual rights 
and the expected protection if interests of both parties are not well considered in reforms.  
In June 2017 when the GDPR comes into force, it will have far more effects to trans-border data 
flow that the DPD. The GDPR applies to controllers and processors beyond the EU as long as 
their processing activities relate to or targets EU Member States or individuals from EU Member 
State. Article 3(1), the Regulation applies to any processing of personal data in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, ‘regardless of whether 
the processing itself takes place within the Union or not. Article 3(2) refers to the targeting, by 
non-EU established controllers and processors, and of individuals ‘who are in the Union’, for the 
purposes of offering goods or services to such subjects or monitoring their behaviours. This 
connecting factor is further specified by Recital 23. 
In relation to international transfer of personal data, the GDPR has not changed much the rules 
which existed under Articles 25 and 26 of the DPD. However, the GDPR tighten the rules 
                                                          
92 This is a working group of all German supervisory authorities (DPAs) considered by its members as equivalent to 
Article 29 Working Party but publishes its opinions in a form of ‘resolutions’ which reflects the position of 
supervisory authorities.   
93 In this decision which was reached on 28/29 April 2010, the Düsseldorfer Kreis resolved to sanction any data 
exporter who fails to carry out measures to ensure ‘adequacy protection’ by the US based data importer. see 
Schmidl, M and Krone, D., ‘Germany DPAs Decide EU-U.S. Safe Harbor May Not Be Relied Upon Exclusively’, 
http://www.bnai.com/GermanyDpas/default.aspx cited in Makulilo (n 26), p. 209. 
94 Greenleaf and Bygrave (n 89). 
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regarding the data subjects’ consent on trans-border data transfers. In this case, the GDPR 
requires all data processors to make sure that the data subject has been sufficiently informed of 
all the risks of transfer before data can be transferred to a third country. 
The framework established under the GDPR requires also a prompt system for data breach 
notifications, accountability framework and insists on privacy by design by data controllers and 
processors. The GDPR also gives more power to data subjects regarding their rights to data 
access and deletion (Art. 17). Article 79 of the GDPR provides that the data subject who 
considers that his or her rights under the GDPR have been infringed, may choose to bring 
proceedings before the Courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an 
establishment or, alternatively, before the Courts of the Member State where the data subject 
himself or herself resides, unless the controller is a public authority of a Member State acting in 
the exercise of its public powers. Article 82(6) clarifies that the Courts of the same Member State 
have jurisdiction over actions for compensation of the damage suffered as a result of the said 
infringement.  
Chapter V (Articles 44 through 49) of the GDPR governs cross-border transfers of personal 
data. Article 45 states the conditions for transfers with an adequacy decision; Article 46 sets forth 
the conditions for transfers by way of appropriate safeguards in the absence of an adequacy 
decision; Article 47 sets the conditions for transfers by way of binding corporate rules; Article 48 
addresses situations in which a foreign tribunal or administrative body has ordered transfer not 
otherwise permitted by the GDPR; and Article 49 states the conditions for derogations for 
specific situations in the absence of an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards. Under the 
GDPR, adequacy decisions are also subject to periodic review to determine whether the entity 
still ensures an adequate level of data protection (Recital 107). In the periodic review, the 
Commission consults with the entity, and considers relevant developments in the entity and 
information from other relevant sources such as the findings of the European Parliament or 
Council (Recital 106). 
Looking back into Africa, the ongoing reforms may create an enforcement challenge. First there 
is lack of clarity of the protection offered. Yes, the Malabo Convention, Sub- regional 
instruments and national laws have adopted comprehensive frameworks for data protection, in 
the EU style. However none of the available instruments define or even attempt to provide the 
meaning of privacy within their contexts. Overall, ‘privacy’ is still an abstract concept in 
African.95 Makulilo once asserted, ‘there is neither concept nor theory that uniquely deals with 
privacy in African cultural context’.96 And although scholars consider privacy as an indispensable 
structural feature of liberal democratic political systems,97 not only the Western democracies of 
the so called first world98 but also to third worlds like Africa, the African Charter on Human and 
                                                          
95 Bakibinga, E.M., ‘Managing Electronic Privacy in the Telecommunications Sub-sector: The Uganda Perspective’, 
Africa Electronic Privacy and Public Voice Symposium 2004,  
http://thepublicvoice.org/events/capetown04/bakibinga.doc accessed on 20/05/ 2014; this is differentiated from 
Europe for instance, where privacy is a concept based on human dignity and hence a fundamental right. 
96 Makulilo (n 26), p. 277. 
97 Cohen, J.E., ‘What Privacy is For?’, p. 19; http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175406 accessed on 10/05/2014. 
98 Bygrave (n 60), p.35. 
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People’s Rights99 lacks provision on right to privacy within its Basic Human Rights provisions. 
This omission has been considered by Bygrave as a result of African collectivist culture that 
makes privacy a less important value.100 It is therefore unclear whether the adoption of the EU 
frameworks also implies the adoption of the conceptual framework concerning the concept 
privacy.  
The reforms came as a package and did not spare time for the understanding of the concept and 
maybe christening within local contexts/legal cultures. It is therefore not surprising that data 
protection is often related with aspects beyond the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms such as eTrade, cybersecurity, and development strategy. Data protection is viewed 
only as a ‘means to an end’ than a fundamental human right.101 The assumption in the present 
research is that, data protection legal reforms in Africa are nothing than a response to protect 
threaten economies;102 this is why, Bygrave noted, ‘even the instruments have less emphasis on 
privacy and data protection as human rights rather as means to consumer confidence and 
overcoming trans-border data flow restrictions’.103 
Understanding of privacy in certain context is crucial in regulating the interests and values which 
data protection laws aims to safeguard. Bygrave insists, ‘the way in which one conceptualizes the 
interests and values served by these laws is not just an academic interest but has significant 
regulatory implication. It is pivotal to working out the proper ambit of the laws and, 
concomitantly, the proper mandate for data protection authorities’.104 Frowein and Peukert 
emphasizes on the clarity of the concept; considering the fact that the right to privacy challenged 
many legal systems of liberal States in the late half of the 20th century.105 Its understanding is 
crucial in ascertaining its objectives and affects its protection in a given context. Hence, as long 
as the broad consensus is that data protection laws are aimed at safeguarding the right to privacy 
of individual persons against potential intrusive data processing practices, its understanding and 
contextual conceptualization is essential. More so because its understanding is also necessary in 
explaining and discharging supervisory and enforcement powers of the data protection 
                                                          
99 OAU, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), 
27 June 1981, entered into force 21st October 1986. 
100 Bygrave, L.A., ‘Privacy Protection in a Global Context: A Comparative Overview’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 
2004, Vol. 47, pp. 319-348 at p. 343; see also Bygrave (n 73); Bakibinga (n 94), pp. 2-3 and Olinger et al (n 61), pp. 
35-36, who through the concept of Ubuntu: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu abanye translated as ‘a person is a person 
through other persons’ explains ‘the culture of transparency and openness in ubuntu would not understand the need 
for personal privacy or able to justify it. Thus personal privacy would rather be interpreted as “secrecy”.  This 
“secrecy” would not be seen as something good because it would indirectly imply that the Ubuntu individual is trying 
to hide something- namely her personhood……..there is little room for personal privacy because the person’s 
identity is dependent on the group. The individualistic cultures of the West argue that personal privacy is required 
for a person to express his true individuality. With Ubuntu individuality is discovered and expressed together with 
other people and not alone in some autonomous space, and hence personal privacy plays no role in this Ubuntu 
context’. 
101 Although most of these countries have, within their constitutions the right to privacy which could also provide 
shadow protection to personal data, it would have been difficult for courts to determine the extent of rights and 
duties and infringement thereof and in any case this framework  could not survive the rigorous standards for 
countries to exist in the globalized world. 
102 Bygrave (n 100); Bygrave (n 73).  
103 Bygrave (n 14), pp. 76 and 82; Greenleaf (n 51). 
104 Bygrave (n 60), p.7. 
105 Frowein, J.A. and Peukert W, Europaische Menscheurecht Konvention: EMPK-Kommentar, Kehl an Rhein: NP 
Engel, 1996, p. 338. 
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authorities, proportional to, and in safeguarding other societal interests and values in data 
processing. 
Regardless of the motivations behind data protection legal reforms in Africa, the present thesis 
does not insinuate similarity in concept or value of privacy between and within African States. 
After all studies like one conducted by Korff106 suggests the existence of considerable uncertainty 
about exactly which interests and values are promoted by data protection laws; despite extensive 
researches, publication and in-depth analysis made on the subject.107 As a result, many data 
privacy laws fails to specify the interests and values they protect,108 some specify the objectives in 
general terms such as, protection of personality or fundamental rights109 or as narrow as 
protection of personal integrity. 
It is surprising to see privacy reforms in Africa neglects conceptualization of privacy as debates 
are more focused on whether privacy is a concept worth protecting in Africa. Scholars such as 
Gutwirth,110 Bygrave111 and Bakibinga112 believe due to African collectivist culture, privacy stand 
little chance. Gutwirth goes further illustrating how even the privacy rights within African 
Constitution have been watered down by the collectivism culture, rendering the right irrelevant 
and ineffective. His arguments are based on the fact that privacy rights in African Constitutions 
were adopted from colonial masters based on the Western concept of privacy. He considers the 
Western concept of privacy as unfitting to African systems, unless proclaimed by African States 
and the legal systems.113 Bakibinga speaking in Ugandan context suggested, ‘in the myriad of 
privacy definition and conceptual myopia, there is a need for defining privacy in a way accepted 
by the society, given the emphasis on communalism versus individualism’.114 
One would expect the reforms to have been the awaited opportunity for institutions (such as the 
AU) to give statements on the state and value of privacy in Africa and what it means within the 
context. This oversight may lead to failure in analyzing the adequacy and exactness of the 
concept privacy or its ability to generate lucid and coherent regulatory measures in data 
protection. Moreover, interpreting and enforcement authorities such as Courts put more weight 
on the ‘objects’ and ‘purpose’ of the law, and relatively little attention to literal meaning of the 
legal text or legislator’s intentions.115By not conceptualizing privacy, it is nearly impossible to 
know the objects or purposes it serves. 
                                                          
106 Korff, D., ‘Study on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Legal Persons with Regards to the Processing 
of Personal Data relating to such Persons’, Final Report to the EC Commission, October 1998; see also Napier, B., 
‘International Data Protection Standards and British Experience’,Informatica e diritto, 1992, Vol. 2, No.1 , 1992, pp. 
83-85. 
107 Mallmann, O., Zielfunktionen des Datenschutzes: Schutz der Privatsphare, korrekte information. Mit einer Studie 
zum Datenschutz im Bereich von Kreditinnformationssystemen, Frankfurt am Main: A Metzner, 1977, p. 10 cited in 
Bygrave (n 73), p. 172. 
108 Bygrave (n 60), p.8. 
109  See e.g., Directive 95/46/EC Article 1 (1) and Convention 108 Article 1. 
110 Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the Information Age, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford/ Rowman & Littlefield 
Publ., 2002, p. 24. 
111 Bygrave (n 100).  
112 Bakibinga (n 95), pp. 2-3. 
113 Gutwirth (n 110), pp. 25-26. 
114 Bakibinga (n 95). 
115 Bygrave (n 60), p.36. 
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Despite the ongoing debates and perceived uncertainties in value of privacy in Africa; reforms in 
data protection continues to take place in different African States and at Regional and Sub-
Regional levels. Perhaps  the effects of globalization in technology transfer, internet usage 
patterns and their inherent threats is the reason for these reforms;116 but more certain is the 
modest threat posed by the DPD117 118 and the influence of international patrons119 and data 
protection experts.120 One undeniable fact is that the EU intends and continues to set pace in 
data protection regulation by providing ‘global data privacy standards’.121 Graham Greenleaf 
suggests that the only way to have these standards implemented properly is for ‘Council of 
Europe to settle and publicize appropriate policies on accession that are appropriate, transparent 
and do not reduce EU Data Privacy standards’,122 or strive to include those principles in what 
Bennet and Raab123 refer to as ‘strong consensus’ fair information principles; or initiate reforms 
                                                          
116 See arguments by Gutwirth (n 112); Mayer, J., ‘Globalisation, Technology Transfer and Skill Accumulation in 
Low-Income Countries’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, August, 2000; and Wiley, 
J., ‘The Globalisation of Technology to Developing Countries’, Global Studies Student Papers,  Paper No.3, 
http://digitalcommons.providence.edu/glbstudy_students/3 accessed 16/07/2014. 
117 See Mauritius National Assembly, Debate No. 12 of 01.06.04, Public Bills: Data Protection Bill (No. XV of 
2004), p.78, where Mauritian Prime Minister urging members of the National Assembly to adopt data protection law 
in EU style to avoid being cut off from data flow; see also South African Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper 24, 
Project 124, Privacy and Data Protection, http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip24_prj124_2003.pdf ; 
Discussion Paper 109, Project 124, Privacy and Data Protection, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp109.pdf narrates the influence of art 25 to the adoption of South 
African  data privacy law; also this is narrated by the unsuccessful accreditation application made by Burkina Faso, 
Mauritius, Tunisia and Morocco for  ‘adequacy protection’ under article 25 of the EU Directive, see these reports in  
CRID, Analysis of the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data Provided in Burkina Faso, 2010; CRID, Analysis of 
the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data Provided in Mauritius, 2010; CRID, Analysis of the Adequacy of 
Protection of Personal Data Provided in Tunisia, 2010; CRID, Analyse du Niveau d’Adequation du Systeme de 
Protection des Donees dans le Royaume du Maroc, 2010. 
118 See commentators such as Bygrave (n 73). 
119 African countries in data protection reforms have been receiving legal technical and financial assistance from 
International organization mainly the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), The European Commission 
through their project in Support for Harmonization of the ICT Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa (HIPSSA) which was 
launched in 2008; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) through its 2006 cyber law 
reform project in East Africa and the European Union. Also, Francophone countries are receiving legal technical 
support from France while on the other hand the United Kingdom, through its Article 19 (acting as an international 
non-governmental organisation) have been critically assessing data protection laws in Africa in line with the EU 
Directive standards. So far the Article 19 made such comments in relation to Kenya and Nigerian data protection 
draft Bills, the comments are accessible under Article 19., ‘Kenya: Draft Data Protection Bill critically limited’, 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2825/en/kenya; Article 19., ‘Nigeria: Personal Information and 
Data Protection Bill’, http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3683/en/nigeria; a fuller discussion is 
found in Makulilo (n 77).  
120 Experts such as Graham Greenleaf and international bodies involved in data protection reforms such as the 
European Commission illustrate the EU Directive as being a universal instrument in data protection and the need 
for its global application [Sheherezade and the 101 data privacy laws: Origins, significance and global trajectories’, 
Journal of Law, Information & Science; EU Commission ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union’ (Communication From the Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The 
Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of  the Regions), Brussels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final 
respectively]; Other experts arguing along the same lines includes Lee Bygrave, Serge Gutwirth and Gus Hosein. 
121 EU Commission ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union’ 
(Communication From the Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social 
Committee and The Committee of  the Regions), Brussels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final; Greenleaf, note 117, 
supra; also as article 25 of the EU Directive can be interpreted.  
122 Greenleaf (n 51), p.69. 
123 Bennett, C and Raab. C., The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective, 2006, MIT 
Press, pp. 12-13;  The principles include accountability, purpose identification, collection with knowledge and 
consent limited collection to where necessary for purpose, use limited to identified purpose or with consent, 
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with principles established within the two earliest international instruments on data privacy as a 
guide to what is minimal requirement of a data privacy law124  and ensure their existence beyond 
‘the paper’.125 Perhaps this could be of assistance, but until that happens, what should third 
countries to the EU do? Specifically, how should Africa approach reforms in privacy and data 
protection?  
With the EU broad role in global governance,126 the current reforms at EU level affects data 
protection legal frameworks in Africa; perhaps even posing a greater challenge to the ongoing 
reforms agenda and the existing data protection systems. As long as data protection is a global 
phenomenon with EU determined to create universal data protection standards and equivalence 
in legal frameworks; defining values and declare them to be of global necessity, Africa is left with 
no choice but to follow the cue.  
The above literature draws a picture of two pulling sides, on one side is the EU with intentions 
to strengthen and expand its influence and data protection standards as universal principles, and 
forging to ensure that EU legal framework for data protection serves as ‘universal law’127 but 
without provision of a roadmap to third countries who are nonetheless subjected and judged 
against such standards; and on the other hand are third countries struggle to fit within the 
universal standards based on the little guidance provided and limited knowledge of the basic 
concepts underlying the overall framework within which privacy and data protection operate. 
Moreover, given the complex relationship between privacy and social norms, a thorough 
consideration not only on the legal text but also the recipients’ unique legal culture, political and 
socio-economic contexts needs to be looked upon. This should be in light of the global trend 
and economy to determine how such principles fit both local and universal standards in data  
protection,128 after all the ‘adequacy’ determination is assumed to deliberate on all these elements.  
The challenge with which the present thesis undertakes is to study and explain privacy values and 
perceptions in Africa; the legal reforms in privacy and data protection in Africa and how the 
reforms can be projected within the local as well as in the global context. The ultimate objective 
is to draw up suggestions on way forward in reforming privacy and data protection laws in 
compliance with wide accepted standards. In light of the fact that the EU is determined to 
strengthen data protection principles and their enforcement outside EU in line with the Lisbon 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
disclosure likewise, retention only as long as necessary, data kept accurate, complete and up-to-date, security 
safeguard, openness on policies and practice, individual access and individual correction. 
124 Greenleaf summarizes them as 1. Data quality - relevant, accurate, & up-to-date); 2. Collection-(limited, 
lawful & fair; with consent or knowledge; 3. Purpose specification at time of collection; 4. Notice of purpose and 
rights at time of collection(implied);  5. Uses & disclosures limited to purposes specified or compatible; 6. Security 
through reasonable safeguards; 7. Openness re personal data practices; 8. Access- individual right of access; 9. 
Correction - individual  right  of correction; 10. Accountable- data controller with  task  of compliance. However, 
the inclusion of all or limited criteria within these principles will depend on specific country circumstances. See 
Greenleaf ( n 51), p. 8. 
125 Greenleaf (n 51), p.12. 
126 Mayer, H., ‘Europe’s Post Colonial Role and Identity’, in Adebayo, A. and Whiteman, K(eds), The EU and 
Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, C. Hurts & Co Ltd, United Kingdom, 2012, Chapter 22. 
127 EU Commission ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union’ 
(Communication From the Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social 
Committee and The Committee of  the Regions), Brussels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final, 2.4.2. 
128 Makulilo, A.B., ‘Privacy and Data Protection in Africa: A State of the Art’, International Data Privacy Law, 2012, 
Vol.2, No.3, pp. 163-178 at pp. 171-172. 
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Treaty129 with the aim to create ‘equivalent’ levels in data protection through approximation of 
national laws.130  
 
1.2.2 Research questions 
 
The literature confirms that African States’ emerging data privacy legal reforms are transposing 
EU Directive 95/46/EC in the absence of any grounding definition of the concept privacy or 
motivation to preserve it in relation to processing of personal data but rather to encourage 
economic outsourcing as the primary motivation. In this context, the present study undertakes to 
address the following questions crucial in determining the appropriateness and viability of these 
reforms within and beyond Africa.  
i. Are the forces that propel African data protection/privacy reforms justifies transplanting of the 
Western frameworks for data protection. 
ii. Are the objectives of the Western data protection frameworks adaptable within African 
context and in view of African cultural values? 
iii. How can the reforms strike a balance between globalization in data protection regulations and 
the localization of data protection while abreast with user patterns and challenges posed by 
technological development? 
iv. What is the future of data protection/privacy in Africa? 
 
1.2.3 Research Methods 
1.2.3.1 Empirical Legal Research 
 
Generally data collection involved a range of methods: unstructured interviews, questionnaires 
distributed by way of online survey and documentary reviews. Interviews and questionnaires 
were conducted to gain insights from the stakeholders’ perceptions, values, experiences, beliefs 
and attitudes towards privacy and data protection in Africa. These methods provided an insight 
on the challenges and prospects in reforming and in implementing the laws within their contexts. 
Last but not least was the interview with data protection project manager (for AFAPDP) and 
consultants involved in the drafting of the Tanzania Draft Personal Data Protection Bill. These 
were approached to get a real experience with reform activities. Documentary review assisted 
with in depth understanding of the processes involved in reforms, considerations and 
motivations for these reforms. They were also used to analyze and symmetrize on ground 
understanding and expectations of such reforms with the actual reforms.  
                                                          
129 Greenleaf (n 51), p.79. 
130 Directive 95/46/ EC, Recital 9. 
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To measure the reliability and confirm validity of the data the researcher was mindful of the need 
to have internal validity, diverse reality and reliability.  To ensure internal validity multiple 
stakeholders and methods of data collection were employed. Triangulation was employed for 
internal validity of data. In doing so, documentary review was conducted before the interviews to 
gain insight over the subject matter and specific local perceptions. The review was once again 
after the interviews and collection of questionnaires to verify data. The interview was also 
conducted to different categories. As suggested by Golafshani131 that, ‘Triangulation is typically a 
strategy (test) for improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings.’ This 
method, according to Patton strengthens the study by combining different methods allowing the 
researcher to get multiple insights about a particular reality.132 Constructivism which according to 
Golafshani133allowed the researcher to view knowledge as a socially constructed and its ability to 
change based on circumstances. Constructivism was used to validate diverse realities. 
Nature of this thesis necessitated the researcher to employ constructivism so as to look deeper 
into the subject matter instead of observing surface features of the emerging and existing legal 
systems. This approach has been advised by Johnson134 whenever dealing with diverse aspects of 
legal systems for purposes of reforms. The research dwelled into legal cultures, privacy 
foundations, historical developments and social-technological changes with impact on the data 
protection legal frameworks. An understanding of these aspects was necessary to explain the 
reform trends while keep in mind varied social realities and influences of change. Finally, the data 
collected both in form and context ensured reliability and the consistence use of the documents. 
Data analysis started with the coding of interviews and questionnaires to bring more evocative 
meanings and to identify patterns, consistencies and variations. Based on variety of data and 
methods used and time available, the research used ‘lamper’ coding.135 Data coding was done in 
two cycles. Simultaneous data coding system was employed to detect similar and varying values. 
The first data coding cycle involved raw data from all participants of the interview and 
questionnaires. This was followed by the creation of notes with comments and reflections on the 
data codes. The third step was the segregation, grouping, regrouping and re-linking of data to 
construe meanings, explanations to the data and building theories. This enabled the testing of 
existing theories about privacy in Africa with the generated theories from the interpretation of 
the data collected. This process not only involved deductive approach in seeking answers to the 
research questions and explaining the working theoretical frameworks, it also involved inductive 
approach in search of theories that reputes the research questions and working theoretical 
frameworks. The coding process was performed manually. Analogy was also involved. The 
process of analogy was used in inspecting individual attributes of the legal texts from case studies 
(Senegal and Tanzania) and the blue print (the EU framework for data protection) to determine 
                                                          
131 Golafshani, N., ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’, The Qualitative Report Volume, 
2003, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 597-607 at p. 603. 
132 Patton, M. Q., Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, (3rd ed.), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
2002. 
133 Golafshani (n 137). 
134 Johnson, S. D., ‘Will our research hold up under scrutiny?’, Journal of Industrial Teacher Education, 1995, Vol. 
32 No.3, pp. 3-6. 
135 Lumping is an expedient coding method allowing the researcher to get to the essence of categorizing a 
phenomenon; Saldana, J., The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009. p. 20. 
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how fitting these frameworks are. This was also helpful in developing a thesis on the future of 
data protection in Africa. 
 
1.2.3.2 Comparative Law Approach 
 
Since the research deals with data protection reforms in Africa in view of global trends, a 
comparative study of data protection law was taken. Comparative study, as suggested by David 
and Brierley136 is an essential approach when dealing with harmonization of international law, 
through a glimpse of other legal systems. In doing so, an observer gets ideas for future 
development, warnings of possible difficulties and opportunities. It also allows a look at one’s 
own legal national system and look at it more critically without moving it from first place on the 
agenda.137 This approach was crucial in understanding essential elements in reforming data 
protection in Africa in light of international trends but in consideration of Africa’s unique 
systems and institutions. Legal comparative, as asserted by William Baker138 allows for an 
understanding of the ideological purposes behind the laws and legislations dealt with. It is a 
practical approach in deciding legal transplantation and legal development or reform.  
The comparative analysis involved on one hand two countries, Senegal and Tanzania against 
each other, and on the other EU DPD and three countries namely France, Germany and United 
Kingdom. Within EU, the analysis was limited to some aspects on the explication of the aims 
and principles within the EU Directive. Accuracy and departures in implementation of the EU 
Directive is also discussed in view of providing an understanding of what Kuner refers to as 
minimum and maximum standards (a bandwidth) for data protection enshrined in the DPD by 
EU Member States139 and most likely third countries, in reform process. In this respect, France, 
Germany and United Kingdom were selected as case studies. The decision to use variety of EU 
Member States law and practices was based on the understanding that, despite all Member States 
implementing the same Directive, their laws and practice differs considerably in structure, 
content and approach140 consequently interpretation against the DPD ranges from compliance, 
inconsistence or violation.141 
Senegal represents civil law countries while Tanzania represents common law countries, the two 
dominant legal systems in Africa.142 143 Selection to study Senegal and Tanzania is first based on 
                                                          
136 David, R and Brierley, J.E.C., Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Study of Law, (3rd ed), Stevens & Sons, London, 1985, p. 10. 
137 Wilson, G., ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in W.H Chui, and M. McConville, (eds), Research Methods for Law, 
Edinburg University Press, 2010, pp. 87-103 at p. 87. 
138 Barker, W. B., ‘Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of 
the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, Pennsylvania State Law Review, 2005, Vol. 
109, pp.101-125. 
139 Kuner, C., European Data Protection Law: Corporate Compliance and Regulation (2nd Edition), Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2007, pp. 34-35. 
140 See Kuner (n 139), p. 33; Greenleaf (n 51), p.73. 
141 See Analysis and Impact Study on the Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC in Member States, 2003. 
142  Time, V.M,‘Legal Pluralism and Harmonization of Law: An Examination of the Process of Reception and 
Adoption of Both Civil Law and Common Law in Cameroon and Their Coexistence with Indigenous Laws’, 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Spring 2000, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 19-
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their difference in legal culture. Secondly, Senegal, within the francophone countries, had a very 
active data protection Commissioner, Dr. Mouhamadou144 who was involved in the local and 
international activities towards promotion of privacy and data protection. Senegal has also strong 
civil society organizations such as JUNCTION145 involved in public awareness and pushing the 
government towards enforcement of privacy rights and data protection. On the other hand, 
Tanzania is still working on its draft personal data protection bill.146 Researcher’s familiarity with 
country’s legal system was one of the reasons for its selection, but also is the fact that, the 
researcher had already studied the personal data protection bill and published a report in the 
Privacy Laws & Business International Reports.147 Hence the researcher’s knowledge of the 
country’s legal system especially on privacy and data protection issues influenced the choice as it 
would minimize field research costs that would be involved if another country was to be 
selected. A selection of two different legal systems was to be able to probe how (if so) their 
differences affected the adoption and reforms by transposing a regime with international origin. 
 
1.3 Chapter Overview 
 
The thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 1 is introduction; setting out the research agenda 
of this study. It includes a statement of the problem, research questions and research 
methodology. Chapter 2 is titled Transposition and Practice of the EU Directive on Data Protection. This 
chapter is devoted to the EU data privacy reforms and practices in selected States notably 
Germany, UK and France. It provides an introductory foundation on the discussion of the 
subsequent chapters. Chapter three is titled Privacy in the African Culture and Customary Legal System. 
The chapter illustrates how ‘privacy’ is viewed in Africa. The chapter provides for different 
terminologies used to refer to ‘privacy’ and scholarly discussion on the nature and value of 
privacy in Africa. Within this chapter, the African traditional legal system is also explained.  
Chapter four, ‘Privacy Regulations and Institutions in Africa’, examines the legal structure and systems 
for the enforcement of human rights in Africa.  Chapter five is titled, Data Privacy Reforms in 
Senegal and Tanzania. The chapter focuses on reform processes in the two jurisdictions in Africa 
by looking into the influences that lead to the reform processes, examine elements that 
affect(s/ed) (positively and negatively) the process and how local institutions shaped the nature 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
143 The less dominant legal system was imposed by Portuguese and the Northern of African countries dominated by 
Shari’a law with peculiarities of Arab and Islamic cultures which need a more focused study. See suggestion in 
Makulilo (n 26), p. 473. 
144 See participarion in several local and international workshops some explaining the status of privacy and data 
protection in Senegal and others are offering understanding on the need and nature of privacy and data protection 
law. He is also a member of the Francophone Group of reflection on the establishment of an international 
instrument on protection of personal data and privacy within the AFAPDP, and a member of the editorial team of 
the ECOWAS Supplementary Acts on personal data, electronic transactions and the Directive on Cybercrime. More 
can be seen in the Commission’s Website through; http://www.cdp.sn/ accessed on 22/05/2014.  
145 A Senegalese Association aims at promoting and protecting human rights. JUNCTION in collaboration with 
Privacy International has been a driving force towards privacy and data protection in Senegal.  For more activities in 
this regards visit, www.jonctions.org.  
146 See the press release of 31 March 2014 at the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology Website  
http://www.mst.go.tz/index.php/78-news/94-taarifa-kuhusu-undaaji-wa-sheria-salama-ya-matumizi-ya-mtandao 
accessed 22/05/2014. 
147 Boshe, P., ‘Evaluation of the Data Protection Bill in Tanzania’, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 
2014, No. 127, pp. 25-26. 
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and type of legislation in place and or reform process.  Chapter 6, Conclusions and Future of African 
Data Protection Regimes offers conclusions retorting research questions and filtering major findings 
and reform patterns. The chapter also offers a thesis on the future of the African data protection 
regimes.  
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2. Transposition and Practice of the EU Data Protection Directive 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a holistic survey and discussion on the transposition of the EU Data 
Protection Directive in selected EU countries. The essence of the chapter is the fact that the 
European Union plays a pioneering role in the world in the field of data protection. 
Consequently, understanding adoptability and practicability of the DPD within the mandated 
context is necessary before making an analysis of the same in different contexts.  
The discussion takes the form of parallel comparison between specific provisions and practices 
in different jurisdictions in Europe against the provisions of the DPD. The object is to see how 
the provisions of the DPD have been transposed and interpreted in different contexts and at 
different levels, and how different interpretations and practices affects(ed) the efficacy of the 
transposed DPD provisions and its objectives.  
This discussion focuses on three countries, Germany, France and United Kingdom (UK).  
Germany is selected because the writing of this thesis was done in Germany; hence convenience 
in accessing relevant materials and information on the Country’s data protection framework. 
Moreover, Germany is considered as a country which best demonstrates a variety of approaches 
in transposition of DPD.148 149 France is studied because the subject of the thesis involves 
Senegal as a case study. Senegal was a France colony, and today, France still has a substantial 
influence on Senegal legal and political affairs. In fact, it is France, through the AFAPDP who 
initiated and assisted Senegal in the adoption of the new data protection legal framework in the 
EU style. Moreover, Senegal is among Francophone countries which have recently adopted the 
Francophone Binding Corporate Rules under the guidance and support of France. The UK is 
studied because is an ex-colonial master to Tanzania; Tanzania being the second case study of 
this thesis. The UK is assessed to determine its influence on common law countries in Africa 
such as Tanzania. Accordingly, UK law still applies to its former colonies. For instance, Tanzania 
through the Judicature and Application of Laws Act Cap 358 R.E 2002 applies the common law 
of England, the doctrine of equity and statutes of general application in force in England in 
1922.150 Similarly, case laws decided by English Courts have a high persuasive authority to the 
Courts in Tanzania. The assumption is also made on the fact that, the UK being a common law 
country, she is the closest ‘neighbour’ likely to inspire the approach to which Tanzania (or any 
common law country in Africa) may adopt the reforms. Logically, data protection regimes being 
‘foreign’, a cue from the UK may be taken to reduce a likelihood of failure in the adequacy 
determination. 
This chapter illustrates best (or worst) transposition or practices concerning the objectives of the 
DPD. The survey and discussion take no particular ideological position, rather an objective 
approach is taken, in which case criticisms in law or practice in any data protection regime is 
                                                          
148 Kuner( n 139), p. 13. 
149 Germany being a Federal State has Federal Data Protection Act that applies to processing practice of the Federal 
government and to private actors with a Federal Data Protection Commission to oversee its implementation. 
Furthermore, each state (Länder) has its Data Protection Act with separate DPAs. Germany has also implemented 
specialized regulatory mechanisms such as the adoption of Telemediengesetz of 2007. 
150  Judicature and Application of Laws Act, s.9.  
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made. This stance is crucial in providing proper and evidence-based recommendations to 
countries under privacy law reform on the best shoals to navigate in transposing/implementing 
the DPD or any other legal regimes or codes on data protection. 
It should also be clear that the discussion in this chapter is mainly an overview. The aim is to 
provide a basic understanding of the main instruments on data protection and practice. It is in 
no way an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the overall EU system on data 
protection. The objective is to provide key aspects for consideration in transposing the DPD 
into local legislation as well as the content, context, practices and enforcement frameworks. As 
Kuner suggests, the first step to implementing the DPD is to understand the instrument of law 
and the legal traditions which it springs. This is a foundation to understanding detailed issues of 
local data protection laws.151 However, in light of the breadth of the topic, this chapter deals with 
specific aspects of the DPD, mainly some basic concepts and core rules that define the overall 
mechanism for privacy protection on personal data. Also, the thesis does not deal with sector 
specific data protection instruments to avoid cosmetic treatment on those specific instruments. 
 
2.2 Synopsis and Objectives of the EU Data Protection Directive 
 
As explained in chapter one, the DPD was adopted on 24 October 1995 giving the Members 
States three years for its transposition into domestic law. The DPD is yet the longest and most 
comprehensive instrument on data protection152 with 72 recitals and 34 articles within eight 
chapters; but lacks explanatory memorandum. Therefore the travaux préparatoires to the DPD 
serves a significant role as interpretation reference.153 EU Directive covers both automated and 
manual154 data processing, either structured or in filing state, in public and private sectors for 
identified or identifiable natural person.155 There is, however, an exception to this scope. The 
DPD does not apply when data processing in public sector concerns matters falling outside the 
European Community Law156 or when in private sector the processing involves personal data by 
natural person in the course of purely personal and household activities.157  
The EU Directive sets two main pillars in the protection of personal privacy with regards to the 
processing of personal data. The first pillar provides for substantive law and the second pillar 
provides for a procedural law (enforcement mechanism). The substantive law consists of its 
scope, definition and more important to the protection, the basic data protection principles 
which are more or less the same those within the OECD Guidelines and Convention 108. Also, 
it establishes a framework for trans-border data transfer under Chapter IV (Articles 25 and 26) 
                                                          
151 Kuner( n 139) pp. ix-2. 
152 Bygrave (n 14), p. 53. 
153 Makulilo (n 26), p. 159. 
154  In case of manual processing data must be (or intended to) form part of structured filing system, see Articles 2 
(c), 3 (1) and Recital 15. 
155 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 2 (c), 3 (2) read together with Recitals 12 and 27. 
156  These are activities falling under ‘second pillar’ and ‘third pillar’ involving public security, defence, state security 
and activities of a state in areas of criminal law. 
157 Directive, Article 3 (2). 
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prohibiting the Member States from transferring data to third countries unless such third 
countries ensure ‘adequate level of protection’. 
The DPD came with two main objectives stated in the Recitals. First is the promotion of internal 
market of the EU through harmonization and strengthens the existing regulations to allow free 
flow of personal data between member states.158 Second is to safeguard data subject’s privacy 
right with regards to the processing of data.159 According to Recital 23,160 this was anticipated by 
an adoption of legislation in conformity with the DPD protection standards.161  
The DPD is however not solely tied to the concept privacy as Roos suggests. Its main focus is 
on personal data. This makes its protection to data processing wider beyond those acts 
considered privacy-sensitive in their own right.162 This is evidenced by the fact that the DPD 
contains rules encouraging freedom of expression,163 freedom of information,164 preventing 
discrimination and improving efficiency. Through these provisions, the DPD provides for 
definitions of concepts, rights and obligations and clarifies the scope of the data protection rules 
for processing of personal data, (including a special category of processing), an establishment of 
supervisory authority and rules on trans-border data flow including transnational oversight 
arrangements.165 Basically, the DPD provides a general framework for Member States to 
                                                          
158 See Directive 95/46/EC; Article 1 (2) and Recitals 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11. 
159 See Directive 95/46/EC, Article 1 (1) and Recitals 2, 3, and 10; see also Rechnungshof v Osterreichischer Rundfunk and 
others [2003] ECR I-4989 paras 39-45. 
160 Directive 95/46/EC, it states, ‘Whereas Member States are empowered to ensure the implementation of the 
protection of individuals both by means of a general law on the protection of individuals as regards the processing 
of personal data and by sectorial laws such as those relating, for example, to statistical institutes’. 
161 Directive 95/46/ EC, Recital 9 states, ‘Whereas, given the equivalent protection resulting from the 
approximation of national laws, the Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free movement between 
them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and in particular 
the right to privacy; Whereas Member States will be left a margin for manoeuvre, which may, in the context of 
implementation of the Directive, also be exercised by the business and social partners; whereas Member States will 
therefore be able to specify in their national law the general conditions governing the lawfulness of data processing; 
whereas in doing so the Member States shall strive to improve the protection currently provided by their legislation; 
whereas, within the limits of this margin for manoeuvre and in accordance with Community law, disparities could 
arise in the implementation of the Directive, and this could have an effect on the movement of data within a 
Member State as well as within the Community’.  
162 Roos, A., ‘The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study’, LL.D Thesis, UNISA, 
2003, p. 17. 
163 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 9;  Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971, paras 88-90, where the 
Court held that the provisions of the Directive do  not restrict the exercise of the general  principles of freedom of 
expression or other freedoms and rights which are applicable within European Union and enshrined under article 10 
of the ECHR. Nationals and Courts implementing the Directive are responsible in determining the balance between 
the rights and interests in question; See also explanation offered by Article 29 Working Party on their 
‘Recommendation 1/97 on Data protection law and the Media’, WP 1, 25 February 1997. 
164 Although there is no specific provision within the directive, Article 29 Working Party opined that the directive 
should be read as complementing the right to information, and although there is no hierarchy between the  right to 
data protection and right to freedom of information, the two a complements each other. And accordingly the 
European Commission Regulation provides whenever collision occur (as it can be foreseen in some circumstances) 
balance of interest in two rights is to be found on case to case basis to resolve tension between the two rights. See 
Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2001 on the European Ombudsman Special Report to the European 
Parliament following the draft recommendation on the European Commission in Complaint 713/98/IJH’ , (WP 44, 
May 2001) and EC, Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43 respectively. 
165 Chapter I (Articles 1-4) contains general provisions, definition of concepts, the object and scope of the Directive; 
Chapter II (Articles 5-21) contains rules on processing personal data lawfully. It has principles for criteria for 
legitimate processing (including special category of data processing), data quality, data subject participation, 
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implement into their national laws,166 what Bygrave refer to as ‘comprehensive vision of what 
protection of data privacy should involve with a relatively rigorous set of rules’.167  
 
2.3 Background and Basis for Privacy Protection in France, Germany and UK 
 
In Germany and France, data protection laws came as an inevitable means to regulate 
government misuse of personal data. In Germany, the first data protection law (also the first 
comprehensive data protection law in the world) was enacted in 1970 in the state of Hesse. The 
primary goal of this law was to safeguard the large State-owned databases and provide for 
transparency in the processing of personal data. The Federal Data Protection Law 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) was enacted on 21st January 1977.  However, a huge proclamation to the 
protection of personal data came about in 1983 as a consequence of the adoption of a Census 
Law (Volkszahlungsurteil).Upon this adoption; the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
declared a personal right to information self-determination (Informationelle selbstimmung) when 
enforcing Article 2 para 1 of the Constitution (Das Grundgesetz).168 This was a result of a law suit 
instituted by 34,000 citizens to challenge the government collection of statistical census. Citizens 
feared this may lead to surveillance by government and that the statistical census was an unjust 
invasion of personal privacy. As a result, the Court ruled that the Census Act was partly 
unconstitutional and annulled it. The Court in translating the constitutional right to privacy 
created a personal right to information self-determination. Today, the right to information self-
determination is the central principle underlying data protection in Germany.169 170  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
confidentiality, security and notification to supervisory authority; Chapter III (Articles 22-24) has provisions on 
judicial remedy, liability and sanctions; Chapter IV (Articles 25-26) contain rules on Transborder data flow; Chapter 
V (Article 27) provides for codes of conduct; Chapter VI (Articles 28-29) contain rules of establishing supervisory 
authority by member states and a requirement for setting up a ‘working party’ to look after individual rights with 
regards to processing of their personal data; Chapter VII (Article 31) is on implementation measures by the 
Community; FINAL PROVISIONS (Articles 32-34) on the timeframe and how member states are to comply with 
the Directive. 
166 Raab, C.D and Bennett, C.J., ‘Protecting Privacy across Borders: European Policies and Prospects’, Public 
Administration, 1994, Vol.72, pp.95-112. 
167 Bygrave (n 14), p.59. 
168 However, the Federal Supreme Court had recognized the right to personality since 1954 in the Leserbrief [1954] 
N.J.W. 1404, B.G.H. when enforcing article 1 of the Constitution (GG), and according to Frischzellen-Kosmetik B.G.H. 
1984, 681, 426 this right continues even when the person dies; a dead person has a right to protection of his 
reputation as well. See also on Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1 which opined that the right to privacy 
provided in Germany places it in a middle level between France and UK privacy protection. 
169 Zurawski, N., ‘Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies: Germany Country Reports’ 
http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Germany-Composite-Reports-Final1.pdf accessed 
22/07/2016, p.2; Korff, D (ed)., Comparative study on different approaches to new privacy challenges, in particular 
in the light of technological developments: Case study Germany, 2010; See alsoWolfgang, K., ‘Germany’ in Rule, J.B  
and Greenleaf, G (eds)., Global Privacy Protection: The first Generation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Uk and 
Northampton, MA, US, 2008, pp.80-106. 
170 In the Court order of 24th January 2012 in BVerfG, 1 BvR 1299/05 The Federal Constitution Court emphasizes 
the principle of information self determination to be the ground rule in data protection in Germany. In the case, the 
Court rules sections  111-113 of the Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationgesetz) which allow for the 
collection and storing of data and their usage for automated processing  as violating the right to information self-
determination declaring the provisions as null and void. The English version of the case is available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20120124_1bvr129905en.html. 
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The right to information self-determination carry ‘the idea that citizens hold the right to be 
informed about the uses of their data when collected, used or forwarded by public or private 
bodies and enterprises; and the right to determine (within the boundaries of the applicable law) 
what data they give away………..Although the term “informational self-determination” cannot 
be found in the GG (basic law) and only appears in the 1983 ruling, it has become the guiding 
principle of all data protection law that followed in Germany.’171 Today, the right to privacy is 
explicit in the Federal Constitution (GG) under Article 10 guaranteeing the secrecy of postal and 
(tele) communication against tapping and interception; and article 13 which provides for physical 
privacy against inviolability of dwelling house.172 
The 1977 Federal Data Protection Law was amended on the 23rd of May 2003 when Germany 
transposed the DPD.  Previously, the law was amended in 1990, 1994, 1997 and 2001. However 
major amendments occurred later in 2009.173 The 2009 amendments strengthened the protection 
to personal data against market usage of data lists and employment data. The law also enhanced 
data protection authority powers to enforce the law and requires a controller to provide a report 
for data breaches, which further enhances the security and integrity of personal data. 
Germany being a Federal government with 16 States (Länder) has a Federal Data Protection Law 
and specific States Data Protection Laws with Data Protection Commissioners in each State. The 
Federal Data Protection Law remains to regulate Public Federal authorities, State administrators 
(when a State law lacks specific provision) and private bodies (in the latter case when data 
processing systems and or automated filing system are for commercial or professional use). The 
State Data Protection Laws regulate Public sector within specific States. The States’ Data 
Protection Commissioners also oversees private sectors’ compliance with the Federal Data 
Protection Law within their States. Clarity must be made here, that all the 17 data protection laws 
in Germany do not differ in substance, they all base on the same principles. There could be 
minor differences in interpretation of the principles, but the principles are consistent.174 
This right to information self-determination is the anchor to data protection laws not only in 
Germany but of the world today. From this principle, standards have been set in usage and 
dissemination of personal data while ensuring data security and providing data subjects with the 
right to participate in protection of their data held in private and public institutions. German 
Courts continue to widen the scope of Article 1 (1) and 2 (1) of the Federal Constitution to meet 
current development in technology. A case of 1 BvR 370/07175 is an example where the Federal 
Constitution Court ruled article 2 (1) and 1 (1) of the Federal Constitution includes guarantees to 
                                                          
171 Zurawski ( n 169), p. 3. 
172 According to article 13 (2) GG, home search can only occur upon Judge’s authorization and (articles 13 3-7) 
when there is justifiable suspicion of serious criminal activities/ infringement of a law. Hence search will be granted 
in preservation of public safety and protection of people in the dwelling house. 
173 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], December 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, as amended. 
174 Zurawski (n 169), p. 5. 
175 The English version of the case note BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 vom 27.2.2008, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 267), of 27 February 
2008, is available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20080227_1bvr037007en.html see 
also press release following the judgment, Press Release No. 22/2008 of 27 February 2008, Provisions in the North-
Rhine Westphalia Constitution Protection Act (Verfassungsschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen) on online searches and on the 
reconnaissance of the Internet null and void available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2008/bvg08-
022.html;jsessionid=EC00A2D06207165C62A3D5C96F74110D.2_cid370 both accessed on 01/03/2016. 
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confidentiality and integrity in the information technology systems. For Germany, the Data 
Protection laws, apart from transposing the DPD, they are considered as an extension of the 
Constitutional right to privacy. According to Zurawski, they ‘support claims by citizens and gives 
them a strong tool to challenge infringements and modify acts and new laws that may infringe 
and impact on privacy rights and informational self-determination.’176 
In France, the data protection legislative reforms were triggered by an article in the ‘Le Monde’ 
titled ‘SAFARI haunts French’.177 SAFARI was a government project aimed at interconnecting 
all files with citizens’ data to easily identify them for administration purposes. This article 
revealed government plan which led to a commotion by the public over their privacy and 
security of their personal data. Consequently, the French government was forced to establish a 
Commission to oversee the project and make sure the use of IT does not unreasonably infringe 
the personal privacy or endanger the security of personal data. Four years later, the French 
government enacted the Data Protection and Personal Liberty Law (Loi Informatique et Libertés).178 
This law established the CNIL (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés) as an 
administrative body to oversee the protection of personal data.  
In 2004, France transposed the DPD. The transposition necessitated France to amend the 1978 
law to align with the DPD; although most of its provisions were already in line with the DPD.179 
Nonetheless, on the 20th of October 2004 the law was amended, specifically on regulation and 
the use of cookies.180 The amendment also gave the CNIL more obligations in relation to data 
protection this includes the mandate to promote practices by institutions and bodies of the EU 
and cooperate with other Data Protection Authorities in promoting data protection that is 
consistent across Europe in line with the DPD.181  
Unlike Germany, France had no explicit Constitutional right to privacy, although she recognized 
a tort to privacy since 1858, which received codification in 1970 under the Civil Code. 
Furthermore, France adopted the ECHR since 1974.182 Consequently, in 1995, the Constitutional 
Court implicitly ruled the Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
                                                          
176 Zurawski (n 169), p. 6. 
177 Published in March 1974. 
178 Law No. 78-17 of January 1978. 
179 Nicole Atwill, 2012; available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/france.php accessed on 
02/03/2016. 
180 The law was amended by Act No. 2004-801 of 7 August 2004 and an implementing decree No. 2005-1309. It was 
later  amended by Decree 2007-451 of March 25, 2007 [modifiant le décret 2005-1309 du 20 octobre 2005 pris pour 
l'application de la loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, modifiée par la loi 
2004-801 du 6 août 2004 [Decree 2007-451 amending decree 2005-1309 of October 20, 2005, implementing law 78-
17 on Information Technologies, Data Files and Civil Liberties]. 
181 Other amendment to the Franch DPA includes the 2009 amendment through Law 2009-526 on the 
simplification and clarification of the law and procedures (Loi 2009-526 du 12 mai 2009 de simplification et de clarification 
du droit et d’allègement des procedures); 2010 amendment through Organic Law 2010-704 of June 28, 2010, relating to the 
Economic, Social and Environmental Council (Loi organique 2010-704 du 28 juin 2010 relative au Conseil économique, 
social et environnemental) and in 2011 amendment through Law 2011-334 of March 29, 2011 relating to the Defender 
of Rights (Loi 2011-334 du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur des droits), and through Ordinance 2011-1012 of August 
24, 2011, on Electronic Communications (Ordonnance 2011-1012 du 24 août 2011 relative aux communications 
électroniques). 
182 Official Journal January 3, 1974, published pursuant to Decree No. 74-360, Official Journal May 4, 1974. 
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(Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789) to include respect for privacy.183 This makes 
Germany and France the earliest countries to have comprehensive data protection laws with 
supervisory authorities in Europe. In fact, it is argued that the DPD was inspired by these two 
regimes.184  
The United Kingdom, being a Common Law country and a Monarchy does not have a written 
Constitution. However, the right to privacy had been enforced through the law of confidence 
preventing an unauthorized disclosure of personal information185 as a breach of confidence.186 
The UK has never recognized or enforced privacy as the common law tort of privacy187 rather as 
the right against invasion of private lives and protecting private sphere. According to Taker, the 
development of the right to ‘information (data) privacy in the UK, involves Court interpretation 
of the tort of breach of confidence following the jurisprudence of articles 8 and 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the 
right to privacy.188 This evolution changed the Courts’ approach from ‘the information is confidential’ 
to ‘the information private’.189 The change of approach is mainly attributed to the adoption of the 
Human Rights Act in 2000. In 1998, the UK transposed the DPD which came into force in 
2000. 
 
2.4 Analysis on Transposition of the EU Directive in France, Germany and UK 
 
Transposing the DPD requires a proper understanding of its provisions which Bygrave190 admits 
is no easy task due to the nebulous manner in which many of its provisions are formulated and 
the paucity of authoritative guides on their meaning. It can even be more confusing for those 
unfamiliar with legal traditions from which it springs.191 The DPD was formulated in general 
terms, yet with great details on what domestic data protection laws should provide as a baseline 
protection and which cannot be derogated from. To ensure equivalence in protection, EU 
Member States were to transpose it in the form of a legislation adoption. However, with Recital 
9 giving member states room for manoeuvre, Member States had leeway to define the context of 
their laws and establish enforcement structure to fit their local legal culture; of course, as long as 
the framework erected ‘meets the requirement of clarity and certainty in legal situations. 
                                                          
183 Décision 94–352DC du Conseil Constitutionnel du 18 Janvier 1995, available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1994/94352dc.htm; accessed on 29.02.2016: This decision was confirmed in 1999 in 
Décision 99–416DC du Conseil Constitutionnel du 23 juillet 1999, available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1999/99416/index.htm both accessed on 29/02/2016. 
184 Nicole Atwill, 2012; available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/france.php accessed on 
02/03/2016. 
185 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac & G 25 (1849). 
186  According to Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1WLR 804, the main principles on the law of breach of 
confidence is based on good faith to protect idea which can be valuable and mundane. It does not matter whether 
or not confidential relationship exists. 
187 Wainwright and another v. Home Office, (2003) UKHL 53, (2003) 4 All ER 969.  
188 Keith, T.I., ‘An examination of the commercial and non-commercial appropriation of persona within the United 
Kingdom, with a comparative analysis with common and civil law countries’, LL.M thesis, Durham University, 2011, 
p. 11. 
189 Ibid, p.13. 
190 Bygrave (n 14), p.56. 
191 Kuner (n 139), p. 2. 
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Consequently, as an effect of diversity in legal cultures and structures, perceptions and 
understanding of the right to privacy (or the concept privacy) countries interpreted the DPD’s 
basic content and core rules differently. Regardless of similarities in rules transposed by each 
country, the interpretation process and local foundations of the right to privacy (where data 
protection emerged from) affected the nature and quality of protection offered. Some Member 
States imposes stronger measures while others impose comparatively weaker measures. 
 
2.4.1 Definition of Basic Concepts 
2.4.1.1 Natural and Juristic Persons 
 
The concept ‘person’ has been given different meaning and scope in domestic laws by the 
Member States. While the DPD defines a person as natural person192 with the Article 29 
Working Party clarifying the scope of the provision to cover only living being,193 there are 
countries that extend the meaning of a ‘person’ to cover juristic persons194 and dead persons. 
Kuner explains the variation in the meaning of the concept ‘person’ beyond ‘living being’ by 
arguing that, Article 1 of the DPD read together with Article 2(a) and Recital 24195 allows for 
such extension to suit specific circumstances, and so the definition can safely be construed to 
cover ‘persons’ beyond the natural person.196 He agrees that the DPD intended a person to be a 
natural person but deliberates that it allows a Member States to extend the meaning to fit 
individual circumstances. France and the UK both adopted the definition as spelt in the 
Directive while Germany under Section 2 of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) a person includes 
a natural and juristic person as well as private law associations. 
 
2.4.1.2 Personal Data 
 
Based on the definition of a person, the DPD considers ‘personal data’ to be information 
relating to natural, identified or identifiable person.197 198 Also, ECtHR in Amann v. Switzerland199 
clarified the scope of this provision. The Court specifies personal information to include such 
                                                          
192 EU Directive, Article 1 (1). 
193 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, 20 June 2007, p. 22. 
194 E.g., Denmark. 
195 Directive 95/46/EC; Recital 24, which states ‘Whereas the legislation concerning the protection of legal persons 
with regard to the processing data which concerns them is not affected by this Directive’. 
196 Kuner (n 139), p. 77. 
197 EU Directive, Article 2 (a). 
198 Personal identifiers include personalized numbers such as social security numbers, biometric data such as 
fingerprints, digital photos or iris scans. The Directive 95/46/EC under Recitals 14,15,16, 17 and 26 states It does 
not matter in which form or format the data is. Data identifier can be written, spoken communication, images, 
closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage or sound, in electronic form, on paper or biometric sample. Consequently, 
any data, not personal per se but tied to a person, and which, with further research can reveal identity of a person is, 
for purposes of the directive, personal data. See further elaboration offered in ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, No. 
59320/00, 24 June 2004; ECtHR, Sciacca v. Italy, No. 50774/99, 11 January 2005; ECtHR, Peck v. the United Kingdom, 
No. 44647/98, 28 January 2003; Kopke v. Germany, No. 420/07, 5 October 2010; ECtHR, P.G and J.H v. the United 
Kingdom, No. 44787/98, 25 September 2001. 
199 ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], No. 27798/95, 16 February 2000. 
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personal information originating from professional interaction not only on private interactions.200 
The idea behind the Court’s clarification is to allow an individual to be able to pursue 
development and fulfils one’s personality.201 Consequently, any information relating to a natural 
person whether in a domestic or public sphere is construed as personal data and therefore falls 
within the protection regime established by the DPD.202 The definition took a relative approach 
to what is persona data. 
In this regard, the key to understanding, interpreting and implementing this provision is its 
requirement that any data that is ‘personal, an identifier, or identifiable of natural person’ is 
personal data.203 As long as a link can be established between specific data and a natural person 
(either by decoding/decrypting data) such data becomes personal data; on contrary if a link 
cannot be established between specific data and a natural person then such data is not personal 
data. This, as Kuner suggests, creates a presumption that data are usually personal unless it can 
be clearly shown that it would be impossible to tie data to an indefinable person.204 
The United Kingdom has been considered to have a complex and difficult to understand and 
use, yet very weak data protection regime.205  She has been criticized for undermining data 
protection by narrowing the application of concepts through Court interpretation. About what 
constitutes personal data, UK has, through the Court of Appeal in the Durant Case206 issued a 
ruling narrowing its meaning hence limiting data subjects’ right to access personal information 
held by data controllers. According to the Court ruling, section 7 of the DPA on access of data 
subject to information held,  was never meant to be a ‘key’ to allow access to all documents 
mentioning the data subject’s name or any or all data retrieved by putting the data subject’s name 
into a search engine. Consequently, the Court ruled, to qualify as personal data, information 
must be biographical and must have the concerned data subject as the central focus.  Hence, a 
mere appearance of a person’s name in records/files is not sufficient to make such information 
personal data. And although in 2014 the Court of Appeal in Efifiom Edemii v The Information 
Commissioner and The Financial Services Authority207 clarified that, a name could be personal data as 
long as the name is not so common, the definition still deviates208 from the DPD definition. 
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Nevertheless, the Court considered itself as being faithful to section 7 of the DPA and the 
DPD’s intentions.  As a result of UK divergence, WP 29 issued guidelines on the concept and its 
scope.209Regrettably, the UK still failed to correct her misinterpretation based on the WP 29 
guidelines forcing the European Commission to issue her a formal warning for failure to 
implement the DPD. 
On the other hand, Germany210 and France211 have wider definitions of personal data. In France, 
personal data is any information relating to a natural person who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, by reference to an identification number or one or more factors specific to him. It 
means any data that may lead to an identification of a person is considered personal data. This 
includes a name, photograph, sex, ID numbers such as social security numbers, motor vehicle 
registration numbers, place or date of birth, address (physical or virtual) or biometric data such 
as digital prints or even a person’s voice. It follows, therefore, even anonymized or encrypted 
data, if it can be deciphered and reveals the personal identity, is personal data. 
In Germany, personal data means any information concerning personal or material 
circumstances of an identified or an identifiable person.212 According to Douwe Korff, for 
Germany law to know whether information qualifies as personal data the test is relative. He says, 
‘the question of whether data “can be” linked to a specific individual depends (in German legal 
thinking too) on the knowledge, means and capabilities of the person handling the data. Certain 
data can, therefore, be “personal data” for one person (who can link them to a certain individual) 
but not “personal data” for another person who cannot relate them to the individual.’213 It 
follows then, in the two jurisdictions, to qualify as personal data, information must be in a way 
that it allows an identification of a person, distinguishing him/her from other persons. The same 
forms the EU jurisprudence as decided by the CJEU in the Promusicae case.214 The three scenarios 
are different from the case in UK where mere biographical information is not considered as 
personal data. In the UK personal data is contextual, a personal name can be considered a 
personal data in one context and not so in another.  
UK does not consider IP addresses as personal data. Even in her transposition of the ePrivacy   
Directive 2002/58/EC through Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations of 2003, IP 
addresses are never mentioned.  In France and Germany, up until 2016 only static IP addresses 
constituted personal data. In relation to dynamic IP addresses, the Court of Appeal in France 
had ruled215 that dynamic IP addresses did not constitute personal data. In the Court’s opinion, 
dynamic IP addresses such as those collected on internet based searches do not, even indirectly, 
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allow identification of a physical person. Similar ruling was pronounced in Germany at the 
Federal level and some States. Explaining this position, a District Court in Munich opined that 
dynamic IP addresses lack the attributes for determinability since only the access provider could 
combine an IP address with individual person but not a service provider. And since the laws in 
Germany prohibit access providers from handing over the information identifying individuals, a 
mere dynamic IP address cannot be used to identify a person.216 In contrast, Berlin and Koln 
consider dynamic IP addresses as personal data. The District and Regional Courts in Berlin 
respectively ruled that dynamic IP addresses are personal data.217 Explaining their position, the 
Courts were of the opinion that, as long as the web provider can identify the person by 
combining the IP address and personal information, then both static and dynamic IP addresses 
are persona data. WP 29 came around to clarify the position. In their opinion of June 2007, the 
Working Party said IP addresses are personal data. Later in 2008, the ECJ affirmed the opinion 
of the Working Party in the case of Promusicae by ruling IP addresses as personal data. Of latest is 
the case of Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland,218 where the CJEU ruled that dynamic IP addresses 
constitute personal data. With the coming of the GDPR, IP addresses, both dynamic and static 
are, according to Article 4 read together with Recital 30, personal data. 
2.4.1.3 Filling System 
 
The DPD defines filing systems to include ‘any structured set of personal data which are 
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a 
functional or geographical basis.’219 The UK law considers filling system narrowly compared to 
the DPD. UK law defines a filling system as a set of data which is structured either by reference 
to individuals or by reference criteria relating to individuals, in such a way that specific 
information relating to a particular individual is readily accessible. This narrow meaning has been 
further narrowed by the ruling in the Durant case where the Court clarified that ‘where not 
computerized, [filing system] would need to resemble the efficiency, accessibility and 
sophistication of a computerized system, allowing a data controller ready access to requested 
information.’220 This means, as explained by Jagessar and Sedgwick; 
‘If a person has to ‘leaf through files, possibly at great length and cost[s] to see whether 
it or they contain information relating to the person requesting information... [this 
would] bear no resemblance to a computerized search and therefore would not qualify 
as a ‘relevant filing system.’221 
Although in essence, the Court here was trying to lessen controllers’ burden relating to access 
requests, the implication is the narrowing and divergence in standard in the meaning and scope 
between automated and manual filing systems. The Court went further declaring that it is not 
sufficient to constitute ‘filing system’ only on the basis that the files are structured by identifiers 
such as names or date. The data should be organized in a way that would enable one to isolate 
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particular aspects of the personal information referred to.222 To constitutes a filing system as 
intended under the law, one need not leaf through files to find relevant data.  On the other hand, 
German law differentiates between manual and automated data while France disregards the 
DPD categorization regarding ‘decentralized’ and ‘dispersed’ systems.  
 
2.4.1.5 Consent 
 
Consent under the DPD is a requirement for processing of personal data. Under Article 7(a) of 
the DPD, consent is considered sufficient as long as it is not ambiguous. The UK law, like the 
DPD does not clarify what constitutes a valid consent. Korff223 believes, the law suggests that a 
consent can be sufficiently ‘implied’, it need not be signified. This approach is relatively weaker 
than that of France224 and Germany.225 The BDSG goes further than the DPD by explaining 
what constitutes a valid consent. BDSG states, for consent to be valid, it must be informed and 
given freely by a person concerned. The consent requirement under the BDSG became stricter 
with the 2009 amendments. The amendment obliges data controllers to properly inform data 
subjects of the intended purposes of processing on collection.226 The information that is given to 
a data subject, as explained by Korff, ‘must be very specific227as to enable data subjects to make 
an informed decision as to whether or not to give their consent. In extension to what the DPD 
provides, the BDSG provides for a form of consent, something that the DPD did not stipulate. 
The Law requires consent to be in written form, or in exceptional circumstance, the law accepts 
digital forms or digital signature as signalling consent to contracts concluded online.228 In 
Germany, as in France, data subject’s consent is required for any subsequent processing of 
personal data whereas in UK initial consent is sufficient for subsequent processing of personal 
data. 
The coming of the GDPR has prompted the ICO to reform the status and mode of the consent. 
According to its GDPR Consent Guidelines of March 15, 2017, 229proposes that consent must 
be written or verbal statements acknowledging consent. However, if consent is implied, it should 
be by a clear and affirmative act to which the giver understand that the acts constitute consent to 
a certain obvious purpose. The Guidelines also suggests a possibility of withdrawal of consent 
and expiration of consent after a certain period. 
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2.4.1.4 Data Controller 
 
Different from the DPD, the BDSG and the French law defines ‘data controller’ broadly to refer 
to any person or body collecting, processing, or using personal data on his or her behalf or 
commissioning others to do the same.230 The UK law provides for a definition of a data 
controller as any person who determines the purpose for which and the manner in which any 
personal data are to be processed.231  
 
2.4.1.6 Data Processor 
 
The DPD considers data processor as a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.232 The concept has not 
been defined under the BDSG.  The UK233 and France234 adopt the DPD definition of a data 
processor. However, the UK adds an explanation to it; that, employees are not to be considered 
as processors. 
 
2.4.1.7 Third Party 
 
A third party is any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body other than 
the data subject, the controller, the processor and the person who, under the direct authority of 
the controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data.235 While France does not 
provide for third party, the UK and Germany has adopted the above meaning as stipulated by 
the DPD. In the UK the law uses slightly different phrasing although with the same meaning236 
while in Germany the law restricts the concept to persons carrying processing activities under the 
instruction of the data controller within the EU and the EEA only.  
 
2.4.1.8 Recipient 
 
The DPD considers a recipient as any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body to whom data are disclosed, whether a third party or not. However, the authorities 
which may receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry are not regarded as recipients.237 
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2.4.2 Data Protection Principles and Processing Conditions 
2.4.2.1 Criteria for legitimate processing of ‘ordinary data’ 
 
The French, German and UK laws transposed similar principles for data protection as stipulated 
in the DPD. However, the scope and context in the application (based on judicial interpretation) 
differs.  The extent of protection is also affected by the varied meanings and scope of operating 
terms as discussed in the above sub-section. For instance, in Germany, the primary criterion for 
legitimate processing is a free consent, processing based on law or to fulfil a legal obligation. This 
is also the position proposed under the DPD.238  France, on the other hand,  considers free 
consent as a primary determinant of a legitimate processing activities239 while the two other 
categories, i.e. processing based on law and to fulfil legal obligation are an exception to the 
primary rule.240 A major diversion is made in the UK law. In the UK, the law does not consider 
consent as a requirement for legitimate processing; instead, the law requires the processing to be 
‘fair and lawful’.  
 
2.4.2.2 Criteria for legitimate processing of sensitive data 
 
In the processing of special category of data (popularly known as sensitive data) the DPD under 
Article 8 sets a rule that such data may only be processed with an explicit consent.241  The DPD 
has listed a number of data considered ‘sensitive’242 to which the Members States have adopted 
and some extend the list further. In principle, the DPD requires Member States to prohibit 
processing of sensitive personal data. The PDP further gives States room to allow the processing 
of sensitive personal data as an exception but upon certain conditions. In the processing of 
sensitive data the French law requires an express consent; and an additional requirement is made 
to genetic and biometric data which, apart from an express consent, requires DPA’s 
authorization. In Germany, prior processing authorization or a prior checking of the data by the 
DPA is required before any data considered sensitive can be processed. 
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2.4.2.3 Data Protection Principles 
 
Collection and processing principles The DPD stipulate the needs for data controllers to ensure certain 
conditions are met in order to sufficiently ensure personal data is secured.243 First, the DPD 
stipulates that, ‘data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.’244 It means, collection of personal 
data should be limited and defined by its purpose to process with clarity and specificity. In 
clarifying ‘purpose’ WP245 insists that the purpose of processing must be clear to allow 
determination and quantity of data required. In illustrating this fact, the Working Party stated, 
ambiguous, generic or broad description of purpose such as ‘improving user experience’ or 
‘marketing purposes’ are not sufficient determinants of purpose.246  In enforcing this provision, 
the UK law provides that, ‘data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or 
those purposes.’247 The law has expanded the principle allowing collection of data for multiple 
purposes and processing activities. ICO clarifies this saying, processing for other purposes is not 
prohibited by the law as long as the processing is compatible with the original purposes.248 In 
determining compatibility of purposes, ICO provides that one; 
‘…should bear in mind the purposes for which the information is intended to be used 
by any person to whom it is disclosed….. Because it can be difficult to distinguish clearly 
between purposes that are compatible and those that are not, we focus on whether the 
intended use of the information complies with the Act’s fair processing requirements. It 
would seem odd to conclude that processing personal data breached the Act on the 
basis of incompatibility if the organization was using the information fairly……… If 
you wish to use or disclose personal data for a purpose that was not contemplated at the 
time of collection (and therefore not specified in a privacy notice), you have to consider 
whether this will be fair.’ 
It is safe to interpret that, what ICO is saying is that, as long as processing is fair, further the 
processing is legal under the UK law. The DPD under Article 6 (1) (b) was meant to give 
controllers flexibility to determine a further use of personal data. To come to a proper 
conclusion on compatibility, WP recommends that, the controller to look into the context in 
which data was collected and reasonable expectation of the data subject with regards to further 
processing. Treacy and Bapat249 in clarifying WP opinion believes that the WP emphasizes on 
‘the need to look at the nature of the relationship between the data controller and the data 
subject and the balance of power, which includes not only the information provided to the data 
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subject, but also a consideration of ‘what would be customary and generally expected practice in 
the given (commercial or otherwise) relationship’. Of course, this will also depend on the extent 
of sensitivity of data and processing operation involved. Hence, as the authors’ advice, there is a 
need to take into account positive and negative effects of proposed further processing activities 
and potential privacy invading effects of such actions to data subjects.250  
The WP further recommends the implementation of additional safeguards such as data 
encryption, aggregation, PETs in any further processing as a remedial tool to ensure 
compatibility. The fairness principle by ICO as a warranty to further processes seems to be short 
of the DPD data compatibility exception. According to ICO, fairness means being transparent to 
individuals about how their information will be used.251 It further elaborates that ‘assessing 
whether the information is being processed fairly depends partly on how it was obtained. In 
particular, if anyone is deceived or misled when the information is obtained, then this is unlikely 
to be fair……The Data Protection Act says that information should be treated as being obtained 
fairly if it is provided by a person who is legally authorized, or required, to provide it’. In effect, 
personal data are always to be treated as being obtained fairly if they were received from a person 
who was authorized by law as long as the rules regarding information to data subjects are 
complied with.252 
In Germany, this principle is, in addition to what is stipulated under the DPD, requires that data 
must be collected directly from the data subject253 and must be kept in minimal. According to 
Knorff, in Germany, purpose limitation is the very heart of the Germany Law.254  This is the idea 
behind the Germany’s ‘data reduction and data economy’ rule which has been enshrined in the 
law.255 This is the reason the German DPAs issued several press releases in 2015 to object CoE 
proposals to weaken the purpose limitation principle in the GDPR by making it legitimate for 
the same controller to process personal data for ‘incompatible’ purposes as long as the 
processing is for legitimate interest of the controller or a third party.256  
The rule as applied in German requires that collection of personal data must be as minimal as 
possible for the intended purpose. To enforce the aspect of ‘purpose specification’, the rule 
requires, as explained by Knorff, organization and structuring of tools for data processing to 
ensure economy of data in the processing activities. Inevitably, this enforces structural 
requirements for processing systems, which as per section 3 (a) also includes data anonymization 
or pseudonymization whenever possible. 257 258  
Article 6(1) (c) of the DPD also supports the idea of ‘data minimization’ stating that data must 
be ‘relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or 
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further processed.’ The idea is to restrict data collection to such data as directly relevant with 
reference to specific processing purposes. 
In France, Article 6(3) provides for a similar principle as the one provided under the DPD. 
Accordingly, for further processing and the question regarding compatibility of data, the CNIL 
controls this through the process notifications by data controllers.259 
The above principle also enforces the obligation not to retain personal data longer than 
necessary for the purposes for which it was collected. Under the DPD the principle is termed as 
the data retention principle which requires retention of data for so long as is necessary for the 
purpose for which they were collected. This principle had been further enhanced in 2006 by the 
adoption of the European Data Retention Directive in 2006.260 
One of the major aspects of data protection regulations is the maintenance of quality, reliability 
and integrity of personal data. Article 6(1) (d) of the DPD enforces the above principle by 
enacting data quality principle. This principle insists on the relevance, accuracy and completeness 
of data for the purpose.261 In essence, this principle obliges data controllers to ensure data is kept 
accurate an up to date.  
Transparency and accountability A controller has obligations to keep data subject informed on the 
use of their data and to ensure compliance with their processing activities with the law. The 
DPD Articles 10, 11 and 12 advocates for transparency. They require data subjects to be 
informed of the processing activities relating to their data, to ensure transparency and allow data 
subjects exercise their rights to access.  As expressed by AWP,262 accountability ensures 
controllers are keen with their obligations. This includes putting in place measures to guarantee 
compliance with data protection rules in a context of processing operations and documenting 
processing activities as a proof and to demonstrate measures taken in adherence to the law. 
Transparency involves the right of data subject to access information about his data and involved 
processing activities. Furthermore, access rights are considered to have dual nature, first is the 
right to access one’s data and second the right to request for amendment, block or deletion of 
the data. This aspect has been clarified in College van Burgermeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v. 
M.E.E. Rijkeboer.263 
In the UK, the law requires that information on processing activities should be provided or 
made readily available in so far as practicable. This, as clarified by ICO means, ‘data controllers 
must be transparent about how they intend to use the data, and give individuals appropriate 
privacy notices when collecting their personal data [and] handle people’s personal data only in 
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ways they would reasonably expect’.264 However, on the other side of the coin, data subjects’ 
right to access has been hugely limited by the decision in the Durant case. By narrowing the 
meaning of personal data and filling system, data subjects’ access right has also been affected. 
This was the Court’s holding that a determination of whether or not data is personal data, 
consideration should be made as to ‘whether or not the data is significantly biographical; that is, 
where the data conveys information beyond a person’s mere involvement in particular 
occurrence’.265  The Court also directed that, where the focus of the data is not on the specific 
person, a mere mentioning of a person’s name in a document or file does not necessarily affect 
the data subject’s privacy to confer the subject access right.266 This interpretation, according to 
Rempell,267 is inconsistent with the spirit of the DPD. He argues that the DPD’s definition of 
personal data is not to be subjected to any limiting interpretations. Although the wording in the 
UK’s DPA are consistent with the wording in the DPD regarding what is personal data, the 
Court of Appeal in the Durant case erred itself in interpretation of the concept. In effect, under 
the UK law, mere appearance of personal biographical details in a file do may not qualify it as a 
personal data to warrant subject’s right to access and other related rights. 
In France, despite the fact that the right to information forms the CNIL doctrine, the law does 
not have provisions requiring data controllers to inform data subjects of the processing activities 
when the respective data was not collected directly from the data subject.268 This goes contrary to 
the spirit of the DPD. The DPD requires data subjects to be informed of the data collected from 
other sources (if they are not already aware of the collection) for purposes of fairness. Again, 
French law proves to be inconsistent with the DPD in this aspect, unlike the UK law which is 
keen and emphatically on the information to data subjects. However, with regards to subjects’ 
access right, once data subject requests access to data, a data controller is obliged to respond to 
the request within two months. Consequently, a data subject can, under Article 40 of the French 
law request for deletion, rectification, block or updating of the data.  
In German BDSG, the right to access to personal data extends to non-structured files. Section 
19 of the BDSG requires the data controller to provide, upon request, to data subject with access 
to any data related to them, including information on the source of data, recipients of the data 
and purposes for processing and storage of the data. In fact, Section 33 obliges data controllers 
to inform subjects of the collection of data on the first instance. The information which data 
subject must be provided with must include a type of data and the purpose for the collection, 
nature of processing activities and identity of the controllers and recipients, (if any). This 
obligation is in line with article 10 of the DPD.  
Data security and confidentiality Data security and confidentiality are provided for under Articles 16 
and 17 of the DPD. A controller and any person under controllers’ instruction must process data 
only as per controllers’ instructions.269 In enforcing this requirement, the controller is to ensure 
                                                          
264 UK ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/principle-1-fair-and-lawful/accessed 
23/07/2016. 
265 Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, para 35, Para 28. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Rempell (n 29), p. 825. 
268 Loi du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, Article 11 (1) (c); Korff(n 259), p.20. 
269 If the controller involves agents or third parties, the DPD obliges the draw of contract on legal relation between 
the controller and processor/agent with access to personal data under the authority of the controller. As such, all 
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that personal data is sufficiently secured. The DPD suggests the use of both technical and 
organizational safe guards.  To comply with the provisions, the UK law requires data controllers 
to take ‘appropriate technical and organizational measure’ in light of the technological 
development. The law makes reference to security against ‘unauthorized or unlawful processing 
or accidental loss. The similar provision is provided under the French law where controllers are 
required to take all necessary precautions with regard to the nature of the data and the risks of 
processing  to prevent such data from being altered, damaged and against unauthorized access by 
third parties.270 On the other hand, German BDSG goes beyond the above security 
requirements. The BDSG does not only require the provision of the technical and organization 
safeguards; it explicitly refers to the use of encryption and PETs to counter technological 
development that may have an adverse effect on data security. 
The three jurisdictions took a risk-based approach in implementing the DPD requirement on 
security and confidentiality of personal data. The enforcing authorities in the three jurisdictions 
have gone an extra mile by publishing guidance advocating for the use of encryption as means to 
enforce confidentiality especially on personal data processed on the cloud.271 
Furthermore, with regards to sensitive,272 professional and official confidential data, the law in 
Germany, under Section 42a requires data controllers to notify data subjects and the DPA of any 
data breach including unauthorized access or unlawful processing of personal data when such 
breach poses a significant harm273 to the rights and protected interests of data subject.274 The law 
imposes a duty to the controller to eliminate the breach and secures the data. In France, a similar 
requirement is imposed on registered electronic communications service providers. The 
providers are duty bound to notify the DPA and the data subject275, within twenty-four hours of 
data breaches regardless of their gravity.276 The UK law has no corresponding obligation under 
the law; however, in practice, the ICO imposes an obligation to DPA to report serious breaches. 
According to ICO, cases that qualify to report include those with potential harm to individual 
rights and the sensitivity of compromised data. 
Trans-border data transfer The DPD establishes a regime for international data flow. The regime 
restricts the flow of information to third countries without an adequate framework for data 
protection.277 The DPD does not have a precise measure to determine ‘adequacy’ of data 
protection frameworks but offers no guideline to such determination. To have an adequate data 
protection framework, a country must have both the substantive measures (data protection 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
persons engaged by the controller. The controller is further made liable to ensure compliance to data protection 
rules to all data processed by processors or agents under instruction. 
270 Loi du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, Article 34. 
271 See the FFC, Report on the legal obligations for encryption of personal data in Europe and Asia, 2013. 
272 BDSG, Section 3 (9). 
273 Although the law has not provided the meaning of ‘significant harm’ it is assumed that the determination is left 
to the controllers. 
274 For cases involving a large number of data subjects, the law, to reduce a burden to the controller, requires that 
the breach notification to be published by way of advertisement in at least half a page in at least two national daily 
newspapers or a means with similar exposure (Section 42a). 
275 Notification to data subject is conditioned upon the effect of the breach to subject’s privacy rights. 
276 Section 34 and Decree 2012-436 of 30.03.2012. 
277 EU Directive, Article 25. 
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principles) and procedural mechanism for enforcement. In short, a country should have guiding 
legal principles, an independent supervisory authority and a good level of compliance. 
When a country lacks an adequacy protection, EU Member States are prohibited from 
transferring personal data unless the transfer is made under Article 26 of the DPD. Article 26 
permits transfer to third countries without an adequate level of protection as an exception to the 
general prohibition. This can happen if the EU Member State and the third country have 
executed a Standard Contractual Clause subject to EC approval; in case data is to be sent to an 
affiliation in a third country, parties can implement Binding Corporate Rules for data transfer; or 
an individual data subject can consent to the transfer. 
In this aspect, German BDSG took a different approach as that proposed in the DPD. Germany 
looks at the ‘adequacy’ or protection offered by the recipient of data in the third country and not 
the ‘adequacy’ or protection offered by laws and regulation in the third country. An illustrative 
example is a decision taken by the Düsseldorfer Kreis278 (‘Dusseldorf Circle’) cautioning German 
DPA’s from accepting a blanket ‘adequacy’ decision made about the Safe Harbour, urging them 
to consider each data importer independently of SH determination of an adequate protection by 
the European Commission. This decision required German data exporters to carry out minimum 
checks to ensure that data importers are not only SH certified but also adhere to data protection 
principles therein.279 On the other hand, UK and France adopted the framework suggested by 
the DPD. The UK goes further by declaring an acceptance of any declaration made by the CoE 
on third parties regarding provision of adequate level of protection while France has, in 2015 
announced to grant single authorization to a group of companies that adopts BCRs.280 However, 
following the Schrems decision in 2015 on the validity of SH, CNIL ordered data controllers to 
stop all data transfer to the US by the end of January 2016 or invoke the use of Modal clauses or 
BCRs on a transfer of personal data to the US. 
 
2.4.3 Enforcement Mechanism and Data Protection Authorities 
2.4.3.1 Enforcement 
 
As part of a safeguard measure, the DPD under Article 19 requires countries to create a system 
of notification of all wholly or partly automated processing. To address this aspect, the French 
law took a different approach; instead of imposing the requirement to notify, it requires data 
controllers to register with the DPA and obtain authorization especially on processing activities 
by a public body and when processing involves sensitive data. The law requires only a 
                                                          
278 Is a working group of all German supervisory authorities (DPAs) considered by its members as equivalent to 
Article 29 Working Party but publishes its opinions in a form of ‘resolutions’ which reflects the position of 
supervisory authorities.   
279 The decision was reached when Safe Harbour was still regarded as providing adequate level of protection before 
it was invalidated by the ECJ in 2015. In this decision which was reached on 28/29 April 2010, the Düsseldorfer Kreis 
resolute to sanction any data exporter who fails to carry out measures to ensure ‘adequacy protection’ by the US 
based data importer. see Schmidl, M and Krone, D., ‘Germany DPAs Decide EU-U.S. Safe Harbor May Not Be 
Relied Upon Exclusively’, http://www.bnai.com/GermanyDpas/default.aspx cited in Makulilo (n 26), p. 209. 
280 See CoE Report analysis of transposition, p. 32; According to the announcement by the CNIL, once a company 
adopts BCRs it will not need any subsequent authorisations for transfers to third countries. 
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notification of the period for data retention. Similar to France, the UK law requires registration 
of all data processing activities. Unlike France, in the UK data controllers do not need prior 
authorization to process personal data neither are they required to notify the DPA on the data 
retention period. Germany has diverged from the requirement of notification281 and registration; 
the law imposes stricter requirement but with the same objective. It requires every data controller 
to appoint a data protection officer.282 The data protection officers oversee compliance with the 
data protection law. In a case of failure to appoint data protection officer, the data controller is 
obliged to seek DPA authorization with every processing activity. Notification requirement, as in 
France is also required on data retention period. 
 
2.4.3.2 Data Protection Authority 
 
The DPD requires any data protection framework to establish an independent supervisory 
authority.283 The independence referred to by the DPD is the functional independence. To 
achieve this independence, scholars argue that the authority must avoid unnecessary dependence 
on other bodies, which may undermine its functional independence or create such an 
assumption;284 as elaborated in European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany,285 that any direct 
or indirect influence to the authority functionality undermines the requirement of Article 28 (1) 
of the DPD. No body must have either actual or perceived functional influence over the 
authority. 
The Court elaborated that, the ultimate goal of Article 28 is to allow these authorities to act 
objectively and impartially hence guarantee effectiveness and reliability in enforcing national laws 
in protection of individual rights in the processing of personal data. To ensure its independence, 
Article 28 (2) requires the authority to equip itself with personnel who possess legal and technical 
expertise to enable the discharge of its functions freely. 
The laws in the UK, France and Germany provides for the establishment of such an 
independent authority. However, in practice, these authorities leave a lot to be desired. For 
instance, the ICO, UK’s data protection authority has limited enforcement powers. ICO is more 
of a pragmatic body than punitive. It may pronounce a controller as being in breach of the law 
but cannot issue any fine.  
Before January 2016, Germany had ten of the sixteen Länder as part of the Ministry of interior 
and the Regional Government as sub ordinate authorities.286This means the Regional 
Government was under the instruction of the respective Ministry. The remaining six Länder the 
supervisory authorities oversee the processing activities, but the determination of lawfulness and 
                                                          
281 Notification is only required in processing activities for in anonymized and non-anonymized commercial 
transfers and for marketing and opinion researches. 
282 BDSG, Section 4 (f) (1). 
283 EU Directive, Article 28. 
284 Makulilo (n 26), p. 189; Bygrave (n 60), p. 70. 
285 ECJ C-518/07, Paras 18-25. 
286 These included Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rhineland-
Palatinate Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. [see article 35 BDGS] 
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appropriateness of such processes was reserved for the Ministry.287 As a result of this interaction 
between the Ministry and the Länder authorities, the ECJ288 ruled the Länder as not having 
sufficient independence based on the fact that they are part of the Regional Administration and 
subject to State scrutiny. In its defense, Germany elaborated that, the State scrutiny over the 
Länder is simply a routine administration’s internal monitoring mechanism which has no effect 
on the independent functionality of the authorities. In rejecting this argument, the ECJ stated 
that the ‘requirement of independence precludes any external influence, whether direct or 
indirect which could call into question the performance of the DPAs of their tasks and 
competences descending from the Directive’. However, the Germany Parliament (der Deutsche 
Bundestag) decided to strengthen the independence of both the Federal and States’ (Länder) Data 
Protection Authorities. The DPAs are, as of January 2016 independent of the Ministry of interior 
and the Regional Government which existed since 1978 and continued after the adoption of the 
DPD. The presently, the Federal DPA reports to the Parliament, and his/her decision is subject 
to judicial review.289 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In the context of the DPD, Korff advised on uniformity in transposition of definitions as the 
key to proper and sufficient implementation. He suggested that even a minor change in the 
wording of definition can have significant effects in the application/applicability of rules. He 
illustrated the situation, ‘As a result of seeming minor additions or variations, some data will be 
regarded as ‘personal’ in some countries but not in others; some processing systems will be 
regarded as (sufficiently structured) ‘filling systems’ to fall within the law in one country, but as 
insufficiently structured or easily searchable and thus outside the law in another’. This situation 
reflects what has been shown in the discussion above, for instance, in relation to the UK 
definition of the filing system and personal data as compared to the DPD, France and Germany. 
Perhaps the hard truth is explained by Legrand that a total harmonization is impossible because, 
one, the meaning of law in different cultures can never be the same, and two, the meaning 
cannot survive the journey (in case of transposing the law). The meaning of a legal rule is thus 
contextual but more importantly a function of application of the rule by its interpreter, of the 
concretization or instantiation in the events the rule is meant to govern. In elaborating this 
position, He posits:-  
‘This ascription of meaning is predisposed by the way the interpreter understands the 
context within which the rule arises and by the manner in which she frames her 
questions, this process being largely determined by who and where the interpreter is and, 
therefore, to an extent at least, by what she, in advance, wants and expects (unwittingly?) 
                                                          
287 These include the Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westfalia. 
288 European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany; ECJ C-518/07. 
289 Information published online on 29.12.2017 with title ‚Die Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die 
Informationsfreiheit wird ab 01.01.2016 eigenständige oberste Bundesbehörde und gibt einen Ausblick über die 2016 anstehenden 
Aufgaben‘,  available at 
https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Infothek/Pressemitteilungen/2015/27_Update%20BfDI%202.0%20-
%20Ausblick%202016.html Accessed on29.03.2017 
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the answers to be. Hence, the meaning of the rule is a function of the interpreter’s 
epistemological assumptions which are themselves historically and culturally 
conditioned. These prejudices are actively forged, for example, through the schooling 
process in which law students are immersed and through which they become impressed 
with the values, beliefs, dispositions, justifications, and the practical consciousness that 
allows them to consolidate a cultural code, to crystallise their identities, and to become 
professionally socialised. Inevitably, therefore, a significant part of the very real 
emotional and intellectual investment that presides over the formulation of the meaning 
of a rule lies beneath awareness, because the act of interpretation is embedded, in a way 
that the interpreter is often unable to appreciate empirically, in a language, in a morality, 
and in a tradition, in sum, in a whole cultural ambience that guides the experience of a 
concept —what Hans-Georg Gadamer would refer to as a “pre-understanding” 
(“Vorverständnis”)’. 
In the present context, Germany is considered to have the strictest framework for data 
protection standards. On the 24th February 2015, Germany adopted a new Consumer Protection 
law which enables consumer protection associations to file cases on behalf of data subjects for 
violation of their rights. More specifically, the consumer organization may file cases against data 
controllers who use personal data for advertising and marketing, in opinion researches or use of 
geographical data to track or trace data subjects for promotion purposes. Perhaps this is 
attributed to Germany history and the constitutional foundations of the right to privacy. 
Country’s history, judicial and political will have led to varied doctrines affecting the nature, aims 
and objectives of data protection laws and their judicial interpretation as illustrated in the above 
discussion. Nevertheless, the importance of, at least, principles of data protection has an 
importance in achieving the equivalence in protection and objective enforcement across 
jurisdictions. 
France law provides for a similar context as provide by the DPD and in few instances stricter 
protection. Moreover, apart from her being a member of the EU, France is also part of the 
Association of French-speaking Data Protection Authorities (AFAPDP) drafting, adopting and 
enforcing different conventions and data protection regulations. Thus, France enforces not only 
EU regulations but also conventions, agreements, and regulations adopted under the AFAPDP. 
For this reason, France is likely to have one of the technological and user pattern responsive 
frameworks for data protection in Europe. 
The United Kingdom has to a larger extent transposed similar contents as the DPD. 
Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of the law has undermined the level of protection offered 
to personal privacy and data security. Consequently, regardless of the similarity in texts, UK data 
protection framework provides for a lesser protection as compared to Germany and France. 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
3. Privacy in the African Culture and the African Customary Legal System 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Africa is a Continent of fifty-four States and six dependent territories. The Continent is known 
for political instability, civil wars, poverty, unstable and feeble corrupt legal systems. Although 
Jane Williams argues, that governance situation has been improving in the last decade.290 This 
chapter examines the concept ‘privacy’ and its meaning in Africa. Moreover, this chapter 
discusses privacy perceptions and how they determine development and functionality of privacy 
and data protection in Africa. In this way, it looks at the weaknesses, strengths and opportunities 
these perceptions have in responding to changes and global dynamics with regards to data 
protection. In understanding contextual framework, the chapter also examines related 
terminologies used with privacy.   
The chapter is the foundation for the analysis of the case studies in chapter five. It demonstrates 
that the need to understand contextual knowledge of certain framework and cultures is inevitable 
in developing or changing such frameworks. This is especially with privacy regimes as they 
regulate social behaviors which are highly influenced by specific culture. In which case, David 
Nelken argues, creating privacy and data protection frameworks ‘needs cautious designing in 
reflecting social values of a particular culture since such values affect privacy perceptions, 
meaning and they are the foundations of the jurisdictions creating and supporting privacy 
regimes. Consequently, a privacy framework needs to conform to the cultural context in which it 
is located for it to be effective.291  
Culture defines law, its purpose, where and how it is to be found.292 Arguably, even when the 
rule is imported, its application is contextual. Its effectiveness depends on the ability of the 
interpreter to link the rule with cultural foundations and employ what Krygier refers to as a 
positive sanctions and persuasions to ensure compliance.293 Hence, by decoding African 
perceptions and understanding of the concept privacy, and its regulation, the chapter lays a 
foundation to determine acceptability and workability of imported regimes (or any other local 
regimes) in Africa. In doing so, it allows identifying strength, weaknesses and flaws within those 
regimes and the overall reform process against the core objective of privacy and data protection 
laws.  
 
3.2 Africa: Political, Socio-Economic and Technological Context 
 
Africa is the second largest continent after Asia, with 22.4% of global mass (30.2 million square 
kilometers). It has a population of over one billion people with an average growth of a 
                                                          
290 Williams.  J., ‘UPDATE: Sources of Online Legal Informatics for African Countries’, Published May/April 2015 
on http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/African_Law1.htm accessed on 03/07/2015. 
291 Nelken, D., ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’ in Nelken, D and Feest, J (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures, 
Hart Publishing, USA, 2001, pp. 25-26. 
292 Ibid. 
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Rule of Law’, International Journal of Sociology 1996-1997, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.17-47. 
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population of approximately 2.5 million per annum. (World Bank Report). Africa is made of 54 
independent States. Politically, the African States have presidential systems of government; with 
a President as the head of State and head of government. Most States practice multi-party 
political system.294 This has not always been the case. When African States got their 
independence around 1960s-1970s, they inherited Constitutions which defined a type of 
government and political powers. These Constitutions were regarded as imposed to the African 
States by the departing colonial masters. These Constitutional contained principles considered 
‘alien’ to Africans. The Constitutions introduced separation of powers, the rule of law, 
parliamentary supremacy, and judicial independence; bills of right and introduction of the multi-
party political system. 
Independent Constitutions did not last long as the emerging States amended or replaced them 
with new Constitutions legitimizing authoritarian rule with either military governments or single-
party regimes. This was done under the guise of self-discovery and socialist ideology, and on a 
political argument that the independent Constitutions were neo-colonial devices designed to 
ensure ‘the preservation of imperial interests’ in the newly emergent state. 295 Basically, the new 
governments watered down the essence of constitutionalism and democratic governance.296 The 
new Constitutions were modelled as Constitutions of power, not liberty or limitation; 
empowering African ruling elites with outmost ruling power. Prempeh describes the situation as 
a creation of ‘the notion of African managers to newly sovereign…could or should be restrained 
constitutionally in their exercise of power whereas previous European colonialists had not been 
was deemed a contemptuous insult…the result was the rise of Africa’s imperial presidents’.297 
The end of the 1960s, as a result, witnessed derogation of democracy, gross violation of human 
rights with impunity across the Continent. The ruling parties which had become intolerant of 
opposition politics stifled democracy and sacrificed constitutionalism on the altar of political 
greed.298 This resulted in civil wars; coup d’etats with military overthrew governments to rectify 
socio-economic and political messes by these governments. Unfortunately, the military regime 
fell into the same faults as civilian administration.299 This, together with the collapse of the USSR 
as a super power after the cold war, rendered African economy stagnant and African States had 
to surrender themselves to international donor communities (World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund e.tc.) in efforts to rescue the devastated economy. 
To access economic reliefs, African states had (as a condition from donor organizations) to go 
through ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs). SAPs required African states to liberate 
their political systems by introducing multi-party political systems, democratic elections, 
adherence to bills of rights and good governance; most of the features of the Independence 
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Constitutions. This marked the third phase in the constitutional making in Africa. The states 
adopted or amended their Constitutions to incorporate liberal constitutional principles. This 
explains the revival in constitutionalism in the continent in the last two decades.  
Today, single-party parliaments, military juntas and presidents-for-life no longer dominate the 
political map of the Continent as they did at the end of the 1980s.300 Few countries are moving 
into the fourth phase of constitutional making, strengthening liberal constitutional principles, 
imposing limits to executive powers, grant the judiciary independence and parliamentary 
supremacy and guarantee important civil and political liberties. The new wave prompt scholars 
such as Gyima-Boadi to refer to the situation as the ‘rebirth of African liberalism’.301 
Social-economic Africa is the least developed Continent with majority of its people living below 
poverty line, high prevalence of diseases and malnutrition. It has comparably weak physical and 
knowledge infrastructure, poor telecommunications and transport facilities.302 Yet, in terms of 
natural resources, it is one of the richest, with 50% of the world’s gold, most of the world’s 
diamond and chromium and 90% of the world’s cobalt (Williams 2009). However, Africa 
accounts for less than 2% of the global trade.303  
Africa’s economy is still regarded as agrarian (pre-industrial) with little export. Agriculture which 
forms the largest sector of its economy faces challenges for lack of technology, viable industries, 
draught conditions, capital and researches;304 misguided economic policies, corruption and 
uncaring (neglecting governments). For the same reasons, the mineral sector and tourism are yet 
to be fully utilized despite wealth in these areas. Furthermore, fifteen nations are landlocked, 
with no direct connection with global market; as such, their participation in the global economy 
relies on international cooperation with neighboring States with ports and shipping services. As a 
result, ‘there is only handful of African countries with GNP above $1000,305 with just as many 
countries reporting GNP below $200.306 However, it was projected that growth in Africa’s 
economy would occur in 2014. The boost is a result of global economy and improvements in 
regional business environment, but a bigger role is played by increased domestic demand.307  
Although there is arguable growth in GDP, this does not reflect the real living standard of an 
African. Research conducted by Boston Consulting group (BCG) and the Tony Blair African 
Initiatives concluded that GDP is not a perfect measure for living standards in Africa. Levels of 
well-being are out of whack with its GDP. Hence a mere GDP growth does not translate into a 
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well-being of an African.308 Ignoring any statistics, Africa is still categorized as less developed 
with slow economic growth for lack of investment capital, researches and high debt burdens.  
Technology Africa has experienced tremendous growth and ICT diffusion, innovation and 
penetration of technological devices in the last two decades.309 More use of technology is 
embarked and encouraged as a strategy to deal with socio-economic challenges facing Africa. 
Technology is also used as means to cease opportunities that may benefit Africa. This is the 
reason for Africa-wide policy changes in the 1990s.  The changes were instilled by development 
agencies including the Pan African Development Information System (PADIS) and international 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and UNESCO. African States were urged to adopt 
comprehensive national ICT policies as a strategy towards socio-economic development. 
Another instrumental motivation was the Maitland report of 1985 which warned of the missing 
link between telecommunications and development.310 This resulted in a major ICT sector 
reforms, with adoption of an ICT policies, privatization and or liberalization of incumbent 
telecommunication companies in most of the African States.311 
This gave rise of trade competition, increased innovation and growth of technology and hence 
evolution in the ICTs. This, however, does not imply that technology in Africa came in the 
1990’s. Mainframe computers were introduced in Africa in the 1960’s. This was followed by mini 
computers in the 1980’s. The mini computers came as part of global initiatives urging countries 
to contribute to central data banks so as to have access to cooperative information resources.312 
This is yet another reason which necessitated formulation of ICT policies in the 1990’s. The 
acquisition, training, usage of computer database in both public and private sector increased 
massively, as a result adoption of ICT policies and regulation became necessary. 
ICT is now used in Africa to accelerate economy, poverty reduction as well as improving 
governance and administration, and training in the education sector. Technology has, to a large 
extent enabled Africa to tap into advantages of technology in business and investment at the 
local and international level. Unfortunately, despite the growth in ICTs, overall sector 
performance is low compared to the global average. The only area that Africa has high growth is 
in the area of cellular penetration. Africa has performed well compared to the rest of the 
world.313 The future of technology is also promising as investors worldwide view Africa as the 
future because African population is considered readily to engage with new technological-based 
tools to improve their life standards. 
Africa is increasingly becoming a key player in acquiring, generating and applying technological 
knowledge to development challenges. It is also the fastest growing in mobile technologies 
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compared to the rest of the world. For instance, by 2012 there were 54 million Facebook users in 
Africa. Although, as Borena et al, argue, regulation and managing of the use of ICTs does not 
correspond to its innovation and development nor does it corresponds to monitoring and 
control the operation and usage of SNS. Despite the growth in usage, Africa is entirely 
dependent on imports of technology, innovations and platforms (SNS) from developed 
countries. There is also limited knowledge on the risks, effects and loopholes for abuse of 
privacy, cyber and related crimes that comes with the use of technology and the internet. As a 
result, there are growing incidences of misuse of technology, unauthorized sharing of 
confidential information, breaches of security and incorrect profiling.314   
 
3.2 Conceptualizing Privacy 
 
The concept privacy is hard to define (or even understand) with precision. The difficulty in 
having a precise definition is based on the fact that the concept is said to be elusive, transitory315 
and contextual;316 it also means different thing to different people;317 it is a concept which ‘has [a] 
protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers.318 Its meaning may vary and can be determined 
based on individual interaction with the society, culture and technology. Its character is also a 
question of debate; whether privacy is a state/condition, a claim or a right.319 Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand and describe the interests that privacy is meant to protect; at least for 
jurisprudential reasons, in bringing legal certainty when the right to privacy is legislated and 
implemented. This can be done by identifying its scope, interests it protects and proper 
mechanisms for its regulation and implementation. 
In Africa, the concept has been borrowed from Western jurisdictions where it is believed to have 
originated. Unfortunately, the borrowing came blindly without contextualizing it within the local 
settings. The African scholars also avoid the task of conceptualizing privacy; instead, they use the 
concept without any clarification on its applicability or propriety in the African context.320 At this 
point, understanding privacy value is necessary for articulating, developing and applying its 
principles. It is also crucial in identifying necessary measures for its protection and for 
jurisprudential reasons.  
Chapter one to this thesis illustrated an understanding of what privacy is. Simply put as a right to 
be left alone321 or right to self-determination. However, simply saying ‘right to be left alone’ does not 
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say much about the right to privacy. It calls for questions such as one posed by Mark Hickford, 
‘left alone how and when? It gives possibility of extreme wide interpretations of situations which 
can be construed as entailing right to privacy but  may fail to predict concrete outcomes and  or 
when or how to intervene in one case but  not another’322 There is a danger of being interpreted 
to apply situation not intended to have been covered at the time of its conception. 
Summarizing debates on the subject, Bygrave323 came up with four principal ways of defining 
privacy. The first one is based on non-interference; second is based on limited accessibility, the third 
one is based on information control and the fourth links privacy to intimate or sensitive aspects of 
persons’ life. This is not far from what EPIC and Privacy International  suggests; that privacy 
safeguards four things; personal information, bodily privacy, communications privacy and territorial privacy.324 
This is similar to what legal scholars have come to agree as a form of protection for liberal self.325 
Better described by Neethling326 as an ability of a person to determine his private facts and hence 
the scope of his interest in privacy; the power of self-determination which is the essence of 
person’s privacy and therefore also of his right to privacy. 
 In the absence of universally agreed definition, it is, safe to say privacy gives the individual 
control over their private lives against intrusion, physical or otherwise.327  The case of Investigating 
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smith328 elaborated that ‘private’ does not refer only to an individual within 
his intimate space but also in social capacity in which people act. Also, according to the ruling in 
Niemitz v Germany329 as well as in Coeriel & Aurik v the Netherlands,330 [privacy protection] extends 
to persons’ professional activities and certain activities done in public sphere.331 
Neethling has made a plausible analysis in differentiating privacy and other personal rights often 
mistaken as infringement of privacy. Disturbance of person’s peaceful life is one such instance. 
Neethling cites the case of Pretorious v. Minister of Correctional Services332 as an example. In the case 
the Court ruled that broadcasting of radio programmes in prison cells is an infringement of ‘right 
to acoustic privacy’. According to Judge Bertelsmann, acoustic privacy is a right of a person not 
to be invaded by any broadcast which the individual has not consented to be exposed to.333  
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Neethling’s argument on the ruling is that, there was no real infringement of privacy since there 
was no acquaintance  with personal facts contrary to the determination and the will of the person 
involved, but rather an infringement of sensory feelings; a physical sensation of inconvenience, 
discomfort, unpleasantness, tiredness, irritation or disgust generated through victim’s senses.334  
Daniel Solove is of a different opinion; he believes disturbing one’s tranquillity or solitude 
invades ones privacy even though it does not involve acquaintance of personal information. He 
believes, as long as intrusion causes harm by interrupting people’s attention and hence their 
activities, it amounts to a breach of personal privacy.335  
Another misconception is identifying privacy with dignity. Narrating from South African 
experience, Neethling explains that, as long as to succeed in an action for invasion of privacy one 
must prove insult; it is a misjudgment of the right privacy. In reality, violation of privacy, insult 
may not be present at all. And privacy and dignity are independent interests of personality; 
although invasion of privacy may also affect personal dignity.336 
Identity (defamation in other jurisdictions) is also misrepresented as a violation of personal 
privacy. Neethling explains that this is not an infringement of privacy since privacy is infringed 
only through acquaintance with or disclosure of true facts. Truthfulness is, therefore, an element 
of infringement of privacy. Hence, publicity which paints the plaintiff in a false light to public is 
infringement of identity but not infringement of privacy. Although infringement of privacy can 
be accompanied by infringement of identity, these two are separate personal interests.337 Once 
again Solove has a contrary opinion to this. To Solove, dissemination of false or misleading 
information about a person amounts to an invasion of privacy. He calls it, information 
distortion.338 As long as such information is tied to a certain person and affects how others 
perceive that person, allow others to judge his/her behavior and character, then this information 
harms one’s privacy.  
Arguably, there is logic in Solove’s premises if one looks at data protection codes. Data subjects 
are given right to access, correct, update and request deletion. The logic behind this right is to 
make sure no misleading information about a person is processed. Misleading information 
affects personal privacy as much (or even more than) true information. Misleading information, 
if disclosed, has a potential to harm personality as it has an impact on how others perceive and 
judge one’s character. Accordingly, privacy should, as Solove believes, be taken on harm oriented 
approach. However, I would slightly differ with Solove, invasion of privacy should only be when 
there is unauthorized acquaintance, process or storage of personal data not merely discomfort 
made to a person by other people who have neither access nor process his personal data. This 
harm should come from the value attached to personal information. Once used, there is a person 
who gains from its value at the expense of the other who gives up control of the information. 
This is why data subject has a right over whom and how others may benefit from his data; and 
how such data should reflect on his personality and character. 
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In many cases, personal autonomy has also been viewed as an invasion of privacy. An example is 
when people are prohibited from doing certain things such as viewing or possessing 
pornography materials. This is justified on the ground that personal autonomy is related to the 
freedom of human self-determination which includes freedom to make decisions about one’s 
private affairs. On the contrary, self-realization, as Neethling argues, does not involve an 
infringement of privacy since there is no acquaintance with private facts against the will and 
determination of the person involved. 
In conclusion, Neethling revisits the American view; that right to privacy extends to patrimonial 
interests. To him, this is improper since privacy relates only to personal facts regarding a person 
in his condition of seclusion and not facts concerning immaterial properties such as invention, 
production process, trade secrets, book or creation of art. The objects may exist separately and 
independently of human personality. Therefore, it is incorrect to view an acquaintance with such 
immaterial property as an infringement of personality right of privacy.339  
Neethling analysis narrates instances of misapplication of the right to privacy in South Africa for 
lack of jurisprudential understanding of the interest with which privacy is aimed at. His insistence 
on the subject is that privacy should be sought and defined by its existence and nature in factual 
reality.340 As described by Hickford, privacy relates to ‘those things or aspects of one’s life that 
you, as an individual in social world, would have a reasonable expectation of exerting control 
over in terms of dissemination or disclosure should you wish to’. As further explained by 
Moreham; 
‘a person will be in a state of privacy if he or she is only seen, heard, touched or found 
out about if, and to the extent that, he or she wants to be seen, heard, touched or found 
out about’. Something is therefore “private” if a person has a desire for privacy in 
relation to it: a place, event or activity will be “private” if a person wishes to be free 
from outside access when attending or undertaking it and information will be “private” 
if a person to whom it relates does not want people to know about it’.341 
Based on Moreham view, privacy is viewed as a claim rather than a state or a condition of being. 
It is a claim a person has over his state of affairs, his information and his space which he 
considers private and intends it to be private. Basically, privacy is a claim of choice; one can 
choose elements and extent of publicity he desired about himself. Irwin Altman is of a similar 
view; he believes that privacy is a claim of choice which depends on one’s ability to control 
interaction with others. To him, however, privacy regulation is a cultural pervasive process.342 
Accordingly, privacy has two dimensions; informational privacy and local privacy.343 
Informational privacy comprises of all ‘personal’ information and facts about an individual; 
information which requires management in the social world. According to Hickford, the term 
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‘personal information’ should not be confused with ‘private information’ as information may be 
‘private’ but not ‘personal’ at all.344 And a person may have ‘privacy’ but not the ‘right to privacy’. 
To have the right to privacy, ‘there must be some valid norms that specifies that some personal 
information about, or experience of, individuals, should be kept out of other people’s reach’.345 
The local privacy is the privacy in one’s space (control over access to oneself). Places inhabited 
by intimate relationships, places of solitude and those occupied/used in promotion of personal 
or professional growth such as in households, working places as well as in the public places. 
These two concepts, that is, informational privacy and local privacy, illustrates privacy as 
elaborated above by Lee Bygrave, EPIC and Privacy International and Neethling. It is also in line 
with provisions of Conventions on Protection of Right to Privacy such as Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and similar 
instruments. 
Perhaps it is better at this point to look at privacy beyond abstract statements. And look at the 
elements of the right to privacy and instances or activities which invade privacy for abetter 
understanding of the concept. Invasion of privacy involves, at the first stage unauthorized access 
to personal information or premises. On the second stage, it involves unfair or illegal or 
unauthorized disclosure of information about a person or exposure to his/her person. The 
exposure includes personal information, images, grief or body in ways that allow others to form 
an opinion of his/her personality or character. The authenticity of information does not matter 
as long as such information is tied to a person and form basis of judgement upon his personality 
or character. There is also a disclosure of personal information obtained without authorization 
(illegal/unfair) or legally obtained but illegally or unfairly disseminated. This could happen if 
there is no knowledge or consent of the data subject or there is no legal basis for the processing 
of such personal data. 
Invasion of privacy also happens when the collection is legal and fair, and dissemination is 
consented by a data subject or authorized by law, but dissemination went beyond the consented 
limits or the initial legal basis. This can happen when data is processed/shared to third parties 
without informing the data subject and obtain consent for the onward processing. It can also 
happen when personal data is processed to serve an unknown, unconsented aims and interests of 
others, what Solove refers to as data blackmail or appropriation.346  
Interference with privacy can involve any of the activities mentioned above. It could be an 
unauthorized access to personal information or space, processing/dissemination of 
illegally/unfairly collected personal information or processing/dissemination of legally and fairly 
collected information without data subject’s consent or legal authorization. It could also be the 
processing of personal data legally and fairly collected and with data subject’s consent to 
processing but processed for secondary purposes, or to third parties without the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject; or processing of misleading and false information. 
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To avoid infringement of privacy, access to personal information or space must be allowed by 
the data subject or by law; and processing of personal data should be made upon informed 
consent of the data subject or on legal basis. The processing must be limited to the objects 
communicated and consented by the data subject or permitted by law. At all times, the data 
subject must be made aware of the context and circumstances from the point of access to the 
final process. This means privacy protection has two dimensions. It calls for cooperation 
between data controllers and data subjects in handling and usage of the personal data to avoid 
breach of privacy. Hence, on the one hand, data controller has a duty to inform and get consent 
from the data subject of all access and processing of data subject’s data. On the other hand, the 
data subject has a right to know the kind of data held, purpose of processing and any secondary 
use of such data. The data subject has a right to access his/her personal information, rectify or 
update them in case of changed circumstances or errors. Data subject may also object to their 
processing all together. 
To Irwin, purpose of privacy is to manage social interaction, establish plans and strategies for 
interaction with others and develop and maintain self-identity.347 To borrow his word, he says; 
‘Privacy mechanisms define the limits and boundaries of the self. When the permeability 
of these boundaries is under the control of a person, a sense of individuality develops. 
But it is not the inclusion or exclusion of others that is vital to self-definition; it is the 
ability to regulate contact when desired. If I can control what is me and what is not me, 
if I can define what is me and not me, and if I can observe the limits and scope of my 
control, then I have taken major step toward understanding and defining what I am. 
Thus, privacy mechanisms serve to help me define me.348  
However, because privacy is seen in the context of human interaction, socially and politically, a 
balance must be struck. Consequently, the right to privacy is not an absolute right. It operates on 
balance with other rights such as the right to information but also in line with other interests of a 
larger public. This is why most of the data privacy law exempts certain activities such as law 
enforcement, intelligence activities and other the public duties conducted by a public officer 
from the application of the law.   In this aspect, Julie Cohen suggests that privacy should not be 
viewed as a right ‘because the ability to have and manage it depends heavily on the attributes of 
one’s social, material and informational environment’.349 Since privacy goes beyond protection of 
an individual, it furthers fundamental public policy goals relating to liberal democratic 
citizenship, innovation and human flourishing. This is the reason privacy policy takes into 
account these purposes. Excessive regard to private life endangers civil liberties by leaving the 
body politic unattended.350  
The right to privacy also overlaps with other fields of law and rights such as tort of defamation, 
right to liberty and trespass. This may explain the disassociation of privacy with other aspects of 
the law as narrated before; but again as Cohen argues, there is no single formulation of privacy 
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purpose, and neither is it a fixed condition as it changes with individual relationship, social and 
cultural context in boundary management.351 
The evolving nature of privacy can also be seen in the change of terminology. In 1970’s when 
privacy rights extended to the protection of personal data, scholars came up with a debate on the 
need to change the terminology to suit the changing circumstances. The use of terminology 
between ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’ was examined. On the one hand, scholars argued that 
privacy has simultaneous existence and synonymous usage with data protection. Those arguing 
in this line based their arguments, first on the fact that privacy is used in the USA, Canada and 
Australia to refer to what is called data protection in European jurisdictions,352 and secondly, the 
difficulty in drawing a line between the two concepts.353 354 With different view are those who 
believe that the idea that privacy and data protection is interchangeable. They argue privacy and 
data protection emerged from the central objective of the right to privacy, to protect against 
unjustified interference in personal life;355 hence, they simply have a similar implication.356  
The confusion led to the mutation of the two concepts giving rise to new concept ‘data privacy’. 
According to Bygrave ‘data privacy’ is the best representative concept which also reconciles both 
sides to the controversy (the European and her counter parts USA, Canada and Australia) in 
policy discussions.357 With this convergence, Makulilo argues that the two concepts are 
increasingly becoming synonymous and hence interchangeable in their use.358 The same effect is 
observed by Kunner who believes this to be an effect of the movements towards an international 
framework for the protection of personal data and personal privacy.359 As a result, whether a 
person uses the concept ‘privacy’ or ‘data protection’ or ‘data privacy’ it does not matter. What 
matters is the context in which the concepts are used; the principles (contents), scope and 
application of such principles. 
However, for purposes of this thesis, the concept ‘privacy’ is preferred as opposed to data 
protection and data privacy. The use of the term ‘data privacy’ and ‘data protection’ may also be 
used in certain contexts to deliver the intended meaning without derogation. The reason is the 
fact that privacy is mostly understood in African context than the later concepts. Also, data 
protection reforms in Africa are still in their infant stage. Hence, terminologies such as data 
protection and data privacy are not of familiar usage to local communities. On the other hand, 
the concept privacy is well accustomed in the context of data protection and data privacy. The 
discussion debunks the concept privacy in African context in an effort to determine its value, 
perceptions and status within diverse African communities. 
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3.3 Privacy Concept and Perception in the African Context 
 
Privacy is understood more or less the same in different African communities. This is despite 
their diverging legal systems. Countries under Common Law system attribute same meaning to 
privacy as in the Western jurisdictions. African authors such as Makulilo believe this trait to 
result from the fact that the concept was imported from the Western, hence the borrowed 
meaning.360 The most popular definition of privacy in African discourse is the one promulgated 
by Prof. Johann Neethling, believed to have originated from the USA. This definition was 
accepted by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.361 It defined privacy as ‘a condition 
which includes all personal facts which a person himself at a relevant time determines to be 
excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he evidences a will for 
privacy’.362 Its recognition in African goes beyond African literary works, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has endorsed this meaning in National Media Ltd v. Jooste.363   
Privacy concept receives a similar connotation in local African languages such as the Swahili 
language,364 where privacy is known as ‘faragha’.365 The same is defined in the Swahili dictionary as 
‘mahali pasipo wazi au pasipo watu; siri; upweke; mafichoni; kando; chemba’; translated into English as 
‘private sphere or in seclusion from people; secrecy; solitude; hidden; rim; closed’.  In 
Francophone countries most of which are under Civil Law systems, uses the word la intimité; le 
secret or la solitude, to refer to privacy but as a right, it is referred to as droit à la vie privée (right to 
privacy) 
In Islamic countries following Shariah law, the concept is khususiat or alssrria (ةيصوصخ or ةيرسلا) 
which means privacy, confidentiality, or exclusiveness; it is also referred to as eazila (ةلزع) which 
means isolation, seclusion, loneliness, desolation or solitude; also as sirria (ةيرس) which means 
confidentiality, secrecy, stealthiness, or wrap. Traditionally, this term had been to refer to a 
‘hidden military unit’ using a secret convention in wild formations. However, as a right, privacy it 
is expressed as Haqq al-xuSuuSiyya ( ةيصوصخلا قح ) According to the Quran (the Supreme Law) 
the right to privacy entails prohibition against spying, which according to verse 49:12, prohibits 
spying against one another and against intrusion to a private realm. The Quran on verse 24:27 
continues, ‘do not enter any houses except your own homes and unless you are sure of their 
occupants’ consent’.366 This prohibition warns further that, owners of houses not to enter their 
own houses through a back door or in sneakily manner.  
From the above narration, privacy in African societies carries similar values and objectives as in 
the Western. However, its status and enforcement differ highly based on political stance and 
legal culture. Giving such example of diverse meanings of the concept privacy is Abdul Raman 
Saad who explains it with reference to the Islamic community. Saad compares the concept as 
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perceived in Islamic communities as against the Western perception. In Islamic communities, 
privacy is aimed at prohibiting public humiliation of the individual even if it is something of 
legitimate concern to the public. This is different from the Western objectives of privacy which 
would seem to allow publication of information of a person’s private life or information if there 
is a legitimate public concern.367  
Saad argues that, even without the existence of law, privacy is a concept recognized in various 
cultures, but depending on a cultural setting, each society has its own attitude and perception 
towards what amounts to privacy. In illustrating this, the author proceeds with a comparative 
analysis of privacy perceptions among the Germans, Americans, French and English. He says 
...‘the Germans marked of their private Lebensraum by closed doors, fences, and strict rules about 
trespass. German law, for instance, forbids the photographing of strangers in public places 
without their consent. Americans have open doors and no fences, but mark their social status 
with ‘private’ offices and ‘private’ secretaries. The French pack closely together in public, but 
rarely invite outsiders to their homes, even if they know them well. And the English, it seems to 
rely mainly on their reserve: when an Englishman stops talking, that is a signal that he wishes to 
be left alone’368 
Human rights and individual liberties are argued to have existed in Africa long before 
colonization.369 Of course, these principles were not in a written form hence no documentary 
evidence can be produced to this effect. Granted, Fremount speaks of the existence of at least 
one of the adoption of a written document enshrining these rights in Africa. He says, there was, 
in 1236, an adoption in Kouroukan Fuga (Kanbaga, Mali) of a Charter containing human rights. 
He cites the provisions of the Charter, articles 5 and 9 as stating; 
‘[e]veryone is entitled to life and to the preservation of their physical integrity. 
Therefore, any attempt to deprive someone from his life is punished by death penalty’. 
Article 9 ‘[c]hildren’s education is the responsibility of the whole society. Paternal 
authority is therefore exercised by all’.370 Communities embraced and were tolerant of 
each other’s rights and liberty as they co-existed. According to Keba Mbaye the fact that 
many traditional African religions co-existed also suggests the African acknowledgment 
and respect to human rights and liberties. He continues, ‘many liberties co-
existed….liberty of association, freedom of expression, the right to participate in affairs 
of the state and freedom of circulation. These rights were not conceived and 
experienced in terms of conflicts; rather, in terms of group rights and also of 
responsibilities.’371  
These rights and liberty were in the form of duties to others and the society. 
The right to privacy was not among the rights or liberties recognized. This is because Africans 
believe in the community than individuality. However, the right was later adopted within bills of 
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rights in independent Constitutions. The adoption of the right carries another story. In this 
regard, Frémont says ‘each country has a different story to tell. For some countries, bills of rights 
were imposed by colonial powers before surrendering jurisdiction; for others, some time has had 
to pass after independence. What appears to be clear is that the presence of cultural factors 
explains their rapid emergence or not as does, among other things, the local legal environment. 
In almost all cases, mixed legal systems were in place (influenced by the Dutch, British, French, 
or Belgians) and superimposed on the tribal (or traditional) legal foundations.’372  
In 1981 Africa as a Region adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The 
Charter did not define what ‘people’ means but provided for all the rights under the UDHR 
except the right to privacy and the right against forced labour or compulsory labour. In relation 
to the right to privacy, it can only be assumed that the omission is based on the nature of the 
right, which, if granted may paralyze the whole idea of the Charter, i.e. promotion of communal 
values and African cultural norms, in this case, communalism vis a vis individualism. In fact, 
Evelyne Ankumah notes that one of the most notable and probably the most serious 
shortcoming of the Charter is the incomplete and imprecise formulation of guaranteed rights. As 
a result, the Charter offers little legal protection to an individual.373    
African legal systems and legal culture are diverse based on the difference in languages, 
anthropology, religion and culture.374 These aspects have also, to some extent been manipulated 
by colonialism. As a result, most African countries have pluralism legal systems, with customary 
African traditional legal systems,375 mixed with a foreign legal system, (either Common law, Civil 
law, Roman-dutch or Islamic law).376 Africa has profound cultural values which may affect how 
privacy is received, perceived and valued. The dominant is the sense of community which 
overrides the sense of individualism.  An African idea of security and its value depends on 
personal identification with and within the community. This aspect has been a subject of 
scholarly debate in the privacy arena. Oliver Onwubiko, for example, explains this scenario as 
follows; 
‘Communalism in Africa is a system that is both supersensible and material in its 
terms of reference. Both are found in a society that is believed by the Africans to be 
originally ‘God-made’ because it transcends the people who live in it now, and it is 
‘man-made’ because it cannot be culturally understood independent of those who 
live in it now…This community also, within this transcendental term of reference 
(God-made) becomes the custodian of the individual’s ideas’.377 
In Africa, the community, therefore, offers an individual psychological and ultimately security as 
it gives its members both physical and ideological identity. The aim is to produce and present an 
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individual as a community-culture-bearer. Since culture is a community property, it must be 
protected by the community.378 Individualism or individual identity cannot take precedence over 
community identity. Thus individualism as an ideology and principle of life is not encouraged in 
Africa, even though it is not destroyed.379 This is in contrast with the superstructure of the 
Western world which as Shahadah illustrates, ‘elevates individual over the society and therefore 
enshrines an ethic of one against others in a situation of existential tension. All institutions of the 
West predicate their existence on the assertion of an individual as unique even without the 
group.  
On African side, communalism is a moral foundation of African culture hence things 
incompatible with peoplehood are therefore generally incompatible with African values’.380 As a 
result, individuals can only have rights by virtue of obligation they fulfil to the community. 
Davidson elaborates in these terms; ‘[The African] logic regarding legality in terms of individual 
obligations, not individual rights. At least in jural and moral assumptions, communities live at an 
opposite extreme from the “free enterprise individualism” which supposes that the community 
has rights only by virtue of the obligations it fulfils to the individual’.381 Hence, unwillingness to 
share with people one’s private or even public matters can be interpreted as bad manners or a 
sign of enmity. Putting this in a single sentence, Posner posits, privacy is therefore considered as 
a right of the deceivers to conceal shameful facts about themselves’. People are expected to 
discuss their issues freely and look for communal opinion or solution to one’s problem/issues.382 
It follows then, terms like ‘intimacy’ in African context are not exclusive for particular friends 
but applying to a whole group of people who find themselves together through work or 
residential requirements.383  
Optimist Shahadah believes, as much as culture drifts on the open ocean of interaction, 
technological development, pushed on by the winds of globalization, African culture changes. 
He believes, there is no longer such a thing as African monolithic purity cultures; but explains 
further that, the shifting dynamics of culture does not mean an alteration in the fundamental 
principles of the culture. And distinction must be made between practices of the people and their 
cultural ideal, what he calls ‘the superego of the culture’. He gives an example of the rise of 
sexual immorality in African communities as a reality but explains that this does not mean 
immoralities are an aspect of culture; because these trends are not desirable and are not 
encouraged; they go against the superego of the cultural ideal. It means the ethics of the said 
culture remains static. And that one basic fact is that African cultures are communal as opposed 
to ‘individualistic’ and this one difference creates an entirely different paradigm and behaviors. 
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These cultural laws are about boundary-maintenance, which fundamentally inform notions of 
morality that in turn inform legislation and national hood.384 
In Africa, culture is not only the people, their practices and beliefs; it’s the whole process from 
legal, family to the political level. It instructs life with values and habits which service humanity 
and has a role in personal continuation. So, Africa identity is not one hard thing but a multitude 
of self-impose conditions which ideologically run fluidly across indigenous Africa; it is not a 
scientific observation but a cultural-political one.385 
South Africa is the best illustration in this; it has both the Constitutional and Common Law right 
to privacy and statutory data privacy law. South Africa is also a country which has been judicially 
active in the area of privacy law more than any other African country. Both Common Law and 
statutory law define privacy as part of an individual’s personhood. However, the Ubuntu 
philosophy386has influenced the conception of personhood within South African context. 
Consequently, because of Ubuntu, personhood is not determined by a person himself as in the 
Western jurisdictions but is also determined by others (community).387 This is a departure from 
the Western culture with individualistic personhood conception and understanding of privacy. 
Africa has communalistic approach to personhood which represent rights and duties to a legal 
person. 
With this argument, it means illumination of legal practices should be contextual, at least in 
Africa with its peculiar environment. Nicola Lacey explains the importance of contextualizing 
law and legal practices saying; ‘legal practices lie not merely in an analysis of doctrinal language 
but in a historical and social studies of the institutions and power relations within which that 
usage takes place;388  more so, with privacy, a concept which is hard to define, highly contextual, 
and with ever-changing values. Collin Bennett says, privacy is highly subjective, which means it 
varies by time, jurisdiction, ethnic group and gender. To have an acceptable privacy legal 
framework, individual concerned should be the one defining the contents and interests in privacy 
according to the context.389 According to Neethling, to be able to conceptualize and regulate 
privacy, an understanding of personality interests in the pre-legal existence in factual reality is 
important.  He argues that, by ‘nature a person has a fundamental interest in particular facets of 
his personality (such as his body, good name, privacy, dignity et cetera), these interests exist 
autonomously de fact, independently of their formal recognition de jure. 
In Africa, one major attribute is communalistic society. It pre-exists as a condition that 
determines attitude, practices and the value of the right to privacy has or can take. This alters the 
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original concept of privacy as understood in the Western discourse and as borrowed in Africa. If 
we follow Neethling argument, that laws do not create new interests rather protects recognized 
pre- existing interests to promote justice, then it is prudent to understand the value, practices and 
interests in privacy in African context before any legal reform can take place. It is important 
because as Irwin emphasizes;  
‘Privacy regulation may be culturally unique in terms of particular behaviors and psychological 
mechanisms used to regulate it. Thus while capability for privacy regulation may be culturally 
universal, the specific behaviors and techniques used to control interaction may be quite 
different from culture to culture’.390  
In the same premises Neethling opined that if the jurisprudential concept of privacy is in conflict 
with its nature de facto, it cannot be considered to be a scientific concept. That the legal principles 
based on an inaccurate understanding of factual reality will necessarily lead to uncertainty and 
contradictions and consequently, may produce unfair results.391 
 
3.4 African Customary Legal System 
 
The African customary ‘legal’ system has, like other modern systems, established jurisprudence 
with law enforcers and pre-prescribed sanctions. Unlike the modern systems, it lacks written 
codes but has a central focus on upholding cultural values and socially accepted norms. Jacques 
Frémont,392 believes that the African customary legal system ‘is a convergence of law as advanced 
by Hugo Grotius (moral principle/morality of law),   John Finnis (natural law theory, i.e man’s 
ability to gasp values directly) and the ‘command’ aspect from John Austin’s theory.’ Frémont 
beliefs are built from the idea that, this system is, unlike the modern law, not taught in schools 
and cannot be found in a written code, but its exists through man’s comprehension and 
observation of community moral, values and practices which if not observed commands a 
punishment. The teachings and the main sources of the African law are songs, pithy sayings, 
proverbs and maxims. 
The main objective of this system is to bring the community together. Therefore, the system 
primary aim in conflict resolution is geared towards understanding between parties and 
resolution of the dispute. The primary objective is not to punish a wrongdoer. It is a system 
which does not encourage winning or losing.  Unlike the modern systems where winner wins all 
and loser loses all, the African customary system is guided by the principle of ‘win a little - lose a 
little’. It is a system of compromise between parties to a conflict. In a modern world, we would 
say it is similar to the alternative dispute resolution system (ADR). This is not to say that there is 
no punishment; where necessary punishments are imposed in extreme cases such as murder. In 
such cases, the wrongdoer is banished from the community and s/he is never to return to the 
community. 
                                                          
390 Altman (n 342), pp. 68-69. 
391 Neethling, J., Persoonlikheidsreg, Butterworth, Durban, 1979, p. 30. 
392 Frémont (n 369), p. 151. 
 66 
 
The ultimate goal of the system is, as elaborated by Frémont to pull the society together;393 not to 
create divisions by pronouncing a winner or a looser in a conflict but rather resolve the dispute 
in an amicable way. To achieve this aim, the conflict resolution process as described by Olaoba 
involves a demonstration of the culture in its radiant splendor and flame. ‘This was why in pre-
colonial African societies, peace and harmony somehow reigned supreme and often produced 
unique atmosphere for peace to thrive and development became dynamic.’ Olaoba continues 
that some of the features includes ‘performance stance ….. demonstration of the customs and 
norms, deification of the ethnical framework of the society and the trust of conflict resolution 
throughout the society thus creating conducive environment for the facilitation of peace and the 
enhancement of harmony. The process was anchored in dramatization of issues involved in a 
conflict;’394 popularly known as ‘drumming the scandal’. According to the author, the 
dramatization of the conflict has a purpose of allowing participants in the drama to get an in-
depth understanding of the customs and norms bequeathed to them by their ancestors and 
criticize the wrong acts.395 To be able to get a clearer picture of the process I would borrow 
Olaoba’s illustration as follows; 
‘The dramaturgical device always involved a systematic radiation of all sides (scenes) to 
the conflict (drama). In a sense, the party to the conflict (litigants) normally resorted to 
adopting flashback (mnemonic memory) with a recitation model. The asides to the 
conflict were stage-managed by the witnesses who adequately provided the knots of 
denouement for the responding schemes of the adjudicators at all level of statecraft. The 
level of performance by the adjudicators is triangular, focusing or viewing the parties to 
the conflict, witnesses (two parties) and the audience (large crowed). Interestingly, the 
adjudicators must not only third and enthrall the audience so as to boost their morale in 
the interpretive analysis of conflict resolution tradition, they also had to ginger other 
dramatic personae on the stage to comply with dramaturgical devices.’396 
Basically, the system used community cultural norms, traditions and values to regulate the 
community. As further explained by Frémon ‘customary law calls for respect of social order in 
achieving group harmony which is un-derogated values and are preserved at all costs as they play 
a major role in the establishment of behavioral norms, which are usually very constraining. For 
all purposes, they organise the life of the family, the clan and the village. The translation of such 
solidarities, ideally, should be found in legal norms.’397 
The conciliation process takes place in a public place; there are specialized institutions for 
conflict resolution such as Courts and Tribunals. They involve Chiefs, experienced elders or 
kings who can be said to represent the modern day judges or umpires. However, different from 
the judges and umpires, the Chiefs, experienced elders and kings had a different role; their role is 
not of a judge or umpire, they are the performers of the drama in demonstrating the customs 
and norms of the specific community. They are not the ones deciding the case between the 
litigants; rather the decision comes by a conciliatory process by the community. This involves the 
two communities from where the conflicting parties come from. The two communities would 
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help in the reconciliation process and ultimately the litigants are left to resolve their conflict 
through a dialogue. Hence the decision is made in what Frémon terms as collegiality.398 Litigants 
are also allowed to be represented by an orator or a sorcerer. The resolution would usually reflect 
principles of customary law as dramatized by the chief, an elder or a king during the process; the 
ultimate goal is harmony between communities and hence the conflicting parties.  
This process involves sacrifices and fair compensation from the faulty party.399Once the 
reconciliation is reached, the drama would change its theme to a celebration mode. The 
reconciliation is celebrated and the parties and characters would dance celebrating ‘wining a little 
and losing a little.’ This marks the closure of the conflict and the hearing. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The previous chapter narrated the history in the enforcement of the right to privacy and the pre- 
existing understanding of the legal concept affects the nature of the law as well as its 
enforcement and interpretation. In Africa, different communities have defined what privacy is. 
However, the concept has never been legally defined or clarified within the African context. 
Furthermore, among the 54 African States, only two (Kenya and South Africa) have judicially 
enforced the right to privacy. The two countries enforced the constitutional right to privacy 
under tortious principles on personality rights. Eventually, even with its enforcement, privacy as 
a right on its own has never been given a meaning. With this history, it is worrisome whether the 
reforms in data protection and enforcement of personal privacy and data security can be 
objective and sufficient to the cause. 
The African traditional justice system is very different from the modern justice system. This is 
both in terms of process, the relation between parties and the materials involved. From African 
perspective of justice, the modern justice system would seem complex and social unfriendly as it 
does not support the idea of social unification and harmony between parties instead it is founded 
on enmity between parties. Moreover, the rules are foreign in term of process and context. The 
modern justice system is further seemingly to have a monolithic approach while the traditional 
approach is a holistic approach. African justice system along with resolute the dispute aims at 
sustaining harmony and social unity while the modern system is considered to be opposite. The 
reforms in data protection in Africa have mainly adopted the EU data protection framework. 
Unfortunately, among the reformed systems, none have their data protection authorities 
harmonized to reflect pluralistic nature of African legal systems. It is also not clear whether the 
non-inclusion of the other existing legal systems within the enforcement authority may, in the 
long run, adversely affect the implementation of the laws. 
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4. Privacy Regulations and Institutions in Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Privacy is a human right issue. Therefore an understanding of the African human rights 
architecture, from Regional, Sub-regional to the national level is crucial in the understanding 
African privacy regimes. Review of the institutional layout and judicial trend on human rights 
protection as well as adjudication in general can help to sketch a picture on the status, value and 
the future of privacy and data protection in Africa. Through this chapter, the weaknesses and 
strength of the African human rights enforcement systems and privacy regimes are explored.  
 
4.2 The African Union Human Rights and Privacy Protection Framework 
 
The African Union (AU) was established in 2002, replacing the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) after the African Heads of States adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU in Lome, 
Togo.400 The Constitutive Act expresses the main objective of the AU as to strengthen human 
rights situation in Africa. This is the strongest point of departure from the OAU. The AU 
eliminated the principle of non-interference in international affairs and brought about an 
intervention approach to cases of conflicts, unconstitutional changes of governments and human 
rights abuses.401 402 The AU also vows to promote democratic principles and institutions, 
including people participatory and good governance.403 In promotion of human rights, the AU 
undertakes to protect human and people’s rights as accorded by the African Charter and other 
human rights instruments.404 In doing so, the AU promises transparency by allowing people 
participation in the AU activities.405 Unlike its predecessor, the AU has the power to impose 
sanctions on members who fails or refuses to comply with policies or decisions of the AU. 
The AU through its institutions, specifically the Pan-African Parliament and the Peace and 
Security Council objectives are to ‘‘promote the principles of human rights and democracy in 
Africa’’ and to ‘‘encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in Member 
States’’,406 ‘‘promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and 
international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts’’.407 In doing so, the AU 
makes specific reference to principles enshrined in the UDHR on fundamental human rights and 
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freedoms and the sanctity of human life.408 Furthermore, through the Political Affairs 
Department, advocacy policies are developed. Within this department, co-operation between AU 
members, CSOs and RECs on human rights issues are promoted. 
 
4.2.1 Framework for Human Rights Enforcement 
 
The African human rights system is solely based on the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (Banjul Charter) and its protocols. Through the Charter, two organs are established; the 
Commission and the Court. The system is more or less replication of the European system. The 
Banjul Charter409  is the Regional human rights instrument guaranteeing all the rights provided 
and protected by international human rights instruments such as the UDHR, except for the right 
to privacy and right against force or compulsory labor. The Charter, unlike the UDHR, 
European and American human rights protection systems, has included civil, political and socio-
economic rights in this single document. The AU believes, the exercise of these rights is 
complementary and therefore need not be separated. Accordingly, the Preamble to the Charter 
states; ‘States parties have stated their conviction that civil and political rights cannot be 
dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality 
and that the satisfaction of these latter rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of the formers.’410 
The Charter is ‘unique’ of human rights instruments. It emphasizes the importance of historical 
and values of African civilization in protection and enforcement of human rights. Consequently, 
enforcement of human and people’s rights in African continent must conform to this. The 
preamble to the Charter explains the implementation of human rights in Africa as an inevitable 
correspondence to duties; and that there should be a link between civil and political rights against 
the existence of socio-economic and cultural rights. Hence, beyond the usual human rights 
protection and guarantees, the Charter provides additional individual duties to address the 
peculiar nature of African communities and culture. It imposes a duty of an individual to the 
family, the nation and to the international community.411 There is also a duty to preserve African 
cultural values and the commitment to achieve African unity.  
 The preamble states; 
‘Considering that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms also implies the 
performance of duties on the part of everyone;412 
Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to 
development and that civil and political rights cannot be disassociated from economic, 
social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the 
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satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights. 
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of 
African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept 
of human and peoples’ rights’ 
The Charter has designated ‘family’ as a custodian of moral and traditional values and 
obliges states to see to it that family is supported as a unit and basis of a community. 
Article 18 states: 
‘State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of moral and 
traditional values of recognized by the community.’ 
Moreover, Article 17 (3) of the Charter further insists on states’ duty in the promotion and 
protection of morals and traditional values as recognized by the community. In all aspects, the 
central theme of the charter is ‘solidarity’ established under Article 29.  
 
4.2.1.1 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) was established by article 30 
of the Banjul Charter. The Commission is an overseer of the compliance to the AU human 
rights instruments by the Member States. The Commission commenced its operations in 1987 as 
a quasi-judicial organ tasked with the interpretation and application of the Charter, Protocols and 
Human rights instruments ratified by the AU Member States.413  All complaints on alleged 
violation of the Charter from an individual, a groups of individuals, NGOs and all African States, 
with exception to South Sudan which has not yet ratified the Charter, can be lodged with the 
Commission.414  
The ACHPR holds two ordinary sessions a year. It can also hold an extraordinary session on the 
request of the Chairperson of the Commission or a majority of Commissioners. During the bi-
annual ordinary sessions, the ACHPR considers periodic reports submitted by State parties, as 
well as reports from members of the Commission and its Special Mechanisms.415 It is worth 
mentioning that, within the AU, there is also another self-standing body in the enforcement of 
human rights; the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The 
Committee has the same mandate as the ACHPR except its mandate is limited to the 
implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)416 
promoting, protecting and monitoring human rights relating to children.  
Unlike the Banjul Charter, the ACRWC has, under Article 10 provided for the right to privacy. 
Also of importance is to know that, these two organs have no formal link, they operate 
independently of each other. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has pursued a 
                                                          
413 See, ACHPR, Article 45 and Protocol to ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, Articles 26 (1) and 32. 
414 ACHPR, Article 47. 
415 Rapporteurs, committees and working groups. 
416 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
 71 
 
more independent path from the AU. A pertinent example is the establishment of the 
headquarters of this Commission in Banjul, The Gambia, while the African Committee 
headquarters are based at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
In implementing the Charter, the Commission disregards the African states’ legal systems, i.e. 
whether a monist or dualist state. The Commission regards the Charter to be binding to all AU 
Member States regardless of their systems or whether or not they have implemented legal 
measures to affect the Charter.417 Accordingly, the Commission explained in Civil Liberties 
Organization v Nigeria,418 that, if a Member State wishes to rescind its obligation under the Charter 
it must undergo an international process involving notice and not through a domestic 
procedure.419 
Access to the Commission can be by a State party against another State party in violation of the 
Charter; by an individual or NGOs on their behalf or on behalf of others.420 A Complainant can 
institute a communication (complaint) to the secretary general, the Chairman of the Commission 
and the concerned State Party. These communications are required to be confidential until such 
time as the Assembly of Heads of States and Government decides otherwise.421 
Communications to the Commission can only be admissible when the local remedies have been 
exhausted and as long as the Complainant has not approached any other international 
jurisdiction.422However, Article 58 (1) to the Charter provides for exceptions to the rule. It allows 
the Commission to admit communications in the absence of ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ by an 
Applicant. Basically, the exception stipulates circumstances where there is difficulty or 
impossibility to exhaust local remedies and on cases that reveal the existence of a massive and 
serious violation of human and peoples’ rights. In Rencontre Africaine pour la De´fense des Droits de 
l’Homme v Zambia423 the Commission stated that it would be unreasonable to force Complainants 
to exhaust local remedies when such remedies, as a practical matter, are unavailable or 
ineffective. Accordingly, in Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Liberte´s v Tchad424 the 
Commission admitted a communication which had not exhausted local remedies because it was 
of the opinion that it was impractical for the Complainants to get proper remedies in the local 
jurisdiction. The case involved a number of individuals with varied scope of the alleged violation. 
In admitting the case, the Commission stated that ‘it can absolutely not demand the requirement 
of exhaustion of local remedies to cases in which the Complainant is unable to apply local Courts 
for every individual Complainant.’425 The exception to the rule also applies when a Complainant, 
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in fear of his life flees the country and therefore s/he cannot approach the local Courts;426 the 
Complainant is dead,427or the Complainant cannot get legal representation in his/her country.428 
The Commission, although possessing adjudicative powers, lack enforcement powers. The 
decisions rendered by the Commission are not ‘judicial’ decisions, are mere recommendations. 
As a result, not only the States but also the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments 
has been ignoring its recommendations. Christopher Mbazira429 gives examples of such instance. 
This is when the Nigeria government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa in spite of a note verbale from the 
Commission that the execution should be halted until the case has been heard by the 
Commission. Also, the execution of Mariette Bosch by Botswana authorities four days after the 
Commission communicated its appeal for a stay. The Commission having no enforcement 
powers could not demand compliance. Church, Schulze and Strydom believe the Banjul Charter 
and the Commission have been built in the philosophy of negotiation and conciliation rather 
than the adversarial approach associated with adjudicatory mechanisms430 hence the lack of 
enforcement powers by the Commission. 
One positive aspect of the Commission is the room for individual participation. The 
Commission can, under Article 46 of the Charter, admit any individual with information or 
knowledge capable of enlightening the Commission on the subject matter of the case. 
Furthermore, rules 72, 76-77 of the Commission’s rules of procedure allows the Commission to 
invite any person or NGO with knowledge on the subject matter of the case to participate in its 
deliberations. Of course, an individual or NGO participating in the deliberation will have the 
voting power. 
The Commission can also embark into special tasks as an observer of rights. This can happen by 
request of the African Heads of State and Government by virtue of Article 45 (4) of the Charter. 
The Commission can also deal with violations in the absence of country, individual or NGOs’ 
submission. By virtue of article 48, the Commission can launch an investigation against any AU 
member. This power enables the Commission to implement measures against violation or 
potential violation of human and peoples’ rights.  
 
4.2.1.2 The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights 
 
The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (AfCHPR) was established in 2006 through 
Article 1 of the Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the establishment of a Human Rights and 
People’s Court. The Court is the Regional human rights tribunal with an advisory and 
contentious jurisdiction concerning the interpretation and application of the Banjul Charter. The 
Protocol establishing the Court states that the Court is established to complement the 
                                                          
426 Abobakar v. Ghana (2000) AHRLR 124; ACHPR (1996). 
427 Forum of Conscience v Sierra Leone (2000) AHRLR 293; ACHPR (2000). 
428 Civil Liberties Organisation and Others v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 75; ACHPR (2001). 
429 Mbazira, C., ‘Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and significant strides’, African Human Rights Law Journal, 2006, 
Vol.6, N.2, pp. 333-357 at p.346. 
430 Church,  J et al., Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective, UNISA Press, 2007; 
p.259. 
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Commission. Presumably to ‘reinforce and to complete the objectives of the Charter. This 
suggests, both the Court and the Commission coexist as independent bodies but within a 
mutually reinforcing relationship’.431 
The Court has jurisdiction on the interpretation and application of the Charter and other 
international human rights instruments ratified by AU members.432 The Court’s jurisdiction 
extends to States that have ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As of the time 
of preparation of this dissertation, 27 States have accepted Court’s jurisdiction. The rest of the 
States are not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to cases instituted by the Commission (on behalf of 
individuals) and African based intergovernmental organizations. However, there are instances 
where an individual or a local NGO can institute a case to the Court. This is only possible when 
a Member State makes a declaration under Article 35 of the Protocol to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court. Such application by individual or NGO is usually instituted as per Article 5 (3) of the 
Protocol. So far, only Tanzania; Burkina Faso, Ghana, Cote d’Ivore, Rwanda, Mali and Malawi 
have made such declaration. It means individuals and NGOs from States which have yet to make 
the declaration, their recourse in case of a human right breach is to institute their matter with the 
Commission.  
The Court affords senior state and government officials with immunity from prosecution.433 
Consequently, heads of States and senior officers enjoy immunity for human rights 
infringements for acts done when they are in office. This is quite contrary to international law 
which allows international Courts to lift the immunity of the Head of State and senior members 
so as to end immunity. It is also different from other supranational Courts’ practice.  For 
example, the ICTR434 and ICTY435 expressly states that the official position of a person, whether 
the head of State or government does not relieve a person from prosecution or mitigate the 
prescribed punishment. A similar position is provided by the ICC. The Rome statute under 
Article 27 (1) declares equality of people on access to the Court and application of the rules of 
the statute regardless of one’s official capacity. 
The execution of the ACHPR by States is voluntary. The AU, in respect of State sovereign, uses 
a polite language in the Protocol establishing the Court, that ‘State parties to the Protocol 
undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are a party and to guarantee 
the execution within the time stipulated by the Court.436  
                                                          
431 Pityana, N. B., ‘Reflections on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, AHRLJ, 2004, Vol. 4, pp.  121-
129 at p. 126. 
432 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 17. 
433 At its 23rd Ordinary Session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the Assembly of the African Union adopted an 
amendment to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to immunize African 
leaders accused of committing serious human rights violations from criminal prosecution before the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
434ICTR Statute, Article 6 (2). 
435 ICTY Statute, Article 7(2). 
436 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 30. 
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The rulings of the Court, as a principle of international law, do not directly repeal any law, set 
aside or nullify local judgment and or ruling or any administrative acts. They only have a 
declaratory effect; they are mere denunciations. The Court rulings of the ACHPR are directed to 
the AU Member States to remind them of their obligations under the Banjul Charter and other 
treaty obligations. It is the AU Member States who have the responsibility to execute the Court’s 
judgments. The task to oversee the implementation and execution of the Court’s judgments is 
upon the Council of Ministers.437 Boukongou considers this mechanism as insufficient to ensure 
compliance ‘given the diplomatic inertia within this authority’438 regardless of the fact that the 
Member States also have a secondary obligation to report on their compliance or otherwise with 
the Court’s judgments imposed upon them by the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government.439 
The Court can, apart from the declarations, issue remedial judgments (compensation or 
reparations), and in special cases, such as those in need of urgent intervention, the Court can 
adopt provisional measures to avoid irreparable harm to individuals.440 
 
4.2.1.3 The Proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
 
In 2003, the AU adopted a Protocol for the establishment of an African Court of Justice. The 
Court was intended to have jurisdiction over economic integration and matters of political 
nature. This Court had never commenced its operations. In 2008, another Protocol was adopted. 
The Protocol proposes a creation of yet another Court; the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (ACJHR). Article 2 of the Protocol states; 
‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights established by the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union 
established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union, are hereby merged into a 
single Court and established as “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights’. 
The proposed Court is replacing the ACHPR and the African Court of Justice (ACJ)441 initially 
established by the Constitutive Act but whose operation was suspended in anticipation to the 
creation of the ACJHR. The Protocol establishing the ACJHR was adopted in 2008 and was to 
enter into force after 30 days upon deposit of the instrument of ratification by 15 AU Member 
States. So far, the Protocol has been signed by 30 countries and ratified by 5 countries only442 out 
of the 54 AU Member States. 
                                                          
437 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 29. 
438 Boukongou, J. D., ‘The Appeal of the African System for Protecting Human Rights, AHRLJ, 2006 Vol. 6, pp. 
268-298 at p. 291. 
439 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 31. 
440 Ibid, Article 27 (2). 
441 This Court was not discussed in the text for obvious reasons. 
442 The countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Libya, and Mali. 
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The proposal is for the Court to have three sections; for general affairs, for human rights and 
individual criminal responsibility. Once the Court receives the required number of ratification, it 
shall have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act and AU 
treaties. The Court will have the power to review decisions, assess the legality of legal 
instruments adopted by AU and organs created thereof. Also, the Court will be dealing with the 
determination of questions regarding the application of international law in the Region and 
Members’ obligations under the International law including determining and issuance of 
reparations for breaches. 
The Court, as with the ACHPR and ACJ, limits its access to State parties, AU organs and 
institutions and AU Intergovernmental Organizations. Access to the Court by individuals and 
national based NGOs will depend on the State’s declaration accepting the Court’s competence. 
And like the present Court, Heads of State and government and senior government officialsh 
have immunity from Court’s prosecution for acts done during their tenure in the office.443 
 
4.2.2 Privacy and Data Protection in the African Union 
 
Privacy in Africa is regulated from the Regional, Sub-regional to the national level. At the 
Regional level all instruments providing for human, civil and political rights, contain provisions 
for the right to privacy with exception to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right of 
1981. For example, the ACRWC and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and Convention on Cyber Security and Personal 
Data Protection of 2014 (the Malabo Convention).  
 
4.2.2.1 Regional Regulation 
 
The Malabo Convention was adopted on 27 June 2014, making Africa the second Region, after 
EU to adopt a data protection instrument. However, the Convention, unlike the EU-DPD does 
not only provide for data protection framework, rather has created two regimes; cyber-security 
regime and data protection regime. The Convention deals with three main subjects affecting 
online activities, e-commerce, cybercrime and security and data protection. Data protection 
regime established by the Convention is provided under Chapter II: Personal Data Protection. 
From the preamble, the objective of the Chapter is to protect privacy and promote free 
movement of information. The aim is to inspire harmonization of existing data protection legal 
regimes and invoke reforms to the Member States lacking or with weaker data protection 
regimes.  
The established regime is modelled in a similar structure as the international instruments such as 
the OECD guidelines, Convention 108 and the EU-DPD. On processing of personal data, the 
Convention provides for seven principles of data protection, similar to those found in 
                                                          
443 Article 46A of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights. 
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international codes, of course with some few adjustments.444 The Convention excludes the 
regulation of personal data contained in temporary files made by technical intermediaries 
including the ISSP providers for automatic, intermediary and transitory storage of data. 445 Other 
exemptions are on the processing of personal data for purely domestic purposes and in personal 
context, as long as such data is not intended to be shared to or with 3rd parties;446 and the 
processing of personal data for journalistic and research as long as it is done in accordance with 
the professional codes. Processing for artistic and literal expression is also among the exempted 
activities.447 Processing of personal data involving data matching is restricted upon DPAs 
authorization.448 However, the Convention contains no provision for data breach notifications. 
The restriction is declared on the processing of sensitive personal data, save for a few instances 
where the Convention is making an exception.449 The Convention definition of sensitive data 
includes the usual category of sensitive data but extends further to include data such as those of 
‘parental filiation’ not usually found in other data protection codes. This could be based and 
justified on the belief as Greenleaf and Georges explains that, in Africa ‘knowledge of the 
identity of a person’s biological parents can be used in spells to harm them’.450 
Decisions made based on automated processing of personal data are prohibited when such 
decision can substantially affect the data subject.451 Furthermore, unlike other data protection 
codes, the established framework for data protection does not create restrictions on direct 
marketing. Instead, the restrictions are introduced under Chapter one of the Convention which 
creates the legal framework for e- Transactions.452  
Furthermore, the established regime gives the Member States an obligation to establish an 
independent Data Protection Authority.453 The composition and administrative powers of such 
authority are left to the determination of individual States.454 
The framework for trans- border data transfer under the Convention restricts the transfer of 
personal data outside the AU to territories without adequate level of protection.455 Sadly, the 
Convention leaves the AU Member States on cross road for failure to define what presupposes 
an adequate level of protection; and while it does not suggest free flow of data between parties to 
the Convention, it does not impose an adequate requirement to AU Member States regardless of 
whether or not they have ratified the Convention. Furthermore, by virtue of Articles 12 (2) (k) 
and 14 (6) (b), DPAs can authorize trans-border transfer of personal data regardless of the 
adequacy of protection offered by the recipient. Surprisingly, the Convention, unlike the other 
data protection codes, i.e. OECD; CoE and DPD, lacks derogation rule for trans-border data 
                                                          
444  Malabo Convention, Articles 16 – 23. 
445 Ibid, Article 9 (2) (a).  
446 Ibid, 9 (2) (b). 
447  Ibid, Article 14 (3). 
448 Ibid, Article 15. 
449 Ibid, Article 14 (2) (a-j). 
450 Greenleaf, G and Georges, M., ‘The African Union’s data privacy Convention: A major step toward global 
consistency?, Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 2014, No. 131, pp. 18 – 21 at p. 19. 
451 Malabo Convention, Article14 (5). 
452 Ibid, Article 6. 
453 Ibid, Articles 11-12. 
454 Ibid, Article 11 (3). 
455 Ibid, Article 14 (6) (a). 
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flow. There are no provisions regarding Binding Corporate Rules or Model Contracts for 
transfer of personal data to third countries. 
 
4.2.2.2 Sub-Regional Regulations 
 
Africa has at least eight RECs, but only four are as yet significant in the data privacy context: 
ECOWAS (West); SADC (South), ECCAS and CEMAC (Central) and EAC (East). Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
 
(A) West African Region 
The Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection In the west Sub-region the ECOWAS456 had, in 
2010, adopted the Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on personal data protection. The Act is so 
far considered the strongest in the Region among the existing data protection instruments, 
including the Malabo Convention. Other scholars go further saying the Malabo Convention is a 
replica of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. Makulilo asserts that ‘even the scope and aims are 
the same except that, whereas the Convention applies in the territory of Member States of 
African Union, the Supplementary Act applies to any processing of personal data carried out in 
the UEMOA or the ECOWAS Member States’.457 
The objectives of the Act as recited in the Recitals 10 and 11 of the preamble are the same as 
those in the Malabo Convention, that is, protection of privacy and promotion of free movement 
of information, and, also, to harmonize data protection legislations among the Member States 
existed before the Act. The Act provides for principles in the protection of privacy in chapter V; 
and like the Malabo Convention, the Act requires the establishment of the data protection 
authority to oversee compliance. The Act goes further specifying qualifications for the members 
of the proposed DPA. To be qualified, one must be qualified in the field of law, ICT and other 
fields of knowledge to achieve the objectives of the Act; unlike the Malabo Convention which 
provides for a list of people who may serve in the data protection authority. The Act has also 
clarified its enforcement, stating that the Act is an integral part of ECOWAS Treaty,458 which 
means the ECOWAS Court of Justice is therefore mandated to enforce the Act. 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice The ECOWAS Court of Justice was established in 2002 by article 2 
of the Protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty. The Court was established to interpret and enforce the 
                                                          
456 ECOWAS is an Economic Community for West African States with fifteen members including Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo. 
457 Makulilo (n 26), p. 345. 
458 ECOWAS Treaty, Article 48. 
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principles of treaties and other legal regulation adopted within ECOWAS, as such, its jurisdiction 
extends to all instruments adopted by the Community. Within its jurisdiction, the Court task is to 
determine Members’ obligations under international law and community instruments, the legality 
of Regulations, Conventions, Directives and all legal instruments adopted by the community, and 
enforce Members’ human rights obligations. Access to the Court is by State party or a member 
of the Conference of State. The Court can also offer advisory opinions at the request of 
institutions and the Member States. 
 
(B) East African Region 
In the East African Sub-region there are two instruments for privacy protection; the Draft Bill of 
Rights for the East African Community of 2009 and the East African Community Legal 
Framework for Cyber Laws, Phase I of 2008 and phase II of 2011.  
The EAC Draft Bill of Rights The EAC draft Bill of Rights was drafted to address the omissions in 
the national Constitutions of Member States and to harmonize the standards of human rights 
protection in the Sub-region. The Bill provides for the right to privacy under article 7. The 
provision makes good of the omission in the African Charter with regards to rights to privacy in 
the context of the EAC Member countries.   
The EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws On the other hand, the EAC Legal Framework for 
Cyber Laws was proposed in 2006 by the EAC’s Council of Ministers, seeing the need to 
establish a proper regulatory framework to nurture e-Government strategies at the National and 
Sub-Regional level.459 Consequently, the task force on cyber laws was formed in 2007. The task 
force divided the reforms into two phases based on urgency and priority of addressed issues. 
Phase I address e-transactions, e-signature and authentications, privacy and data protection, 
property, domain names, taxation and freedom of information. On privacy and data protection, 
phase I stated; the objectives of the framework is to harmonize policies and regulations in the 
East African Community.460 461 Surprisingly, it neither proposes a specific framework nor model 
law. The framework only gives Member States obligation to create a framework for data privacy 
and non-binding recommendations towards legislating for such a framework.  
The travaux preparatoires recommends baseline standards for the processing of personal data, 
encouraging members to comply with what the framework calls ‘principles of good practice’. 
According to the Framework, the principles of good practice include accountability, 
transparency, fair and lawful processing, processing limitation, data accuracy and data security.462 
                                                          
459 Legal Notice No. EAC/8/2007, East African Community Gazette, Vol.AT 1-No.0004, Arusha 30th December 
2007; East African Community, Draft EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws, (Phase I) November 2008, p.3. 
460 See the EAC, Background Paper for the Second  Meeting of the EAC Task Force on Cyberlaws, Golf Course 
Hotel, Kampala, Uganda, 23rd -25th June 2008, EAC/TF/2/2008, (Annex I), p.2; also EAC, Report of the 2nd 
EAC Regional Task Force Meeting on Cyberlaws, Golf Course Hotel, Kampala, Uganda, 23rd -25th June 2008, 
EAC/TF/2/2008, p. 6. 
461 EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase I), p.5; EAC, EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, (Phase 
II), p.3. 
462 Walden, I., ‘East African Community Task Force on Cyber Laws: Comparative Review and Draft Legal 
Framework’, Draft v.1.0, 2/5/08 prepared on behalf of UNCTAD and the EAC, May 2008, p. 17. 
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The principles include data subjects’ right to be informed of processing activities involving 
personal data and an opportunity to amend incorrect data.  
Recommendation 19 of the Framework provides a blanket recommendation, urging the Member 
States to take into account ‘fully’ international best practices in the area without mentioning or 
making reference to any particular data protection framework as forming the ‘best practices’. 
What is more surprising is the fact that, on all subjects dealt by the Framework I, the task force 
has provided a copy of a model law or recommended framework as an annexure; however, the 
same was provided in relation to data protection. 
The Framework does not give recommendations on establishing DPAs, on the contrary, it 
cautions that such authorities, especially for developing countries will be costly. At the same 
time, the task force stresses on the fact that, in the instance, a Member States decides to establish 
a DPA, it is crucial that the DPA is established as an independent body from the Government in 
order to provide necessary trust and assurance in its regulatory activities.  
The EA Court of Justice The EA Court of Justice was established in 2001 by Article 9 of the Treaty 
establishing the EAC. However, the Court does not have human rights jurisdiction. However, 
Article 27 (2) of the Treaty, gives the Council of Ministers powers to extend the Court’s 
jurisdiction to include human rights issues. One may consider the Court’s lack of human rights 
jurisdiction as ambiguity, since the Treaty to which the Court was established to enforce contains 
human rights provisions. So far, the Court has jurisdiction over trade and labor disputes. 
Somehow, the present jurisdiction of the Court reflects the EAC main objective, i.e. to achieve 
political federation.  
 
(C) Southern Africa Region 
The Data Protection Modal Law SADC463 is another Sub-region with privacy regulation instrument.  
In 2012, SADC approved the draft Data Protection Model Law. Like the ECOWAS Act, the 
Model Law propels on the framework for data protection mimics the international codes on data 
protection. Consequently, the regime proposed is similar to the one established by ECOWAS 
and the Malabo Convention, but with some significant variations in their scope of application.464 
The SADC Model Law lacks preamble in an orthodox meaning and context as expected with 
model laws. Hence, it brings difficulties in interpreting the intentions and the context of the law. 
It also fails to give its objectives; however reading from the provided ‘preamble’, the protection 
of an individual right to privacy and harmonization of data protection policies and laws may be 
inferred.  
The SADC Tribunal The SADC Tribunal was established in 2005 by Article 9 (g) of the SADC 
Treaty and the Protocol on the Tribunal. Although inaugurated in 2005, it commenced operation 
in 2010. Article 16 of the SADC Treaty confers the Tribunal with jurisdiction over interpretation 
                                                          
463 The Sothern African Development Community (SADC) is a sub-regional grouping of fifteen countries: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
464 Makulilo (n 26), p. 359. 
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of the Treaty, and all other legal instrument adopted by the community. The Tribunal is also 
empowered to deal with members’ dispute arising out of agreements, conflicts between the 
Member States or the Member States and legal or natural person. The Tribunal was established 
with a mandate to deal with human rights issues; however, in 2012, after a controversial decision 
rendered by the Tribunal against the President of Republic of Zimbabwe for breach of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms,465 the Tribunal was stripped of its power to adjudicate over 
human rights issues. To achieve this, head of States and Governments, adopted a Protocol on 
the Tribunal, limiting its powers to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and other ratified 
instruments relating to disputes between the Member States. 
Other Sub-regions, including COMESA, ECCAS AND UMA have no notable initiatives in the 
area of privacy and data protection; although some countries (such as Tunisia, Morocco) within 
these Sub- regions have adopted comprehensive framework for data protection. 
 
4.2.2.3 National Regulations 
 
The majority of African State Constitutions provides for privacy rights. However, the scope, 
context and mode of their implementation differ from country to country. Taking an example of 
Cape Verdean Constitution of 2010; it provides for two pillars for privacy protection. The first 
pillar of protection resembles those found in international instruments such as article 12 of the 
UNCHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR; with somewhat wider scope and more elaborate. Reading 
from Articles 38 to 42, the Constitution guarantees the right to privacy to personal identity, 
(including personal images) good name, honour, reputation in a civil capacity and in a family 
life.466 The protection extends to protection against arbitrary entry into one’s home without legal 
justification.467 Article 41 guarantees confidentiality of correspondence and communications. The 
Constitution goes further under Article 42 prohibiting anonymous or secret recording (using 
technological devices) and processing of personal data, either for political, philosophical or 
ideological or religious/faith reasons. Prohibition is also made against an unauthorized access 
and processing of computer files, records or database. This provision is similar to Article 71 of 
the Mozambican Constitution.468 
The second pillar is habeas data. Habeas data is provided under article 43 of the Cape Verdean 
Constitution. The provision states as follows; 
                                                          
465 Mike Campbell (Pvt) LTD & others v. Republic of Zimbabwe; SADC (T) 2/07, 13 December 2007. 
466 Cape Verdean Constitution, Article 38. 
467 Ibid, Article 40. 
468  Article 71 of Mozambique Constitution on the Use of Computerised Data states; 
‘1. The use of computerised means for recording and processing individually identifiable data in respect of political, 
philosophical or ideological beliefs, of religious faith, party or trade union affiliation or private lives, shall be 
prohibited. 
The law shall regulate the protection of personal data kept on computerized records, the conditions of access to data 
banks, and the creation and use of such data banks and information stored on computerised media by public 
authorities and private entities. 
3. Access to data bases or to computerised archives, files and records for obtaining information on the personal data 
of third parties, as well as the transfer of personal data from one computerised file to another that belongs to a 
distinct service or institution, shall be prohibited except in cases provided for by law or by judicial decision. 
 4. All persons shall be entitled to have access to collected data that relates to them and to have such data rectified’. 
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‘43. (1). Tous les citoyens ont droit à l'habeas data leur permettant de prendre connaissance des 
renseignements figurant dans les fichiers, les archives ou les registres informatiques les intéressant, d'être 
informés des fins auxquelles elles sont destinées, et d'exiger que ces données soient rectifiées ou mises à 
jour. 
(2). La procédure d'habeas data est réglementée par la loi’. 
The provision gives all citizens the right to habeas data, allowing them to review the information 
contained in the files, archives, or computer records; to be informed of the purpose for which 
their personal data are intended for, and to require that the data be corrected or updated. In 
Cape Verde, habeas data is a procedure regulated by law. 
However, the Cape Verdean Constitutional provision on privacy right and that of habeas data 
have a limited application. They apply only to Cape Verde citizens. This limitation is similar to 
one imposed in the Nigerian Constitution of 2011. Article 37 of the Nigeria Constitution states; 
‘37. The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic 
communications is hereby guaranteed and protected’. 
Surprisingly, all other fundamental rights provided under part IV in the Nigeria Constitution are 
guaranteed to ‘every person’ except the right to privacy which is guaranteed to only to ‘citizen’. It is 
even more surprising that the previous version of the Constitution, the Nigerian Constitution of 
1960 had the right to privacy under article 22 in the following terms; 
‘22. (1) Every person shall be entitled to respect for 'his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence’. 
It would seem that the constitutional right to privacy in Nigeria deteriorated with the 
Constitutional development rather than improving; with regards to the right to privacy. 
The other African States with Constitutional right to privacy structures the right in similar terms 
to international instruments.  The right to privacy is provided as the basic protection to ‘every 
person’, against arbitrary searches in one’s dwelling houses or properties, collection and processing 
of information relating to their family and private affairs including privacy of their 
communications.469 
                                                          
469 See article 31 of the Kenya Constitution 2010; Article 14 of South African Constitution 1996; Article 27 of 
Uganda Constitution 1995; Articles 13 and 15 of Senegal Constitution; Article 57 of Egypt Constitution; Articles 10 
and 11 of Lesotho Constitution; Article 32 of Angola Constitution; Article 9 of Botswana Constitution; Articles 20 
and 21 of Benin Constitution; Article 16 of Tanzania Constitution (New constitution article 27); article 21 Malawi 
Constitution; Article 22 Rwanda Constitution; article  28 of Burundi Constitution; Article 9 of Mauritius 
Constitution; Article 28 of Togo Constitution; Article 6 of Burkina Faso Constitution; Article 24 of Tunisia 
Constitution; Articles 39 and 40 Algeria; Article 37 of the interim Constitution of Sudan of 2005 (the previous 
Constitution of 1973 article 29); article 22 of South Sudan Constitution; article 26 of the Ethiopian Constitution; 
article 24 of the Morocco Constitution as published in the bulletin official; articles 11,12 and 13 of the Libya 
Constitution; article 6 of Mali Constitution; article 12 and 13 of Djibouti Constitution; article 42 and 45 of Chad 
Constitution; article 5,6 and 12 of Gabon Constitution; article 12 of Guinea Constitution; article 23 of Gambia 
Constitution; article 27 and 29 of Niger constitution; article 32 of Zambia constitution.; article29 and 31 of the 
Constitution of  Democratic Republic of Congo; article 13 of Namibia Constitution; article 13 of Madagascar 
Constitution and article 15 of the Constitution of People’s Republic of Zanzibar and article 57 of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe of 2013. 
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Mauritanian Constitution is silent on privacy rights; Somali, Swaziland and Ivory Coast’s 
Constitutional privacy rights are limited to unauthorized entry and surveillance of dwelling 
houses. Cameroonian Constitution has the right to privacy provided in the preamble; normally 
not enforceable. However, Article 12 of the Cameroonian Constitution states, that, Cameroon 
‘shall recognize and protect traditional values that conform to democratic principles, human rights and the law’. 
The similar pattern is seen in Comoros, where the right to privacy is provided in the preamble. 
However, in the case of Comoro, the right to privacy, like Somali, Swaziland and Ivory Coast are 
only guaranteed against unauthorized searches and surveillance of the dwelling houses.  
Some African States have adopted comprehensive privacy protection laws/data privacy laws;470 
other with draft bills.471 These laws enforce the Constitutional right to privacy in a more 
achievable manner. They impose privacy protection obligations and principles in securing and 
regulating storage, usage and processing of personal information. These reforms, as reported by 
Cynthia Rich, ‘are still in their formative stages, in large part because the regulators are not yet in 
place; however, in some of the countries with a more established privacy regimes, the regulators 
have been stepping up their enforcement efforts’.472 The best example to illustrate Cynthia’s 
observation is Cape Verde; Cape Verde was the first African country to adopt a comprehensive 
data protection law in 2001. To-date, the country has yet to establish a DPA. Another example is 
Seychelles, the second country to adopt comprehensive data protection law in Africa in 2003; to-
date, Seychelles has not yet publicized the law. Hence, the law remains unimplemented. Most of 
these laws contain the traditional data privacy principles and obligations.  
Although these principles are similar to the domestic laws, there is varying degrees of the 
strictness of rules, practice and procedures in dealing with personal data as well as regimes for 
trans-border data flow. In some countries, there are also (on top of or without the 
comprehensive data protection laws) sector-specific laws. These laws have privacy specific 
rule/principles based on activities within a relevant sector. Most of such laws are found in the 
communication sector, health sector, National security laws, and employment sector. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Data protection regulations and institutions in Africa are still developing. Privacy is protected 
both in the human rights instruments and specific data privacy laws. The majority of the human 
rights instruments and data privacy laws/instruments are soft law hence do not offer compelling 
force for the enactment of data protection legislation at national levels. Although these laws are 
similar, in a sense that they contain basic data protection principles, and require the 
establishment of supervisory authorities, they are at the same time dissimilar for having different 
scopes.  
                                                          
470 E.g., Angola (2011), Benin (2009), Burkina Faso (2004), Cape Verde (2001), Mauritius (2004), Morocco (2009), 
Senegal (2008), Tunisia (2004). 
471 E.g., Ghana (since 2010); Kenya (since 2009), Tanzania (Since 2013), Uganda (2010), Rwanda (since 2013). 
472 Rich, C., ‘Privacy laws in Africa and Middle East’, Privacy and Security Law Report, 2014.  
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The record on the domestic enforcement of the constitutional right to privacy is disappointing. 
As a Region, Africa neglected or refused to recognize the right to privacy under the Regional 
Instrument. It is therefore not surprising that even at Sub-Regional level; the right to privacy has 
never been adjudicated. The enforcement of other human rights violations has also been stalling. 
In fact, Sub-Regions such as the SADC had decided explicitly to revoke its Tribunal’s power to 
enforce human right violations. This reveals the lack of political will to enforce individual rights 
in Africa; regardless of the promise and guarantees provided in the preambles of the Regional 
and Sub-Regional human rights instruments. 
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5. Data Protection Reforms in Africa: Civil and Common Law Legal Culture 
5.1 Introduction 
 
African States’ legal systems are relatively complex and diverse owing to colonization. The 
majority of the systems are an interface of imported colonial rules and customary laws. Others 
add Islamic law to the mix. Senegal is a former colony of France hence ‘inherited’ the Civil Code 
legal system. In addition to this system, Senegal has a customary and Islamic law system. Like 
Senegal, Tanzania has a system of customary law, Islamic law (invoked mostly in matters relating 
to personal law) and of course Common Law legal system, an inheritance from the British. 
Although the focus of this chapter is not to assess the legal cultures or the systems of the two 
countries, it is necessary to identify the attributes of the two legal systems and their relevance (if 
any) in legal reforms. This is important because both systems have, during and in the post-
colonial era, responded and been influenced differently by an introduction of what Jacques 
Frémont refers to as ‘the official legal system’.473 Also, is the fact that, in the sphere of human 
right (especially the right to privacy) acceptance and legitimization of such rules or legal 
frameworks may create complex questions on concepts and cultural interaction as already 
discussed in chapter three. Another consideration is the fact that, African states accommodate 
more than one legal culture in parallel. In total, the chapter assesses to what extent is this 
classification relevant in relation to legal reforms. 
The chapter also makes a comparative mirror analysis of the two countries data reform process 
and the established data protection regimes. The essence of the analysis is to see how, and if so 
to what extent these reforms reflects the nature of the African pluralistic legal systems. Also, the 
chapter navigates through different attempts to harmonize legal frameworks in Africa as an 
attempt to predict the prospects for the harmonization of data protection regimes in Africa. 
 
5.2 Demystifying Legal Cultures: The Relevance of the Civil and Common Law 
Systems in Legal reforms 
 
Civil or Common Law legal system is the difference resulting from the variation in legal standing. 
While Civil Code system relies on the legal text, the Common Law system relies on judicial 
opinion and traditions (precedents). It means a civil law judge would rely entirely on the legal text 
to derive to a decision; while a common law judge has much more autonomy to decide beyond 
the legal text by applying judicial reasoning and invocation of precedents. Contemporary scholars 
discourage a discussion on the differences between the two systems as they consider having no 
substantial role in legal reforms. Salvatore Mancuso illustrates this with reference to the 
traditional understanding where the distinction came from, regarding the role of Courts applying 
abstracts and general rules to get to a legal standing. Explaining the scenario saying; 
‘Civil Law legal systems are characterized by the presence of codes and other statutes 
containing an extensive number of legal provisions forming the entire corpus of laws to 
be applied by the courts. Such a system is assumed to be self-sufficient; encompassing all 
                                                          
473 Frémont (n 369), p. 150. 
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the rules suited for all possible cases without any need for “external” contributions, 
leaving the courts without any space to move beyond the application of the prearranged 
substantive rules. On the other hand, the English legal system was conceived as a system 
with a limited number of statutes and legislative acts, creating wide autonomy for the 
courts to determine the rule of law applicable to a specific case which would later serve 
as precedent for future courts.’474 
The author believes the reliance in codes and statutes by the Civil Law systems is vanishing. To 
him, the practitioners and scholars from Civil Law legal traditions are becoming more similar to 
the Common Law legal tradition by going beyond the codes and statute and applying case laws. 
He explains in length, and to avoid derogation and distortion in what he meant to say, I prefer to 
bring in his words; 
‘Modem courts tend to make their decisions conform to the principles of law contained 
in the rules set forth in the codes and statutes, as well as to how other courts, especially 
the high courts, have interpreted and applied the codes and statutes. Journals and 
commentaries related to case law have been established in both case law generally and to 
specific areas of law specifically. Academic teaching is constantly moving from the 
simple use of doctrinal handbooks, to a more integrated approach - teaching by using 
case law and incorporating practical classes where the analysis of foreign legal systems is 
now considered essential to better one's knowledge of a specific legal issue.’ 
In the area of law-making, the trend is to move to the adoption of codes characterized by ‘open’ 
rules. Thus, the courts are left to decide between further developments of the single rules (this is 
the case of the Dutch Civil Code of 1992 where even the traditional hierarchy among the 
different sources of law has been abandoned); the adoption of rules that are the result of 
principles elaborated both in the civil law and the common law legal traditions (this is the case of 
the UNIDROIT Principles of the International Commercial Contracts or the CISG which 
greatly influenced the drafting of the rules on contracts in several countries); or the codification 
of legal institutions elaborated by the Common Law tradition (like in the adoption of trust law in 
China).’475 
The author also notes that the Common Law legal tradition is taking steps towards the use of 
codified rules. He gives an example of England’s on going law making activities and the 1998 
adoption of a civil code fashioned in civil law style. He gives other examples of a mixed legal 
system as such as the USA which seems to be moving towards codification of legal rules and 
reliance on written statutes, bringing it closer to Civil Law legal system.  The trend, he says, have 
converged the two systems, something that is not only seen in practice but also in legal concepts, 
rules and fundamental categories, terminology as well as sharing of common legal and 
democratic values,476 which he attributes to the ongoing legal harmonization in Europe. 
As with Europe, Africa is moving towards legal harmonization. Although the harmonization has 
been very slow; an important point of departure is that the convergence of the Civil and 
Common Law legal systems in Africa cannot be surmised as a convergence of legal culture in 
                                                          
474 Mancuso, S., ‘The New African Law: Beyond the Difference Between Common Law and Civil Law’, Annual 
Survey of International & Comparative Law, 2008, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 39-60, at p.. 43. 
475 Mancuso(n 476), p. 44. 
476 Ibid, p. 45. 
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general terms as well. One needs to be mindful of the factual differences; more so when there is 
an introduction (or the need to introduce) of a new legal framework.  The first aspect is the 
structure of the African legal systems with makes it different from the rest of the world. 
Salvatore Mancuso explain this phenomenon in terms of the mixture of legal systems in African 
system; he says, the imported Western legal system which gives each African country a specific 
legal imprint differentiates it with the other African States and gave rise to a sub-classification of 
an African legal system rooted in the structure and tradition of a former parent country.477 
Mancuso continues to explain that, although African legal systems can be assimilated with that of 
the respective colonizing country, one should not assume that the legal rules are the same with 
the Western country from which they received their legal system. There have been several legal 
developments both in Europe and Africa; on one hand, African States have not adopted the new 
development of their former colonies and on the other, African States had their own legal 
development ‘involving the revaluation of customary law, development of their own case law 
and transplant from other non-European legislations. The key role played by customary law, the 
influence of religious law (Islam) give rise to a hybrid, modern African legal system cannot found 
anywhere else in the world.’478 
There is also a role of the Sub-Regional economic community bringing the Member States with 
different legal culture and colonial backgrounds such as the East African Community. Initially, 
the EAC comprised of Tanzania (former Germany and later British colony) which, after 
independent adopted a socialist approach, Kenya and Uganda (former British colonies) and 
currently joined by Rwanda and Burundi (former French colonies). Regardless their history, the 
then and the renewed Treaty for the establishment of the EAC479 calls for the Member States to 
harmonize their national legal frameworks to foster for trade and development within Members. 
South Africa for example, has a mix of Civil and Common law but with a major influence from a 
Roman-Dutch system; characterized by the application of ‘customary’ laws in absence of 
professional judges.480 Today, South African legal system may be characterized as more of a 
Common Law system, although stare decisis is given less weight as other Common Law systems. 
In South Africa, customary law is more powerful that Civil and Common Law. The South 
African Constitution explicitly requires judges, when interpreting Bill of Rights, to consider the 
local Customary Law and International Law.481 In fact, Courts have a constitutional obligation to 
develop customary law in order to align it with constitutional dictates.482  
Another example is the Monarchy of Morocco, with a more complex history and legal culture. 
Morocco has three tier legal systems functioning parallel; the Islamic Law, Civil Law and 
Customary Law. In balancing the requirement of all the systems, Morocco had to establish a 
peculiar Court system, better narrated by Chris Nwachukwu Okeke quoting Emory, L., that, 
‘Morocco has a four-level Court or Judicial setup. It has twenty-seven Sadad Courts, thirty 
                                                          
477 Mancuso (n. 474), p. 46. 
478 Ibid. 
479 See Article 126 of the EAC Treaty and Article 47 of the EAC Common Market Protocol. This led to drafting of 
the Bill of Rights for the EAC and establishment of the EAC Frameworks for Cyber Laws 2008/2011. 
480 De Cruz, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London/Sydney, 2nd ed., 
1999, p.47. 
481 Constitution of South Africa 1996, Article 31. 
482 Gumede v. President [2008] ZACC 23 at p. 29. 
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Regional Courts, nine Courts of Appeal and a Supreme Court in Rabat. Sadad and Regional 
Courts are divided into four sections: shari’a; rabbinical; civil, commercial and administrative; 
and penal sections. Sadad Courts are Courts of the first instance for Muslim and Jewish personal 
law. Shari’a sections of Regional Courts also hear personal status cases on appeal.’483  
Upon her independence, Morocco established a legislative body, Mudawwana and started 
codification of legal rules, including traditional customary rules and Islamic rules. Presently, 
Morocco has a well-established system of religious and customary law with precedents forming 
binding law.484 The legal system implemented today in Morocco is no longer Civil Law system; it 
is a localized legal system devised to express the need, wish and definition of justice for the 
Moroccan people. The legal system in Morocco cannot be considered to resemble any of the 
categories of the Western legal systems or that of the colonial masters or any other African state. 
Therefore, the classification of African States based on the legal system transplanted or adopted 
from the ex-colonial powers bears no or very little significance today in determining new legal 
reforms. This is contrary to the assumptions made at the beginning of this research. Hence, in 
this research, the two systems are not considered as whole separate systems, but, as proposed by 
Mancuso, two possible aspects of Western legal systems as they are no longer taken to have 
substantive significance in legal reforms in the African context. 
Perhaps an important aspect when dealing with African legal reforms is the role of African 
customary law and or practices. Again, a startling and an insightful discovery made in the course 
of this research. While the distinction between Civil and Common Law systems seems to be 
vanishing and of less relevance in reform processes in Africa; the role and influence of African 
customary laws in legal reforms and legal harmonization are remarkable and cannot be ignored. 
Instead of looking at the traditional Civil and Common law differences (which are in fact 
diminishing and may lead to false conclusions) in determining legal cultures in Africa, as a 
Region and in individual States, three dimensions are proposed. Mancuso in affirming Gbenga 
Bamodu485 proposition, suggests a three dimension examination, ‘diversity within each country, 
diversity among the African countries and diversity between African and non-African countries.’ 
Mauro Bussani and Anthony Allott suggests an interdisciplinary study involving researchers from 
other fields such as sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, economists, historian to  search for 
the ‘common core’ of an African law to extract common features from different traditions. 
While the proposal is valid, its implementation may be far-fetched. Africa has 54 countries; each 
country has a number of customs and traditional rules; as a result, Africa has more applicable 
laws (through customary) than other Continents and Countries.486 The diversity of customary law 
practices and traditions within a single country makes its nearly impossible to invoke such a 
study; at least in the present context with limited time, human resource and funds. For example, 
taking one of the case studies, Tanzania has 128 tribes, each with its peculiar customary law 
practices, traditions and own tribal language. In Big countries like Nigeria, there are 250 ethnic 
                                                          
483 Okeke, C.N., ‘African Law in Comparative Law: Does Comparativism Have Worth?’, Roger Williams University 
Law Review, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.1-50. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Bamodu, G., ‘Transnational Law, Unification and Harmonization of International Commercial Law in Africa’, 
Journal of African Law, 1994, Vol.38, No.2, pp.125-143. 
486 Okeke (n 483), p.2. 
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groups each with its customary laws, traditions and ethnic languages.487 These systems of tribal 
law are as diverse and innovative as the legal system of any State.488  
Studying the traditional or tribal laws of African States, summons a major difficulty. Most of 
these systems are not incorporated into written texts. Cultural anthropologists in Africa have 
recorded some systems through studies, but very few have been formally codified as part of the 
laws of the African States. Moreover, the vast majority of these systems would require a scholar 
studying the systems, a journey to the Region and speak with people about how their system of 
traditional law functions. The full understanding of the traditional system would also require a 
greater knowledge of the way the culture and social relations are conducted in the Region and 
with individual State and down to each ethnic group. As such, a simple textual and situational 
analysis of these systems would not suffice. They require far more effort than studying a series of 
Constitutions or Codes for effective analysis. For these reasons, this research opted to focus on 
comparing various layers within each case study (Senegal and Tanzania), the political and legal 
background as well as the history and or motivations pertaining to the drafting and reforming of 
the data protection regimes; and whether or not the reforms reveal any considerations to the 
existing legal systems apart from the ‘formal legal’ system. 
 
5.3 Legal Harmonization and/or Unification: Is Africa in Divide? 
 
The discussion in this section is imperative for the reasons that, this research seeks to examine 
African legal environment with regards to harmonization of data protection regulation. Although 
Senegal and Tanzania were selected as case studies, whatever route the two countries undertook 
have been stimulated and or have bearing within the bigger picture; specifically, Regional and 
Sub-regional responses, trends and practices with regards to data protection and in particular 
legal reforms and legal harmonization in general. Therefore, it is necessary to have a glimpse of 
what is happening on the Continent regarding law reforms and legal harmonization. 
The legal harmonization initiatives in Africa reveal a pattern of partition. The divide manifests 
between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. This, although not formally declared can 
be observed from the approaches, patterns and initiatives towards specific legal reforms and 
collective efforts in legal harmonization. For purposes of clarity, it is important to note that the 
partition is neither related nor influenced by denominations to a Civil Or Common Law legal 
culture. The partition is based on the States’ official languages, i.e. English or French.  
 
5.3.1 The OHADA Framework for Harmonization of African Business Laws 
 
The Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Laws (Organisation pour 
l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) is an organization established in 
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1995489 with the aim to modernize and harmonize business laws in Africa and to promote 
investment and economic growth. Although the organization and its objectives refer to ‘Africa’, 
its activities are focused on the Francophone African countries. The organization has created a 
framework for the implementation of the harmonized business laws in the francophone 
countries through the adoption of Uniform Acts. The Uniform Acts are published in French 
(with no official English translation) which automatically excludes the English speaking countries 
from making good of the Acts. This is in compliance with Article 42 of the OHADA Treaty 
which despite a lack of an official translation of the Acts and other legal documents completely 
disregards the English-speaking countries, by imposing a language requirement to the Member 
States signing the Treaty. The Treaty provides that a country signing the Treaty agrees that the 
working language shall be French. Consequently, all legal documents relating to OHADA and its 
activities, including case laws are published in French. 
Furthermore, the Uniform Acts have a direct domestic application. The effect of the Uniform 
Act is to annul all conflicting domestic laws.490This is a strategy adopted by OHADA to avoid 
discrepancies and adoption of conflicting laws. Consequently, this rejects the English-speaking 
countries from adopting the Acts. The Uniform Acts are made and adopted by the Council of 
Minister under OHADA on behalf of the Member States. Law making bodies in specific 
countries are excluded in the process, although the governments are consulted in the process. 
The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration is involved in providing expert advice, while the 
law making mandate remains with the Council. In effect, this creates another obstacle for the 
English-speaking countries to form membership, as the language of the law is unfamiliar not 
only to the people but also to the law enforcers.  It also closes any possibility of the English-
speaking countries to access the Court (CCJA) for lacking comprehension of the working 
language. Indeed, the English-speaking countries are technically excluded from forming part of 
this initiative in harmonization of business laws in Africa. Nevertheless, Article 53 of the 
OHADA Treaty opens doors to all African countries, members of the African Union (AU) to 
assent.  
 
5.3.2 ARIPO and OAPI 
 
The African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO)491 and Organisation Africaine de 
la Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI)492 are organizations formed to coordinate and harmonize industrial 
systems in Africa. ARIPO was created by the 1976 Lusaka Agreement and it caters for the 
English-speaking African Member States. OAPI was created by the 1977 Bangai Agreement. It 
presupposes of the 61 French-speaking African States. However, unlike the UNIDROIT, OAPI 
provides for an official English translation for its legal and working documents. The two 
                                                          
489 The stablishing Treaty was signed in Port Louis, Mauritius in October 1995 and came into force in July 1995. 
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491 Established under Article 1 of the Lusaka Agreement of the creation of the African Intellectual Property 
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organizations coordinate in issues relating to intellectual properties in Africa and both are 
partners with WIPO through the Quadripartite Agreement.  
In 2006 the African Union made an effort to unite ARIPO and OAPI by creating PAIPO as an 
overall African intellectual property organization. Up until the time of writing this thesis, the 
organization has not yet come into existence. The Draft PAIPO Statute is still under review by 
the specialized technical committee on justice and legal affairs of the African Union. 
 
5.3.3 Harmonization of Data Protection Legal Frameworks  
5.3.3.1 The Francophone 
 
For the purpose of clarity, Francophone Africa is an economic zone comprised of the former 
French colonies in the central and West Africa.493 The Francophone Africa was created by the 
French in 1945, after the WWII with the hope to assure a continued relation and assimilation 
with the colonies and sustaining the exchange rate of the CFA against the dollar.494 495 This was 
after realizing that the zone was comparatively underdeveloped and economically behind. 
In relation to data protection legal reforms, the Association of Francophone Data Protection 
Authorities (Association francophone des autorités de protection des données personnelles - AFAPDP) has 
been playing a crucial role in harmonization of privacy and data protection legal and regulatory 
frameworks in the Francophone Africa. The AFAPDP was founded in 2007 and has its 
headquarters with the French data protection authority in Paris (CNIL). The AFAPDP has an 
objective to promote cooperation and training initiatives between the French-speaking countries 
specifically on issues relating to data protection.496 It offers expertise to countries without 
‘proper’ legal framework for data protection and brings together data protection authorities to 
discuss and resolute on issues relating to data protection in specific countries.497 This is done 
through yearly organized meeting where all members participate. Apart from the meetings, they 
also organize summits for members to discuss and exchange priorities and challenges in 
regulation of data protection. Trainings are also conducted to impart the new authorities with the 
                                                          
493 Including the West African countries of Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cameroon not colonies of the 
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494 Zafar, A and Kubota, K., ‘Regional integration in central Africa: key issues’,  World Bank African Region 
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proper knowledge to implement the law and raise awareness to its members on new legal 
instruments adopted by the organization for their proper implementation.498  
Furthermore, the AFAPDP participates in dialogue with other Regional data protection 
institutions such as the EU and the APEC. So far, the AFAPDP has been granted an observer 
status in the work of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of 
Individual with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe. 
The AFAPDP has made revolutionary changes in the regulation of data protection in the 
Francophone Africa, although much of their work has largely escaped publicity.499 Floriane 
Leclercq, the Data Protection Project Manager at the AFAPDP, had reported that, as of June 
2013, seven out of 16 French-speaking African countries had an authority tasked with the 
protection of personal data and bills are being drafted in six French-speaking African 
countries.500 This makes the Francophone African countries ahead of the Anglophone African 
countries in data protection legal reforms.  
According to Leclercq, the objective of the AFAPDP is to ensure maximum adoption of data 
protection laws and their enforcements. The AFAPDP is inspired by the EU Model notably the 
Convention 108, although she says, one of its key approaches it considers is the adoption of a 
law that respects the needs and traditions of each country. Leclercq adds that ‘the AFAPDP 
offers assistance to States and local authorities to develop an expertise in the protection of 
personal data, based on the experience of members of its network authorities.’501 
The AFAPDP have adopted several instruments that place Francophone African countries more 
secured and in the global data protection map than the Anglophone African countries. In 2013 a 
Protocol for Cooperation was adopted to allow the AFAPDP members to exchange information 
in the discharge of the data protection authorities duties in light of their national law and the 
duty of confidentiality.502 According to the president of the AFAPDP, the Francophones are 
determined to establish a framework which can facilitate cooperation mechanism to regulate 
international transfer within the francophone space in the absence of international regulation on 
international data transfer.503 Other instruments adopted by the organization in protection of 
personal data includes, Madrid Declaration on protection of personal data,504 Protocol on 
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Cooperation between Francophone countries,505Resolution on  Mass Surveillance,506 Resolution 
on Ethics in Processing Health and Generic Data,507 Resolution on Transparency of 
Governments in Processing Personal Data,508 Resolution to Promote Digital Education,509 
Resolution for Sensitization of Society on Data Protection,510 Resolution on Independence of 
Data Protection Authorities,511 Resolution on the Use of French Language in Official and Non-
Official Activities by the Member States,512 this supplements a 2010 Resolution where members 
agreed to use French in official activities of the AFAPDP and international conferences.513 
In 2014, the AFAPDP adopted Company Binding Rules (CRB) to allow transfer of data by 
companies within the francophone space and possibly with the EU members. The rules are said 
to have been modelled based on the same rules from the EU, but also took consideration of the 
developments in EU.514 The Organization is working on creating a global framework on data 
protection, and have adopted the 'Strategy of the Digital Francophone: 2020' with a goal to 
impart an extensive knowledge on data protection within and among the Francophone.  
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content/uploads/2013/12/AFAPDP2013_Education_finale.pdf.  
510 Résolution pour une sensibilisation efficace de la société à la protection des données personnelles,  Adoptée par 
l’Assemblée générale de l’AFAPDP le 31 octobre 2011 à Mexico (Mexique), available at 
http://www.afapdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/AG-2011_R%C3%A9solution-sensibilisation1.pdf  
511 Résolution relative à la nécessaire indépendance des autorités de protection des données personnelles,  Adoptée 
par l’assemblée générale de l’AFAPDP  le 31 octobre 2011 à Mexico (Mexique), available at 
http://www.afapdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/AG-2011_R%C3%A9solution-sur-
ind%C3%A9pendance1.pdf. 
512 Résolution sur l’utilisation de la langue française à la Conférence internationale des commissaires à la protection 
des données personnelles et de la vie privée Adoptée par l’assemblée générale de l’AFAPDP le 31 octobre 2011 à 
Mexico (Mexique), available at http://www.afapdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/AG-
2011_R%C3%A9solution-sur-utilisation-langue-fran%C3%A7aise1.pdf.  
513 Résolution de l’Association francophone des autorités de protection des données personnelles (AFAPDP) pour 
la promotion de l’usage de la langue française au sein des organisations et conférences internationals,  
 Assemblée générale du 30 novembre 2010, available at 
http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Resolution_usage_francais-2.pdf.  
514 Résolution relative à la procédure d'encadrement des transferts de données personnelles de l'espace francophone 
au moyen de règles contraignantes d’entreprise (RCE),7ème Assemblée générale de l’AFAPDP du 22 novembre 
2013 à Marrakech, available at http://www.afapdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/RCE-modifi%C3%A9e-
2014.pdf. 
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5.3.3.2 The EUROMED Partnership 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership came about in 1995 after the European Community 
adopted the Barcelona Declaration.515 The Declaration was aimed at economic integration 
between the European Community and the Arab Mediterranean countries. EU being the major 
trade partner of the Arab-Maghreb, 516needed to protect its markets, after its own integration in 
1992 through the Maastricht Treaty. In doing so, it was inevitable to ensure the stability of her 
neighbors on the assumption that, without security in the Mediterranean, there can be no 
security in Europe,517 hence the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.  
Attempts to establish EUROMED partnership were seen as early as in the 1960s when the 
European Community signed a Special Association and Trade Agreement with the 
Mediterranean countries. In the 1970s, the European Community launched a Global 
Mediterranean Policy declaring the countries around the Mediterranean Sea as belonging to a 
single region, the Mediterranean.518 On the African side, the Mediterranean includes Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan. 
The Barcelona Declaration enforced the previous efforts by making the EUROMED a 
multilateral framework with set of objectives. Together with the Declaration, the European 
Community introduced the European Neighborhood policy.519 The reason for the policy is to 
strengthen her relation with each country individually. The ENP introduces a new aspect of legal 
approximation and compatibility of rules. The aim is to prepare the Mediterranean to participate 
in the European internal market, information society, research, innovation, social policy, people 
to people contracts any many other aspects.520 In the same year, 2004, Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly was established as a body charged with following up on the Euro-
Mediterranean association agreements and to adopt resolutions for the attention of the 
Ministerial Conference.521  
The ENP, according to Postolache, is different from the previous policies as the declaration is 
focused on issues of democracy and human rights.522 The focus of the ENP on democracy and 
human right were further compounded by the adoption of Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean in 2011. With the two documents, the 
European Community shifted approach, making democracy and promotion of human right 
                                                          
515 European Community, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Brussels. 
516 For details see Maamri, N., Free Trade Areas, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Prospects of South-South 
Integration in The Mediterranean, p. 174, http://emo.pspa.uoa.gr/data/papers/7_paper.pdf accessed 26/07/2016. 
517 Adamo, K and Garonna, P., Euro Mediterranean Integration and Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, p.75, 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/nutshell/2009/9_EuroMediterranean.pdf accessed 26/07/2016. 
518 Bicchi, F., ‘The European Origin of Euro-Mediterranean Practices’, Working Paper No. 12, 2004, California, p.2. 
519 Before the ENP, the partnership had three aspects, (i) Political and security partnership, (ii) Economic 
partnership, and (iii) Social and cultural partnership.  The social and cultural partnership emphasizes on, among 
other issues, the respect for the fundamental rights. However, this aspect was largely ignored and efforts were 
directed to the other two categories. See further Postolache, A., New Challenges in the Relation between the 
European Union and the Mediterranean, p. 5, http://www.analyticalmk.com/files/2012/01/02.pdf accessed 
26/07/2016.. 
520 European Community, European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, May 2004, p. 3. 
521 Adamo and Garonna (n 517), p.75. 
522 Postolache (n 519), p. 8. 
 94 
 
priority. The objectives include support to the democratic and constitutional reforms, judicial 
reforms and establishment of an appropriate legal framework. 
The four Mediterranean countries, have, between themselves adopted the Agadir Declaration.523 
This declaration creates a free trade zone between the countries.  Furthermore, Morocco, Israel 
and Tunisia have an observer status at the European Commissions for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ). CEPEJ helps these countries to evaluate their legal systems and guide them through 
reforms. This is part of the EU and CoE programme on creating efficacy legal system in the 
zone; towards a common legal space between the Mediterranean and the EU. The idea behind 
CEPEJ within the Mediterranean zone is promotion of legal harmonization of the States’ 
legislation to match with the European and international standards and to provide support to the 
development and the effective implementation of new legislation in accordance with the 
European and other international standards according to the needs. 
 
5.3.3.3 The Sub-Regional Economic and Development Communities 
 
Africa as a Region has about 14 Sub-regions. However, to avoid repetition to the previous 
section of chapter four on Sub-regional data protection instruments, this discussion focuses on 
the divide on the Sub-Regional instrument. The African Sub-Regions are ‘competing’ and in 
some cases create conflicts with regards to legal reforms. On the one hand, the Sub-Regional 
communities are competing - and in sometime conflicting - between the need of regionalization 
as an instrument for development in view of globalization, and the need for reform within their 
respective legal models. 
Decolonization in Africa and the post-independence challenges such as the territorial disputes 
and lack of effective Regional organ to deal with insecurity issues made it vital for the creation 
of, what Julian Kitipov term as ‘new regional security areas’.524 Consequently in 1967, the first 
Regional Economic Community, the East African Community was established. This was 
followed by the ECOWAS in 1975 and the SADC in 1980. As a Region, Africa has 14 Sub-
regions; today each Sub-region has its own economic community; of course majority with less 
visibility than the few.  
These RECs embrace the idea of Regional identity with varied capacities and interests. This fact 
alone hinders the effectiveness of the overall objective of the African Union to unite Africa as 
one region. The result is the failure of the African Union to collectively address matters of 
common concern adequately. Furthermore, there emerge tendencies within Africa to restrict 
flow of data by States or Sub-regional groups which have adopted data protection 
instruments/laws.525 African States’ domestic laws on data protection have also inhere disparities 
                                                          
523 Déclaration d’Agadir instituant la création d’une Zone de Libre Echange entre les Pays Arabes Méditerranéens, 8 
Mai, 2001. 
524 Kitipov, J., ‘African Local Integration and Multilateralism: The Regional Economic Communities and Their 
Relationship with the European Union’, E-paper No. 16 November 2011, p. 9. 
525 For instance, the AU Cyber Convention has under Article II-41, restriction to cross-border data flow to non-
members if the non-member does not provide adequate level of protection; the same is seen in sub-regional 
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which Makulilo attributes to diversity in legal culture and systems, lack of Regional data privacy 
regime, uncoordinated Sub-regional data privacy frameworks and countries’ peculiar needs.526 
 
5.4 Data Protection Legal Reforms in Africa: Senegal and Tanzania in Focus 
 
As noted in the introduction part to this chapter, Senegal and Tanzania have mixed legal systems 
with Civil Code and Common Law as the ‘official’ or the dominant legal systems respectively. 
Both States adopted Constitutions based on their colonial legacy. This section explores the 
essential characteristics of each country (with no special attention to Civil or Common Law 
denomination), internal and external forces to reform and any consideration made to harmonize 
the process with customary and local norms. 
These aspects are looked against the data protection law and draft bill (the actual texts) to see 
whether the adopted law considers peculiarities common within specific country. This is in a 
view of what Mancuso insists, that, in reforming laws in Africa, ‘it is necessary to arrive at the 
creation of an ‘African law’, and to avoid a fracture among different legal actors causing this new 
epiphany of ‘African’ to become yet another example of inefficient law. The main essence is to 
avoid the conflict in order to avoid rejection’.527 
Although it is necessary to have a localized law, ‘Globalization of law’ necessitates certain legal 
rules and or regimes/frameworks to conform to certain standards. This is the case with data 
protection regimes. Data protection reforms in Africa, which began in wake of 2000s, are highly 
influenced by the existing international data protection codes such as the Convention 108 and 
the DPD. Senegalese law is said to have been highly influenced by the Convention 108 while the 
Tanzanian draft protection of personal data by DPD. To suffice the research quest, a brief 
background on privacy protection, an overview on the internal and external motivations to 
reforms is provided as an overview. This is followed by textual analysis of the law and the draft 
bill. The analysis is made as a mirror comparison between the two texts in evaluating their 
strength in protection of personal data and individual privacy. The mirror comparison is also 
conducted to test the idea of harmonization of laws being pursued in Africa as a solution to 
eliminate obstacles to economic development caused by judicial differences.528 Textual analysis is 
also made identify incorporation (or not) of the existing legal systems (mainly customary 
systems) that have bearing in privacy and data protection. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
instruments such as ECOWAS under Article 36, SADC under Article 48 (1), and even in domestic laws restricting 
transfer to fellow African countries which do not provide adequate level of protection. 
526 Makulilo (n 26), p. 470. 
527  Mancuso (n 474). 
528 Allot, A.N., ‘Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa’, International Comparative Law Quarterly, 1965, Vol. 
14, No.2, pp. 366-389; Allot, A.N., ‘The Unity of African Law’, in Essays in African Law, London, Butterworths, 
1960, pp. 69-71, and Mancuso (n 474). 
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5.4.1 Privacy Protection before the Data Protection Reforms in Senegal 
 
Located in West Africa, Senegal got her independence from France in 1960. The country 
introduced a single party system in 1966 with dual-parliamentary system. In 1976, Senegal 
introduced a restricted multiparty system of government. However, in the late 1980's Senegal 
reverted into a democratic authoritarianism which led to limiting citizen's and civil societies' 
opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights in pretext of order publique (public order). The 
semi-presidential system of government in Senegal is based on the 5th French Republic and the 
French Constitution of 1958. In the late 1990s, with increased power outrage and protests for 
social justice, Senegal was labelled an autocratic government within Africa and at international 
level.529 
As the capital of French West Africa during the colonial period, Senegal was France’s most 
important African territory. The French had a real and central presence there than in other 
colonies, so its culture became particularly ingrained into Senegalese life. The two countries have 
maintained the close ties since political independence. Senegal has maintained a positive 
relationship with France, and many elements of French culture introduced during the colonial 
period remains an important part of Senegalese identity.530  
The Constitution of Senegal contains provisions that protect and guarantees fundamental rights 
and individual freedoms. However, in practice, the state of human rights is affected by the 
Muslim brotherhood and their religious leaders; the Marabouts. The Marabouts exert authority in 
legitimizing a government in power. The Marabouts acts as intermediaries on policies and 
government actions and mobilize electorate activities; hence possesses considerable influence on 
the government. They are, in turn, an essential portion of the social and political stability in 
Senegal. Pitifully, the interests of the Marabouts are not always and not necessarily in harmony 
with human rights standards and advocates for human rights.  
Senegal has had only two Constitutions (with several amendments) since its independence in 
1960. The Independence Constitution had under Articles 10 and 13 the right to privacy as; 
Article 10, 
‘Le secret de la correspondance, des communications postales télégraphiques et téléphoniques est 
inviolable. Il ne peut être ordonné de restriction à cette inviolabilité qu’en application de la loi.’  
Translated as: The secrecy of correspondence and of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and 
electronic communications, is inviolable. Restriction of this inviolability may only be ordered in 
the application of the law. 
 
Article 13 provides further for the right to privacy as follows: 
                                                          
529 Adjolohoun, H.S., ‘The ECOWAS Court as a Human Rights Promoter? Assessing Five Years’ Impact of the 
Koraou Slavery Judgment’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2013, No. 3. 
530 Bawa, A.B., ‘From Imperialism to Diplomacy: A Historical Analysis of French and Senegal Cultural Relationship’ 
a paper presented at the London Art as Cultural Diplomacy Conference 2013 on the theme: “Contemporary 
International Dialogue: Art-Based Developments and Culture shared between nations” held at The Portcullis 
House, British Parliament from 21st to 24th August 2013. 
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Le domicile est inviolable.   
Il ne peut être ordonné de perquisition que par le juge ou par les autres autorités désignées par la loi. Les 
perquisitions ne peuvent être exécutées que dans les formes  prescrites par celle-ci. Des mesures portant 
atteinte à l’inviolabilité du domicile ou la  restreignant ne peuvent être prises que pour parer à un danger 
collectif ou protéger des personnes en péril de mort.    
Ces mesures peuvent être également prises, en application de la loi, pour protéger,  l’ordre public contre 
des menaces imminentes, singulièrement pour lutter contre les  risques d’épidémie ou pour protéger la 
jeunesse en danger. 
Translated as: The domicile is inviolable. 
[A] search may only be ordered by the judge or by the other authorities designated by the law. 
Searches may only be executed in the forms prescribed by them. The measures infringing the 
inviolability of the domicile or restricting it may only be taken to evade a collective danger or to 
protect persons in peril of death. 
These measures may be taken equally, in the application of the law, to protect the public order 
against imminent threats singularly to combat the risks of an epidemic or to protect youth in 
danger. 
In 2001, Senegal introduced a new Constitution; retaining the semi-parliamentary system (with 
dual executive: Head of State and the head of government) although the President is ‘the first 
and the last resort of all the institutions. He is the unquestionable head of the executive, and he 
supplants all the other powers. The President controls all the institutions, and even independent 
administrative bodies.....the president outweigh all the institutions. He dominates the legislature, 
overshadows the judiciary, and does not spare any sector of the nation’s life. The presidential 
mandates are based on the powers of the President as provided by the Constitution under 
Articles 38, 42-52. 
However, this situation may change when Senegal adopts a new Constitution as proposed by the 
Senegalese National Commission for Institutional Reforms. In 2013, this Commission reviewed 
the status and constitutional separation of power. Eventually, the Commission came up with 
Avant Project De Constitution (Draft Constitution) suggesting a new framework for separation of 
powers between the three organs of the State. The Draft, among other recommendations, 
suggests counter assignment of President powers by the Prime Minister.531 
The Constitution in 2001 made changes to the judicial system; it removed the Supreme Court 
and introduced, in its place, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Council of States, the 
Constitutional Council  and the Accountability Court; the system which resembles the French 
system.  
Of more relevance in the present context is the Constitutional Council. The Constitutional 
Council was created as an instrument for the protection of citizens' rights and freedom. The 
Constitutional Council is argued to have been set up in order to re-adjust the country's situation 
                                                          
531 See more elaboration by Kamga, S.D., ‘An Assessment of the Possibilities for Impact Litigation in Francophone 
African Countries’, AHRLJ 2014, Vol. 14, 2014, pp. 449-473 at p. 458. 
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to meet international obligations and democratization of Senegal (among other things).532  The 
composition of the Council requires 3 judges with at least 25 years working experience. They are 
presidential appointees from the list of six suggested judges by the Superior Council. One of the 
appointees must be a person recommended by human rights association who are required to 
submit a list of three nominations. The idea behind is to have a panel of judges from diverse 
sources for independence in decision making. 
The 2001 Constitution maintained the right to privacy as was in the 1963 Constitution, word for 
word. The only change is that the right to privacy is now provided under Articles 13 and 16 
instead of 10 and 13 respectively. The right to privacy in Senegalese Constitution (along with 
other rights and freedom in the Constitution) is argued to have been profoundly influenced by 
the French Civil Rights Code of 1883.533 The right to privacy, as provided in the Constitution 
also reflects other international Covenants and Conventions which Senegal has acceded 
including Article 12 and 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights respectively.  
It is prudent to note here that, in Senegal, international law takes precedence over domestic law. 
Hence on the right of privacy, Senegal would resort to provisions in the international Covenants 
and/or Conventions she has acceded to and approved, whenever they are in conflicts with 
domestic laws. This is according to Article 98 of the Constitution which states; 
Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité 
supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l'autre 
partie. 
Translated as:  
Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, an authority superior to 
that of laws, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.  
As mentioned previously the section’s introduction, the 2011 Constitution also established a 
Constitutional Council (CC) for the enforcement and protection of citizens' constitutional rights 
and fundamental freedoms. The Constitutional Council is also mandated by Articles 74 and 75 to 
check the Constitutionality of all Bills before they are signed into laws by the president. The 
Council is to ensure that international obligations are adhered to. Through this power, all laws 
are required to be submitted to the CC for review before the second reading in the National 
Assembly to determine its constitutionality before any Bill is pronounced into a law. However, 
the president is empowered to seize the CC declaring a law unconstitutional six days after he has 
received the law passed by the National Assembly. The same powers are given to the National 
Assembly when such seization is by one-tenth of the members of the National Assembly.534 
                                                          
532 Baldé, V.S., Juge constitutionnel et transition démocratique. Etude de cas en Afrique subsaharienne 
francophone, 2010. Available at http://www.etudier.com/dissertations/Tmp-3560-279828323162/73237300.html  
Accessed on 05.04.2017. 
533 Getz, R.T., Slavery and Reform in West Africa: Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Senegal and the 
Gold Coast, Ohio University Press, 2004.  
534 Article 74 of the Senegalese Constitution. 
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The Constitution also gives individual citizen the right to raise unconstitutionality of law. This 
can be done either incidental or in conreto during case hearing. A person may raise 
unconstitutionality of the law when s/he believes such law is in breach of the constitutional 
principles. Furthermore, it should be understood that, through Article 92 sub article 1 of 3 of the 
Constitution, citizens can make an application to the CC to enforce their constitutional rights 
and freedoms.  
The CC has already made a number of decisions on political rights and electorate rights.535 
Unfortunately, until the final preparation of this thesis, there has been no case of the breach of 
the right to privacy or data protection concluded.  Apart from the CC, infringement of the right 
to privacy in Senegal calls for criminal prosecution under the Senegalese Criminal Code which 
was also amended in 2008 to incorporate cybercrimes. The amendment creates a new Part III to 
the Criminal Code and introduces offences relating to Information and Communications 
Technology. 
 
5.4.2 Privacy Protection in Tanzania 
 
Tanzania is located in the Eastern of Africa along the Indian Ocean and within African Great 
Lakes region. Tanzania is the United Republic of two formerly sovereign States namely; the 
Republic of Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of Zanzibar. This makes Tanzania a peculiar 
jurisdiction when it comes to law making and legal reforms.  
Tanganyika got her independence on 9th of December 1961 and became Republic in 1962. 
Zanzibar got her independence on 10th of December 1963, and the People’s Republic was 
established after the revolution of Zanzibar of 12th of January 1964. The union of the two States 
took place soon after the revolution of Zanzibar in 1964 and formed one State, the United 
Republic of Tanzania. The Union State has two governments, the United Republic Government 
and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. However, the Union did not extinguish the 
sovereignty of Zanzibar, because, unlike Tanganyika, Zanzibar retains its own Constitution.  
The Constitution of the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar provides for non-Union 
matters.536 This means, the United Republic of Tanzania has two organs of government both 
with judicial, legislative and supervisory powers.537 The Union government and its organs has 
power over the whole territory in all Union matters, while the judiciary of the Revolutionary 
government of Zanzibar and the House of Representative have power limited to non-Union 
matters in and for Zanzibar; within its Constitution. However, laws passed by the Union 
Parliament do not apply to Zanzibar without an express provision in that behalf538 or unless the 
law relates to Union affairs and is in compliance with the provisions of the Union 
                                                          
535 Kanté., B., Les Méthodes et techniques d’interprétation de la Constitution : l’exemple des pays francophones », in l’interprétation 
constitutionnelle, (Soucramanien), Paris, Dalloz, 2005, p.157 in Madior, F.I.,  Evolution constitutionnelle du Sénégal - De la veille 
de l'Indépendance aux elections de 2007, 2009. p.79 
536  See Maina, C.P and Othman, H., Peter C M  Othman H (eds.) Zanzibar and the Union Question, Zanzibar 
Legal Services Centre, 2006, p. 2. 
537 These powers are provided by the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania under article 4(1)(2) and articles 
of Union between United Republic of Tanzania and People’s Republic of Zanzibar of 1964 article 111 (a). 
538 Nchalla, B. M in  Mbondenyi and Ojiende, (n 296), p. 15. 
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Constitution.539 540 Therefore, Zanzibar has her own laws passed by the House of Representative 
in Zanzibar. 
In 1961, when Tanganyika got her independence from the British, the British did not (unlike 
with her other colonies) impose into Tanganyika the British Constitution model. Nevertheless, 
Tanganyika adopted the Constitution in a Westminster tradition with the government organs 
accountable to the National Assembly. The first Constitution, the Independence Constitution of 
1961 excluded the bill of rights. This model of government lasted for one year when Tanganyika 
resorted to a presidential system through the Republic of Tanganyika Constitution (Constituent 
Assembly Act No. 1 of 1962). This was the second Constitution of the Republic of Tanganyika, 
also excluding the bill of rights as its predecessor. The Republican Constitution of 1962 created a 
Republic government. In 1964, with the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Republican 
Constitution was modified to cater for the Union government.  
The then President, the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere passed an Interim Constitutional Decree, 
renaming the Constitution as an ‘Interim Constitution of United Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar of 1964.541 This was the third Constitution of Tanganyika and the first Constitution of 
the United Republic of Tanzania. In 1975, the Interim Constitution was amended.542 The 
amendment did not consider an introduction of the bill of rights; rather, it introduced a single 
party political system (with party supremacy). Consequently, merging the two ruling parties 
(TANU in Tanganyika and ASP in Zanzibar) to form a single party. The merger gave rise to a 
new party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977. In the same year, Tanzania adopted its fifth and 
permanent Constitution namely, the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977.543 
The 1977 Constitution included the bill of rights in the preamble. According to the common law 
tradition to which Tanzania is ascribed to, preambles have no legal force; hence, no one could 
enforce any right enshrined in the preamble.544 This was a political move in response to 
mounting critics by the international society on Tanzania’s failure in her obligations under the 
UNHRC. Jennifer Widner545 explains, that the inclusion of the bill of rights was a way of 
Tanzania to illustrate her commitment to human rights since she used the umbrella of human 
rights to achieve her political goals such as the ‘use of human rights language to galvanize 
international opinion against Idi Amin of Uganda (to help expel his forces from Tanzania). Yet is 
the fact that Tanzania was involved in development of African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights as such, it was essential for her to portray her commitment to the individual rights. 
                                                          
539 Articles 64(4) (a) 6 and (5) Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended); Article 132 (1) (2) 
Constitution of Zanzibar Revolutionary Government, 1984 (as amended). 
540 Union Constitution is the Acts of Union- The treaty which united Tanganyika and Zanzibar.  This treaty was 
translated into domestic laws in Tanganyika the enacted law is the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act of 1964 
(Act 22 of 1964) and for Zanzibar is the Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika Law 1964. The two laws constitute 
Constitution of the Union. 
541 This was through Act no. 43 of 1964. 
542 Amendment was done through Interim Constitution of Tanzania (amendment) Act of 1975. 
543 This is the current Constitution although several amendments have been made to it since its adoption to 
accommodate socio-political and economic changes. 
544 Maina, C. P., Tanzania in Heyns, C., Human Rights Law in Africa 1997: Volume 2, Kluwer Law International: 
Netherlands, 1999. Pp. 282-288 at p. 284. 
545 Widner, J., Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa: NY- 
Norton, 2005. 
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In 1984, the Constitution was amended for the fifth time.546 The Fifth Amendment gave bill of 
rights the force of law by introducing a new part III containing fundamental rights and individual 
duties. Sadly, its was suspended for three years, as Chris Peter Maina puts it, ‘to allow the 
government put its house in order, repealing or amending laws which were likely to conflict with 
the bills of rights.547 In March 1988, the bill of rights became operational, with the right to 
privacy among the guaranteed and protected rights. The same bill of rights was adopted in the 
Constitution of Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar in 1985. Accordingly, the right to 
privacy is provided under Article 16 (1) (2) of the United Republic of Tanzania Constitution; and 
Article 15 (1) (2) of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar Constitution in pari materia with 
the United Republic of Tanzania Constitution.  
The constitutional right to privacy as provided is not an absolute right and its implementation 
depends on other pieces of legislation to provide for the substance of the right and enforcement 
mechanism. This is also clearly stated in a subsection 2 to articles 16 and 15 of the 
aforementioned Constitutions. The right is also limited by other provisions in the Constitution. 
These provisions further subject the enforcement of the right to the ‘principle of 
proportionality’. Its enforceability is scaled with other constitutional rights and can be derogated 
in protection of national security and preservation of public safety.  
Article 16 provides; 
16.-(1) every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his 
own person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his 
residence and private communications. 
(2) For the purpose of preserving the person’s right in accordance with this Article, the 
state authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner and 
extent to which the right to privacy, security of his person, his property and residence 
may be encroached upon without prejudice to the provisions of this Article.548 
The constitutional right to privacy is further limited by Article 30 of the Constitution. This 
section allows enactment of any other law in violation of the bill of rights for the interest of 
general of public (such as public safety, to maintain public morality, in the process of rural or 
urban planning or exploration of oilier interests), in execution of Judgment or Court order, 
protecting reputation, rights and freedom of others.  
Precisely 10 years after the inclusion of bill of rights into the Constitution, the government 
enacted a law to enforce them. The Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act,549 enacted in 1994 
provides for mechanisms and procedure to enforce constitutional bill of rights. Section 1 (2) of 
this Act provides for the scope of application stating; ‘this law applies to mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar in all suits relating to enforcement of constitutional basic rights, duties and related 
                                                          
546 This was through Act No. 15 of 1984. 
547 Maina, C. P., Tanzania in Heyns, C., Human Rights Law in Africa 1997: Volume 2, Kluwer Law International: 
Netherlands, 1999. Pp. 282-288 at p. 282 
548 See Article 16 (2) and 15 (2) of the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania and Constitution of 
Revolutionary government of Zanzibar respectively. 
549 Act No. 33 of 1995. 
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matters.550 The Act is basically a procedural law, setting rules on composition of the judges, the 
majority rule in decision making,551 and mode of instituting a complaint552 as well as proper 
forum for redress.553 
Surprisingly, the Act introduces a provision limiting the powers of the High Court to enforce bill 
of rights. The provision states, ‘where the Court is satisfied that individual rights have been 
infringed by an action or law it should not pronounce such an act or law as being 
unconstitutional or invalid rather it should allow the Respondent or specific authority to rectify 
the infringement. If a law is in conflict with the Bill of Rights the Court should not declare such 
law as being invalid or unconstitutional. Such law will remain valid until the parliament amends 
or repeals it’.554 The provision is in contradiction with another Constitutional provision; Article 
65 (4) which empowers the High Court to declare any law unconstitutional or void. 
 Interesting is the fact that the Constitution was then amended, introducing Article 30(5) which 
is in pari materia with Section 13(2) of the Act. The article requires High Court not to declare any 
act or law void or unconstitutional even when its determination is to that effect. Instead, the 
Court is required to afford the infringing organ opportunity to rectify the infringement.  
The judiciary resisted and declared the provisions as an obstacle in the pursuit of individual 
rights and freedom.555 Consequently, in 2000, it was declared, through Article 65(4) of the 
Constitution, the judiciary has the final say on matters of determining rights and duties according 
to law and justice; however, Article 30 (5) was not deleted from the Constitution. 
No substantive law on the rights and basic duties, (or right to privacy) has ever been enacted to 
provide context or substance of the rights. As a result, most people ends up airing their 
grievances, anger, dissatisfaction and concerns in blog discussions and other interactive social 
media. A few resort to newspapers.556   
In 2002, the government of Tanzania once again amended her Constitution for the 13th time. 
Through this amendment, the Constitution established the Commission for Human Rights and 
Good Governance. The Commission was established as the national focal point for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, duties and good governance. According to Section 3, 
                                                          
550 Parallel to this provision, the Constitution of Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar provides, under article 
25A, procedure for enforcement of the basic rights and duties in Zanzibar. 
551 Section 10. 
552 Section 5. 
553 Section 4. 
554 Section 13(2). 
555 In 1998 the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, stated the section 13 (2) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement 
Act seek to  circumscribe the powers of the High Court in dealing with issues of fundamental rights and duties. The 
Court departed from section 13 (2), despite their duty to give effect to plain words, The Court  opined that it would 
be meaningless for the Courts to refrain from declaring laws or actions that goes against human rights as void or 
unconstitutional. Further, enforcing of this provision is a contravention to article 170A (2) (b) of the Constitution of 
United Republic of Tanzania. See also Adam Mwaibabila v. The Republic,  High Court of Tanzania at Dar es salaam, 
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 1 of 1997, unreported; see also A.G v. Christopher Mtikila [1995] T.L.R 3  
556 One such instance was featured in Arusha Times with headline ‘SIM card registration now viewed as spying 
move’. The Citizen also published a complaint letter from a reader titled, ‘Airtel are bothering me with unwanted 
text messages’. The reader being annoyed by promotional text messages said the telecom company is invading his 
privacy urging the company to provide an ‘opt in/opt-out’ choice to avoid annoying their customers. Other 
publications on concerns over privacy breaches include ‘the Big Brother is Watching You’ in Daily news of 12th 
February 2009.  
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the Commission has mandate in both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar.557 Regrettably, the 
Commission brought no changes on the right to privacy as with the other rights.558 Even in her 
submissions to the United Nations General Assembly, Tanzania’s report did not include the 
right to privacy among the key national priorities, initiatives and commitments she undertook to 
improve.559 More surprisingly is the fact that, the UN summary of recommendations on 
Tanzania report did not show any concern on the omission in relation to the right to privacy. 
This is despite the fact that the UN Recommendation report contains a specific section titled, 
‘Right to privacy, marriage and family life’. However, there is no mentioning of the right to 
privacy; neither the situational analysis nor recommendations for improvement.560 
This indicates, as Makulilo asserts, ‘privacy is less prominent a public issue in Tanzania’.561 
Although he agrees that there is a growing concern over privacy reflected from isolated cases; 
citing an example of the debates that emerged during introduction of compulsory SIM card 
registration in 2009. Perhaps Makulilo assertion indicates the outcome of the first ever case to 
reach the High Court. This was in 2004. It was a case where local Newspaper used images of a 
young lady, namely Siah Nyange. Miss Nyange participated in Miss Tanzania beauty pageantry. 
The Newspaper used her images for commercial advertisement without her knowledge or 
consent. Miss Nyange instituted a civil suit for violation of her right to privacy.562 Many had 
hoped that the High Court would, for the first time, lay some basic principles or guidelines 
underlying the protection of privacy in Tanzania. Unfortunately, the Court did not adjudicate the 
case to its finality as the newspaper company requested to settle the matter out of Court and 
ended up compensating Miss Nyange.  
The Media Council of Tanzania is so far the only forum which went a step further in asserting 
the right to privacy. This was in the Conciliation case of Mkami Kasege and Ismail Msengi v. Risasi.563 
In this matter, the Complainant approached the Council claiming violation of her right to privacy 
and damage to reputation caused by false and malevolent publication by a local Newspaper, 
namely, Risasi. The Newspaper published an article saying the Complainant is involved in extra 
                                                          
557 Section 3. 
558 In the National Report on Tanzania Human Rights Institutions submitted to the Human Rights Council for 
Universal Periodic Review, the Commission  is shown to have dealt mainly with maladministration issues than 
personal rights. [see UNGA., Individual Report of the Tanzania National Human Rights Institutions-Submission to 
the Human Rights Council: Universal Periodic Review, 12th Session 2011; Joint Stakeholders’ (CSOs) Submission to 
the Human Rights Council- Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, 12th Session, 2011]. 
559 UNGA, National Report Submitted in according with para 15(a) of the Annex to the Human Rights Council 
Resolution 5/1- United Republic of Tanzania, Geneva, 3-14 October 2011, p.5. 
560 UNGA, Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights in accordance with 
paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, Geneva, 3-14, 2011. 
561 Makulilo (n 26), p. 534. 
562 Siah Dominic Nyange v. Mwananchi Communications Ltd, Civil Case No. 155 of 2005; The Resident Magistrate Court 
of Dar es salaam at Kisutu (unreported).  
563 Conciliation Case No. 1 of 2005, 1997-2007, MCT 111. A complainant instituted a claim against Risasi 
newspaper for publishing her semi-nude photographs. The article concerned alleged that the complainant was 
involved in an adulterous act against her husband. The complainant who is a University lecturer was concerned of 
the photographs which were published as being invasive of her privacy and damaging to her reputation. The Council 
conclusion was that the allegations were false and in violation of privacy and code of ethics for media professionals. 
The Council explained further that, even to public figures, it is only acceptable to intrude into ones privacy when it 
is absolutely necessary for public interest. The Council then ordered the editor of the newspaper to retract the story, 
apologize to the complainants and pay the costs of the case incurred by the complainants. Sadly, the council decision 
and orders were ignored. Perhaps because the Council is only a voluntary, self-regulatory body without powers to 
issue legal binding decisions. It has only reconciliatory powers. 
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marital affairs and had been caught ready-handed. This article was followed by another 
publication by the same Newspaper claiming the Complainant to have tried to commit suicide 
out of shame. The publications were accompanied by semi-nude photos of the Complainant 
which devastated the Complainant and which she considers to be in violation of her personal 
privacy.  
The Council summoned both parties for a hearing, but the representatives from the Media 
Company did not attend. This forced to Council to continue ex-parte with the Complainant. The 
Council decided for the Complainant based on the Code of Ethics for Media Professionals. The 
Newspaper was found in breach of Complainant’s privacy. The Council ordered the Newspaper 
to issue an apology to the Complainant, retract the story and pay for costs incurred by the 
Complainant. Sadly, the Media Council of Tanzania being a voluntary, self-regulatory body can 
only reconcile parties; it has no powers to issue a binding legal decision. Hence, the Media 
Company ignored the order, and the matter ended with no reparation to the Complainant. 
 
5.4.3 Motivation to Data Protection Reforms in Senegal and Tanzania 
 
Greenleaf and Georges posit that the motivation behind the adoption of data protection laws in 
Africa is the growing use of computers in routine States’ activities, increased use of biometric 
IDs and increased operations of private entities outsourcing activities from EU countries; giving 
an example of the Mediterranean countries.564 The authors are not too far from the truth, 
although, the former, may not be an immediate motivation or rather not a primary concern. The 
Malabo Convention is repeatedly pronouncing in the preamble that its objective is to set forth 
rules essential for establishing a credible environment for electronic transactions and combating 
cybercrimes. Reference to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom is made in 
association with ‘facilitating trans-border commerce’. The same pattern is seen in the report from 
the UNCTAD ECOWAS conference in harmonization of cyber legislation in Africa in stating; 
‘While noting the dangers facing personal data with emerging technology and cloud 
computing, members unilaterally agreed that, there are different cultural approaches to 
privacy. However; the need to adopt data protection legislation is linked to the 
transnational nature of internet and the information economy. In order to benefit from 
the off shoring or business processing outsourcing involving data processing, countries 
need to have some form of data protection law’.565  
Furthermore, the National ICT policies also advocate for reform in the present legal framework 
for privacy and data protection, cyber-crimes, e-commerce and e-contracts.566 However; the 
motivation stated in these policies are merely economic reasons and not focused on individual 
rights and or freedoms. In Tanzania, for instance, the policy narrates that the reforms are 
important for economic development. In Senegal, the National ICT Policy and the National 
                                                          
564 Greenleaf, G and Georges, M., African regional Privacy Instruments: their effects on harmonization, PL&BIR, 
December 2014, pp. 19-21 at p. 19. 
565 UNCTAD, Review of e-commerce legal harmonization in economic community of West African states, 
Switzerland, 2015., p. 77. 
566 URT, 2003; Paragraph 3.5. 
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Science and Technology Policy were both drafted as part of the poverty reduction strategy 
documents which were adopted in 2002.567 The dominating objectives in both policies are the 
massive use of the ICTs for economic development. Therefore, legal reforms in privacy and data 
protection are considered as a means to an end, that is, to facilitate ‘massive’ use of the ICT for 
the economic development and modernization through trade beyond local borders.  
Tanzania commence the reforms after resolving that the existing laws, including the Records and 
Archives Management Act568 which provides the legal framework within which records and 
archives should be managed, needed to be reviewed, taking into account electronic record issues 
as well as access to information and data protection.569 In essence, there was a need for a law to 
secure personal data and activities in the cyber space to allow electronic transactions and achieve 
economic growth. 
At the Regional level, Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC) and the 
South African Development Community (SADC). In 2006, the Council of Ministers of the EAC 
launched an eGovernment programme. The programme discussed strategies for legal reforms to 
secure online transaction. The Council suggested reforms of the Regional and national legal 
frameworks to ensure security in online transactions and interactions. This was part of the East 
African Development Strategy (2011/12 – 2015/16).  
One of the key drivers in the realization of the EAC regional integration agenda is the creation 
of a strong legal framework to realize full potentials in regional eTransactions. Based on this, the 
Council created EAC Task Force in 2008 to implement Council resolutions. The Task Force 
developed two instruments; the Legal Framework for Cyber Crimes phase I and II of 2008 and 
2010 respectively. Phase I suggested legal reforms on eTransaction, Cyber-Crimes, Consumer 
Protections, Data Protection and Privacy. Phase II suggested legal reforms on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Competition, Taxation.  
On privacy and data protection, Phase I, on recommendation 19 states;  
‘The Task Force recognized the critical importance of data protection and privacy and 
recommends that further work needs to carried out on this issue, to ensure that (a) the 
privacy of citizens is not eroded through the Internet; (b) that legislation providing for 
access to official information is appropriately taken into account; (c) the institutional 
implications of such reforms and (d) to take into account fully international best practice 
in the area’. 
Unlike the other Regional instruments, the EAC Frameworks do not provide any ‘framework’ or 
model law for the Member States to draw inspirations from. It merely urges the Member States 
to reform their data protection and privacy frameworks based on international best practice. On 
other legal topics, the Framework has attached, as annexes, some models as examples for the 
                                                          
567 Thiam, N. F. G., ICT in Senegal: Management, Public uses and Perspectives, GOVTECH Conference, 5-8 
September 2010, Durban-South Africa. 
568 Act No. 3 of 2002. 
569 URT, Proposal for Enacting Cyber Laws in Tanzania, Dar es salaam, January 2013, p. 3; See also Report by 
IRMT, Fostering Trust and Transparency in Governance: Investigating and Addressing the Requirements for 
Building Integrity in Public Sector Information Systems in the ICT Environment the case study of Tanzania, January 
2007. 
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best practice. However, for unexplained reasons, on privacy and data protection, the Framework 
neither suggested nor attached a specific sample model considered as ‘international best practice’.  
On the other hand, SADC adopted SADC Model Law on Data Protection in 2012. The primary 
objective of the Model Law as it can be inferred from the ‘preamble’ is harmonization of data 
protection law of Member States. The Model Law adopts a comprehensive framework for data 
protection, similar to that of the DPD and other international codes.  
In 2013, Tanzania embarked on the legal reform process with the aim of transposing the SADC 
Model Law into a domestic law. The process was initiated by HIPSSA.570 Through the HIPSSA 
project, and with financial, technical and expert support from the ITU, European Commission 
and the European Union,571 Tanzania produced her first comprehensive data protection draft bill 
titled ‘Draft Privacy and Data Protection Bill’, which was in 2014 renamed to ‘Draft Personal 
Data Protection Bill’.572The bill applies to Tanzania Mainland only.573 The draft bill was drafted 
within the six identified areas that needed legal reforms; these includes computer security against 
unauthorized access or modification, data protection, guidelines for processing personal data, 
legal recognition of eTransations and eCommerce, framework for legal obligations for online 
suppliers, protection of online consumers and retention of electronic records574 
Prudence dictates a little explanation on the route taken in drafting the draft bill. In Tanzania, all 
legal reforms are conducted by the Law Reform Commission. However, in an unusual manner, 
the reform process was overtaken by the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology. 
Another surprising fact is non-involvement of the public. It is standard practice, by the Law 
Reform Commission to upload draft bills on their website for the public to view and participate 
in the process; a very important aspect that gives the public a feeling of ownership; hence, 
acceptance of the proposed regulatory changes. The Ministry did not follow this approach. Only 
a few selected ‘stakeholders’575 were selected as representatives of the public. Surprisingly, the 
Law Reform Commission was not involved or consulted as one of the stakeholders.  
According to Ephraim Percy Kenyanito and Raman Jit Singh Chim576 the HIPSSA projects for 
the harmonization of ICT laws, under the ITU were, first carried without public consultation 
and second they were adopted as Reference Framework for Harmonization of the 
telecommunication and ICT Policies and Regulation in Africa by Ministers of ICTs for the 
                                                          
570 The Support for the Harmonisation of the ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa project. 
571 ITU., 2013. 
572 This was after the review of the initial Draft by Local and International consultants, including those coming from 
the ITU. 
573 Zanzibar is yet to embark into Data Protection Legal Reforms. 
574 Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology, 2013. 
575  The selected stakeholders includes the President’s Office – Planning Commission, the Ministry of Constitutional 
Affairs and Justice, the Ministry of Finance-Mainland, the Ministry of Finance Zanzibar, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the Ministry of Communication and Transportation, the Ministry of East African Community 
Cooperation, the Tanzania Bankers Associations (TBA), Commercial Banks, Mobile Network Operators (Vodacom, 
Airtel, Tigo, Zantel), Savings and Credit Cooperatives Union League of Tanzania (SCULLT), Tanzania Association 
of Micro Finance Institutions (TAMFI), The Fair Competition Commission (FCC), Tanzania Consumer Advocacy 
Society, Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA), and the 
Financial Intelligence Unit. See the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology Report. 
576 Kenyanito, E. P., and Singh, J. R.,  Chim Room for improvement: Implementing the African Cyber Security and 
Data Protection Convention in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 2016, Access Now. 
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respective Sub-Saharan States.577 Consequently, the Ministers undertook to implement this 
‘project’ as Ministerial projects rather than handing over the task to the law reform authorities.  
In Tanzania, the whole process was conducted in confidential; no person, apart from the 
selected stakeholders’ had access to the text. It took extra effort to acquire the text for the 
analysis in preparation for this project. However, in 2016, the Ministry, for undisclosed reasons, 
handed over the draft bill and all the process to the Law Reform Commissioner. The 
Commissioner, for the first time, published the draft bill on their website and local Newspaper, 
seeking public consultation.578 
Senegal enacted a comprehensive data protection law in 2008, although its implementation was 
‘suspended’ to 2011 for lack of funds.  According to Professor Abdoullah Cissé, the process in 
construction of the data protection legal framework was participatory and inclusive. The 
approach was ideally to align the new framework with political institutions, economic, social 
structures and local mentality. This was necessary to overcome potential resistance to the 
framework. Cissé explains further that, the process was also constructed keeping in mind the 
existing tension between economy and human rights.579 Accordingly, the involvement of 
international organization such as the AFAPDP had in mind a framework that supports not only 
the compliance to human rights in the processing of personal data, but also the 
acknowledgement and preservation of principle social values;580 a fact also affirmed by the 
AFAPDP manager Mmde Leclercq.581 
According to Cissé, the created framework for data protection in Senegal insisted on the law that 
gives judges a room for interpretation of the principles in the protection of personal privacy 
rights in data while keeping in mind the pluralistic nature of the legal system.582 This is surprising, 
considering Senegal conventionally follows a Civil Code Legal culture. 
The law and the draft bill both apply to the processing of personal data in both public and 
private sector whether or not processed by automated or by manual means.583 While the draft bill 
applies to personal data regardless of format or media,584 the law is quite on its applicability 
regarding data formats or processing media.  
 
Scope and Purpose Both the Senegalese law and the Tanzanian draft bill have the aim to stop a 
breach of privacy that may occasion through collection, processing, transmission and use or re-
                                                          
577 Adopted in Cairo in the year 2008 during the 2nd  Conference of African Ministers in charge of Communication 
and Information Technologies (CITMC-2). 
578 See http://www.lrct.go.tz/ and The Daily News of 15 August 2016. 
579 Cissé, A., Séminaire Informatique et liberté Quel cadre juridique pour le Sénégal ? Éléments de synthèse, 
Séminaire Informatique et liberté Quel cadre juridique pour le Sénégal ? Éléments de synthèse.  
580 Ibid. 
581 Leclercq, F., A francophone BCR model to boost African data protection, Data Protection Law & Policy 
September 2013, p.7. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Article 2 of the law and Section 5 (4) of the draft bill. 
584 Section 2 of the draft bill “applies to data notwithstanding format or media, and whether printed, taped, filmed, 
by electronic means or otherwise. According to the draft bill, data can be in form of a map, diagram, photograph, 
film, microfilm, videotape, sound recording or machine readable record.” 
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use of personal data.585 The Senegalese law, unlike the draft bill, goes further stipulating the 
essence of the law, that is, to ensure the processing of personal data and ICT do not affect 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons including the right to private life and the 
rights of the communities.586 As such, the law calls for the treatment of personal data in 
accordance with the rights, freedoms and individual dignity keeping in mind the proportionality 
principle.587  
Personal data The law considers as personal data, any information which can enable identification 
of a natural person either directly or indirectly. Article 4 of the law describes personal data as any 
data that can allow identification of a person, direct or indirect, either by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more elements, specific to his physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, cultural, social or economic identity.588Similarly, the draft bill has,  under Section 4 
defined personal data as any data which can be used to identify a person, direct or indirect, ‘in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his/her 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. The draft bill provides that, 
to determine whether a person is identifiable, one should look at ‘all the means reasonably likely 
to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person.’  
Sensitive data Data concerning philosophical, political opinions, religious activities, sexual life, 
race, health, criminal records and prosecution and administrative sanctions is considered to be 
sensitive data under the law.589Under the draft bill sensitive data contains similar contents as the 
law but extends the list to includes genetic and biometric data, data related to children, data on 
security measures and any data if its processing would reveal ethnic origin, affiliation to trade 
union membership, gender and any personal data otherwise considered by Tanzanian laws as 
presenting a major risk to the rights and interests of the data subjects, in particular, leading to 
unlawful or arbitrary discrimination. Accordingly, the draft bill prohibits processing of sensitive 
data.590 Sensitive data can only be processed when it is necessary to undertake legal obligation 
(for instance, under employment laws or in promotion of human rights), or when data subject 
has given consent to the processing or when such data has been made public by a data subject.591 
However, depending on the nature and extent of sensitivity of the data, the Commissioner may 
still prohibit the processing of such sensitive data regardless of the consent to process given by 
the data subject. Similar restrictions are found in the law under Articles 40 and 21 (4). 
One thing the law is clear on is the fact that its application is limited to natural persons. On the 
other hand, the draft bill definition of a person lacks clarity. It is unclear as to who the data 
subject is, and whether or not it applies to juristic persons. Personal data is defined as, ‘data 
                                                          
585 Article 2 Senegal Law and section 3 Tanzania of the draft bill. 
586 Article 1. 
587 Section 1. 
588 Article 4 (6). 
589 Article 4 (8) 
590 Section 4 of the draft bill provides categorizes sensitive data into two categories; first category includes genetic 
data, data related to children, data related to offences, criminal sentences or security measure, biometric data as well 
as, if they are processed for what they reveal, personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, affiliation, trade-union membership, gender and data concerning health or sex life. 
The second category comprises of any personal data otherwise considered by Tanzanian law as presenting a major 
risk to the rights and interests of the data subject, in particular unlawful or arbitrary discrimination. 
591 Section 16 (2). 
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about an identifiable person that is recorded in any form’.592 The use of the term ‘identifiable 
person’593 makes it difficult to ascertain whether it extends to juristic persons or even dead 
persons. The definition of data subject does not offer much assistance either; it refers to data 
subject as, ‘an individual who is subject to the processing of personal data and who is identified 
or an identifiable person’.594  
The law defines data controller as any person, legal or natural, public or private body who alone 
or jointly engages in the processing of personal data and determine its purposes. The draft bill 
provides for similar definition, except, it excludes from the list ‘private bodies’.595 Whether or not 
the omission in the draft bill is intentional, the implication is that, when a private body processes 
personal data, the application of the proposed law is ousted. It simply means, private bodies are 
given a free pass to process personal data in disregard of the law. Looking further on the 
definition of a data processor, the draft bill makes the same omission. It defines a data processor 
as any natural, legal or public body processing personal data for and on behalf of the controller, 
under controller’s instructions, except for persons who, under direct authority of the controller 
are authorised to process the data.596 The law does not have the term ‘data processor’; instead, it 
has used a different connotation, ‘subcontractor’. 
The law defines a filling system as a structured set of data accessible according to specific criteria, 
whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed based on function or location.597The draft bill 
neither mentions nor defines filling systems. 
Jurisdiction of the laws The draft bill applies to processing activities by a controller domiciled in 
Tanzania or a controller, though not domiciled in Tanzania has processing activities in Tanzania. 
The later applies only when the processing activities are not for purposes of a mere transit 
through Tanzania. The draft bill also applies to processing activities in any State that Tanzanian 
law applies by virtue of international law.598 The law applies whenever processing of personal 
data is done by controller whether or not established in Senegal, as long as the means of processing is 
located in Senegalese territory. It also applies to any place where Senegalese law applies by virtue 
of international law. The law does not apply to processing of personal data by means located in 
Senegal, if the processing is solely for purpose of mere transit. However, in this case the law 
requires the controller to designate a representative established in Senegal. 
Third Countries The law considers all countries other than Senegal as third countries. It does not 
matter whether or not such country is within African region or ECOWAS Sub-Region where 
Senegal is a member.599 The Draft Bill is quite on who are considered as third countries. 
                                                          
592 Section 4. 
593 Section 4 defines identifiable person as, ‘identifiable person” is an individual who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his/her 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. To determine whether a person is identifiable, 
account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the said person’. 
594 Section 4. 
595 See article 4 of the law and section 4 (15) of the draft bill. 
596 Section 4 of the draft bill. 
597 Article 4 (10) of the law. 
598 Section 5 (4) (b) (c). 
599 Article 4 (2). 
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Conditions for Lawful Processing Processing activities in both the law and draft bill are categorized 
into two; general and sensitive personal data processing. The condition for processing of general 
data under the draft bill requires that the collection of personal data to be lawful. Section 6 states; 
‘6. (1) A data controller shall not collect personal data unless:- 
(a)the personal data is collected for a lawful purpose directly related to a function or 
activity of the data controller; and 
(b) the collection of the data is necessary or incidental for, or directly related to, that 
purpose.’ 
It follows therefore, as long as personal data is considered to have been lawfully collected, 
processing activities can proceed without any further requirements such as consent or fairness. 
Although with regards to fairness, it may be argued that, the fact that the draft bill requires 
personal data be collected direct from the data subject or data subject to be informed of any 
collection of his/her personal data as soon as practicable to have fulfilled this aspect.600 This as 
seen in chapter two, may be interpreted to mean ‘fairness’ in collection as the case with the UK 
DPA and subsequent clarifications by the ICO even when the word is not explicitly provided. 
The only instance data subject’s consent is required under the draft bill is when data controller 
wishes to process the data for purposes beyond the initial communicated purposes.601 This 
omission exists notwithstanding the fact that the draft bill is basically modelled after the SADC 
Model which drew inspiration from the international code on data protection, specifically the 
DPD, which emphasizes the importance of data subject’s consent as the main condition for 
lawful processing of personal data.602  
The law requires the collection of personal data to be lawful, fair and not fraudulent. However, 
the processing of such data can only be legitimate if the data subject gives consent to process.603 
Under the law, data subject’s consent forms a central condition for processing of personal data, 
without which, processing activities are in breach of the law. 
Purpose limitation Both the law and the draft bill requires data to be collected for specific, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and any subsequently processing to be compatible with the orignal 
purposes for its collection.604 The law adds the requirement that the collection must ensure that 
the data is adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were 
collected and further processed. By necessary implication, this provision enacts what is popularly 
known as data minimization. This aspect is not enacted either expressly or implicitly under the 
draft bill. 
Data quality To maintain the quality of data, the law requires personal data to be accurate and, 
where necessary, kept up to date. The draft bill adds an obligation to ensure that the data is 
                                                          
600 Section 7 (1) (2) of the draft bill. 
601 Section 9. 
602 Article 7 of the Directive states, ‘Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:   
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent….’. Again Recital 30 to the Directive states, ‘Whereas, in order to be 
lawful, the processing of personal data must in addition be carried out with the consent of the data subject….’ 
603 Save for exceptional circumstance when processing activities can take place without data subject consent as 
provided under article 33 (1-4) 
604 Sections 9, 10, 11 and Article 35. 
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relevant and not misleading.605However, unlike the law, the draft bill does not oblige data 
controllers to take reasonable measures in implementing this provision by ensuring inaccurate or 
incomplete data (with regards to the purpose of processing) are erased or rectified.606 
In the same vein, both the law and draft bill tasks data controllers to ensure reasonable security 
measures are in place for the security of personal data in their custody. The draft bill requires 
security measures to focus on safeguarding the data against loss, unauthorized access, use, 
modification or disclosure, and against other misuses, unauthorized use or disclosure.607The law, 
on the other hand, emphasizes on the security of data by dedicating the whole section II of 
Chapter V the law on security measures. The Section is titled “Obligation de Securite;” it obliges 
data controllers to take due precautions with respect the nature of the data and, in particular, to 
prevent it from being deformed, damaged, and from unauthorized access and dissemination. The 
section gives special attention to automated data processing systems, and restricts its access 
within the country.608 Furthermore, the law requires data controller to establish mechanisms to 
identify and verify third parties who have access to personal data; 609prevent unauthorized access 
to computer systems and computer data, unauthorized introduction of any data in the system 
and unauthorized inspection, reading, copying, modifying, destroying or erasure of recorded data 
by unauthorized persons;610 prevent unauthorized persons using transmission facilities to access 
personal data processing systems and safeguard data by creating backup copies, cooling and 
when necessary convert personal data to a permanent storage.611 
Exempted activities Certain activities are exempted from the application of the law and the draft 
bill. These include the processing of personal data solely for personal and for household 
activities; as long as such processing is not intended for systematic communication, 
dissemination to third parties or for broadcasting.612 Surprisingly and contrary to the usual 
practise, the draft bill has not exempted individual processing of data for purely personal, family 
or domestic purposes. This means activities such as creating a phone book in a mobile phone, 
keeping a diary containing a reference to friends, partners and workmates or domestic grocery 
lists are subjected to legal regulation. Consequently, data protection Commissioner are involved 
in issues arising in private processing of personal data for own personal, family for domestic 
purposes. 
The law does not apply to personal data in temporary copies; such as data processed for 
technical activities in transmission or provision of access to a digital network to allow data 
subject access quality services.613 The law also does not apply to processing of personal data for 
sole purpose of record keeping in a register sanctioned by laws or regulations,614 or data 
processed by charitable non-profit organizations and religious organizations, philosophical, 
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political or trade union relating to a member and for purposes of the organization as long as the 
data is not disclosed to a third party.615 The draft bill has no corresponding provisions. 
Furthermore, journalistic, research, artistic and literary expressions are also exempted in both the 
law and draft bill. However, in this respect, the exemption applies only when such activities are 
conducted as professional activities and in compliance with professional rules and codes of 
ethics.616 In the law, it is further stated that this exemption does not preclude application of the 
provision of other laws relating to press, broadcasting or the penal code which provides for 
codes of conduct or penalizes offences against privacy and individual reputation from 
applying.617 
Other activities exempted from the application of the law and the draft bill are those in the 
preservation of national security, public safety, criminal prevention, investigation and 
prosecution.618 In the draft bill, activities in violation of the code of conduct in the case of the 
legal profession are also exempted.619 In the law, population census, personal data revealing 
directly or indirectly, racial, ethnic or regional origins, parentage, political, philosophical or 
religious or membership to associations, or which relate to the health or sex life of the data 
subjects (as long as they do not form part of linking with other processing) the treatment of 
wages, pensions, taxes and other liquidations are also exempted.620  
Notification and Authorization Regime The law, places an obligation upon data controllers to give 
notification or seek commissioner’s authorization before any processing activity can take place. 
Commissioner’s approval signifies that the processing satisfies the legal requirements.621 
Notification must be given to the general processing of personal data which is not likely to 
invade into personal privacy622 while authorization must be sought in data considered delicate 
and sensitive.623  
In seeking Commissioner’s authorization, a data controller must give detailed information on his 
identity and location (address) as well as the purpose for processing, interconnection and linking 
of data, involved recipient(s) and security measures taken against potential privacy breaches.  In 
cases where the controller is not established in Senegal, the Commissioner requires information 
of a duly authorized representative in Senegal. A data controller must also inform the 
Commissioner of any sub-contracts involved in the process and the shelf life of the processed 
data. 
In additional to Commissioner’s authorization, health data can only be processed if/when data 
subject has given consent to specific processing activities or when such data has been made 
public by the data subject or when it is necessary to protect vital interest of data subject and in 
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activities sanctioned by law. Furthermore, any processing concerning personal health must be 
done under the supervision of a health care professional who is subjected to professional 
secrecy. Additionally, access to medical records can only be given to a patient himself or a 
designated physician. If the patient is dead, the access can be granted only to his non-separated 
spouse, children, and parents.624 
In all processing activities that need commissioner’s authorization, it is upon the Commissioner 
to issue the authorization within two months of application. If authorization is not issued within 
two months, the concerned data controller is allowed to proceed with processing activities, as the 
authorization is deemed favorable upon expiration of the two months if the Commissioner no 
communication against the application. 
The draft bill does not establish a ‘notice of process’ or ‘authorization’ regime. It is also silent on 
the proposed idea of data controller’s obligation to file annual summaries of all personal data 
processes as proposed by the DPD.625 Instead, it requires the Commissioner to maintain a 
register of data controllers and persons maintaining data bureau and any persons providing 
services concerning personal data. The essence of this requirement is to keep record of all 
persons processing personal data, description of data held, purpose(s) of collection and 
processes (as notified to the data subject), sources of collection and description of intended 
direct and indirect transfers of data to countries outside Tanzania, other than countries notified 
to data subject.626 This means unregistered persons cannot process personal data or offer data 
bureau services in Tanzania. 
Interconnection of Data/Files and Databases The law establishes a regime to deal specifically with the 
interconnection of files and databases. Accordingly, an interconnection of files is allowed only 
when it involves data controllers who are running public services for the public interest, or when 
implemented by the State to support the administration of remote services within a framework 
of e-government.627 On the other hand, the interconnection of a database may only be 
performed to achieve statutory objectives or legitimate interests of a data controller. In this case, 
a warrant to process is only granted if processing cannot lead to discrimination or infringement 
of rights and freedoms and safeguards of data subjects concerned. However, the interconnection 
must take into account the principles of data relevance.628 
Before interconnection is made, an application must be lodged to the Commissioner before the 
processing activity. The application must provide information on the nature of interconnection; 
illustrate the purpose which makes the interconnection necessary; duration of the 
interconnection and measure taken to ensure protection and preservation of data subject 
rights.629 All authorizations for interconnection are required to be registered in the 
Commissioner’s directory.630 The draft bill has no corresponding provisions. 
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Automatic Processing The law prohibits automatic processing of data when such processing deals 
with decision making bearing legal effect to a person. However, when processing is done by the 
State in accordance with the laws and regulations, the processing can take place with the 
approval of the Commissioner.631 The law names the type of activities to which automated 
processing is allowed with Commissioner’s approval to include matters of national security, 
defense and matters relating to a criminal investigation, detection, and execution of sentence. 
Others are matters of wages, pensions, taxes and other liquidation. However, when the 
processing leads to evaluation on personality or certain aspects of personality or defines person’s 
profile, such evaluation is not to form a basis for a decision on an individual neither in a Court 
of law or any institution; public or private.632  
In the same vein, the draft bill prohibits personal evaluation based on processing of personal 
data by automated means. Accordingly, the data subject has a right to prevent data controller 
from making any such decision based on processing by automatic means. If such decision is 
made, the data subject has a right, by notice in writing, to request from the data controller to 
reconsider the decision or defer the decision on that basis. Upon such notice, the data controller 
must, within 21, days give data subject a written notice specifying actions taken to comply with 
data subject’s request.633 
Direct Marketing or Advertisement The law and the draft bill forbids data controllers from carrying 
out direct marketing by any means or form of communication unless data subject has given a 
prior consent to receiving such promotions and/or advertisements.634 This includes mobile-
marketing usually done by telecom companies to advertise their products and promotions, or by 
emails or other electronic means.635 Data controllers are further prohibited from using personal 
data to advertise or promote their businesses or transfer to third party for that purpose. The only 
instance personal data can be used for marketing purposes is when data subject has consented to 
their data to be used or shared, to promote business or for commercial advertising. In the draft 
bill, if the controller wishes to do so, he must inform the data subject of the identity of the data 
controller and all necessary information on the product to allow data subjects make informed 
decision. 
Apart from a mere prohibition, the draft bill does not establish a concrete regime on the 
processing for purpose of direct marketing, other laws and regulations erects such regime to 
supplement the draft bill. The Consumer Protection Regulation 2011 made under the Electronic 
and Postal Communications Act of 2010 provides for that regime. The Regulation requires the 
collection of personal data for direct market to adhere to the usual data protection principles.636 
In addition, data controller must identify himself to data subject, and give breakdown of the total 
costs of the product or services that is the subject of the communication.637 The essence is to 
allow data subject to make a decision of whether or not to opt-in or opt-out. Another 
complementing regulation is the Electronic Transaction and Electronic Contract Bill 2014. The 
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ETECB obliges service providers to establish an opt-in and opt-out registers. The ETECB fills 
in the gap left by the Regulation and the draft bill, as both have failed to impose a requirement 
for establishing opt-in and opt-out facilities for this purpose. 
Rights and Duties The draft bill provides for data subjects’ right and data controllers’ duties in the 
implementation of the proposed law. Data controller has a duty and is accountable for adherence 
and enforcement of the data protection principles.638 S/he is also accountable for the integrity 
and strict rules of confidentiality on personal data. Section 10 and 11 of the draft bill and Article 
70 of the law requires data controllers to enter into written contracts with people having access 
to personal data and ensure they have the technical and legal knowledge to uphold the 
requirements of the law. This duty extends to third parties processing personal data for or on 
behalf of the data controller and whoever has knowledge of processing activities.639  
On the other hand, data subjects have the right to access their information held. This right gives 
data subjects a subsequent right to their personal data including the right to inspect the data and 
(if desired) request correction or amendment of inaccurate, misleading or false data and erasure 
of irrelevant data. Data subjects have the right to be informed by the data controller of the 
identity of the data controller, his agents and any third parties to whom data may be transferred 
to. Data subjects have the right to object to any processing of their personal data on legitimate 
grounds.640 Furthermore, data subjects have the right to be informed of their access rights and 
data retention period.641 In the draft bill, the access right is limited to information about the 
purpose of collection or the fact that the collection is for purposes authorised by law and gives 
identities of intended recipients. 
In relation to the right to erasure and amendment of personal data, the draft bill has introduced 
an unusual clause. The clause requires data controllers, when making amendments of personal 
data upon request, not to delete the records of the document as it existed before the 
amendment.642 The intention of this clause is unclear; however, it derogates the overall essence 
of data subject’s right to participate in the protection of his/her data and privacy. What then is 
the aim of allowing data subject to rectify or delete irrelevant or misleading data if the copy as it 
originally existed remains with the data controller? The draft bill is silent on the treatment of the 
retained data and gives no obligation to the controller to inform the data subject of the fact that 
the original copy of the deleted data remains in controller’s database.  
Furthermore, the definition of processing under the draft bill includes storage. It follows then, 
when data controller deletes data (upon data subject request) but retains a copy, s/he is in breach 
of data subject’s rights under the proposed law. Bygrave clarifies such situations in clearer terms 
saying, contravention of one’s right to privacy occasions when ‘the data in question reveal details 
about the data subject’s personality are processed without the latter’s knowledge or consent, and 
the processing potentially casts the data subject in a negative light or could result in a restriction 
of the data subject’s freedom of choice. These principles would seem to apply regardless of 
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whether the information is processed automatically or manually’.643 As long as legality in 
processing personal data under the draft bill is centred on subject’s knowledge of the existence 
of his data in data controllers’ database, this provision goes against the spirit of the draft bill. In 
this case, there is neither knowledge nor consent of the data subject to retain the data.644 This 
Section, not only obliterates the security of personal data provided by the draft bill itself,but it 
also interferes with a sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can freely choose his or her 
identity. 
The Data Protection Authority The law and the draft bill establish Data Protection Authority (DPA) 
as an independent administrative office, tasked to oversee the implementation of these laws.645  
Independence of the DPA is emphasized under Article 14 of the law and Section 21 (2) of the 
draft bill. Both texts envisages a Commissioner with managerial autonomy and freedom from the 
influence of instructions by any other public or private entity. The law goes further in ensuring 
DPA’s impartiality by imposing restrictions on the social interactions of the data protection 
Commissioner. The Commissioner is, under Article 15 prohibited from receiving gifts and grants 
from individuals, organizations or foreign States, unless the grant from the foreign State is given 
through a partnership with the government of Senegal. Furthermore, the Commissioner is 
expected to take all the appropriate measures to ensure independence and impartiality of the 
member staff of the DPA.646 The Commissioner and all member staff must take a Court 
administered oath, promising to save the DPA confidently, faithfully, independently and 
impartially.647 The in both texts the Commissioner’s tenure is protected against unduly 
termination. S/he cannot be removed from the positions save for inability to discharge their 
functions under the law and proposed law, by resignation or for misconduct.648 The law goes 
further by protecting the tenure of member staff of the authority. Accordingly, member staffs 
are irremovable save for misconduct, inability to perform or by resignation. The draft bill has no 
provisions protecting the tenure of the member staff of the Authority. 
 The DPA in both cases receives funds from the government. In the case of Senegal, the 
Commissioner enjoys the management autonomy as he is the one preparing the budget based on 
the needs of the Authority, in light of the rules of public accounting. However, the budget is 
subject to the approval of the Commission’s Board.649In Tanzania, the parliament is the one 
determining and granting the Authority funds to run its activities.  
The Commissioner’s activities in both the law and draft bill includes raising public awareness of 
the individual rights and obligations, oversee that ICTs and its development do not threaten 
fundamental rights and freedoms in privacy protection,650and advice persons and organizations 
on dealing with personal data.  The law grants the Commissioner powers to investigate breach of 
the law, suo motto or on application, and to resolve disputes arising out of the rights and duties 
established under the law. Parallel to these powers, the Commissioner can enter any premises to 
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search and to seize any evidence.651 The Commissioner can also issue sanctions to data 
controllers in breach of the law.652  At this point, it is important to note that, in the draft bill, the 
Commissioner can only deal with dispute brought before the Commission by a complainant or 
third party on behalf of the complaint, s/he cannot initiate investigation suo motto. Furthermore 
Commissioner’s power to enter premises for investigation is conditional. First, the 
Commissioner must inform the CEO of the data controller of the intention to carry out such 
investigation and the substance of the complaint.653 Thereafter, the Commissioner must inform 
the prosecutor before exercising this power.  
 
International Data Transfer The law prohibits transfer of personal data to third country unless such 
country provides for sufficient legal protection to privacy, freedoms and fundamental rights of 
individuals with regards to the processing of personal data.654 In implementing this provision, the 
law considers any country, beyond Senegal as third countries;655 by necessary implication this 
includes countries within ECOWAS to which Senegal is a Member State. In exceptional 
circumstances, trans-border data transfer can be permitted at the request of the data controller 
who must adduce evidence of adequate safeguards with respect to protection of privacy, 
freedoms and fundamental rights of the data subjects.656 In such cases, the Commissioner is 
required by the law to assess the sufficiency of security offered by third country. The assessment 
on the security measure provided by a third country are measured against the required security 
measures provided by Senegalese law, nature of data, purpose of processing, duration, origin and 
destination of the personal data subject to the process. Upon satisfaction of the security measure 
provided by a third country, the Commissioner may issue an authorization to data transfer.  
Personal data  can be transferred in exception to the above rule when the data subject has 
expressly consented to the transfer either in the protection of data subject’s life, to safe guard 
public interest, in an exercise of defense or a legal claim and in an execution of a contract 
between data controllers and a data subject.657 
The draft bill also has a regime for international data transfer; similar to one found in Articles 25 
and 26 of the DPD. Although the draft bill does not define a ‘third country’, Section 4 provides 
that, international data transfer ‘refers to any international, cross-border flows of personal data 
by means of electronic transmission’. Consequently, international or cross-border transfer of 
personal data using any other means, (apart from electronic means) are not regulated under this 
regime. 
The general rule under Section 54 allows transfer of data to countries with adequate data 
protection framework. However, this rule gives additional duty to the data recipient to establish 
that the data is necessary for a performance of a task carried out for public interest or pursuant 
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to lawful functions of the data controller, or that the transfer is necessary and there is no reason 
to assume that data subject’s legitimate interests might be prejudiced. The necessity of transfer is 
to be determined by the data controller658 who shall also make sure that the recipient processes 
such data only for purposes for which they were transferred.659 
As an exception to the general rule, Section 55 (1) allows transfer of data to countries without 
adequate level of protection. Such transfers can only be made when the recipient country ensures 
adequate level of protection and the basis of processing is solely to permit processing for 
authorised activities to be taken by the data controller.660 In this case, adequacy determination 
depends on the nature of data, purpose of the data process activities, duration of process and 
recipient country’s overall legal framework.661 Yet, apart from this condition, there are other 
instances where personal data can be transferred to countries without adequate level of 
protection. These are listed under section 55 (4) to include when the data subject has 
unambiguously given consent to the transfer; when transfer is necessary for the performance of a 
contract between data subject and controller or implementation of pre-contractual measure taken 
in response to data subject’s request; when transfer is necessary or legally required on important 
public interest grounds; or for the establishment, exercise or defence of a legal claim; transfer is 
necessary in order to protect  legitimate interests of the data subject or the transfer is made from 
a register which, according to Acts or Regulations, is intended to provide data to the public and 
which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can 
demonstrate a legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions laid down in law for 
consultation are fulfilled in the case at hand. 
The Commissioner may also authorise transfer or set of transfers if s/he is assured by data 
controller and satisfied that the data controller can provide adequate safeguard with respect to 
the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject concerned. 
This can be through adequate legal and security measures or contractual arrangements.662 
Whistleblowing The draft bill establishes a system for the protection of whistle-blowers from 
retaliation. Whistle-blowers are considered to have an important role in enforcing data 
protection principles. Section 51 (2) provides for the security and protection of whistle-blowers 
in an endeavour to uphold the data protection principles.  In the draft bill, whistle-blowing is 
also encouraged in relation to technical and organisation rules which may have an adverse effect 
on the provisions of the proposed law. 
So far, the draft bill has not provided for the rules on authorisation for and governing the 
whistle-blowing system. However, once the law comes into force, the Commissioner is obliged 
to establish such rules under section 51 (1). The whistle-blowing can, if properly devised, allow 
persons to unearth institutional malpractices and act as a safety net to adverse actions which may 
not be easily detected by the public or the Commissioner.  
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At this stage, it is not clear how the Commissioner is going to address the challenges surrounding 
whistle-blowing in relation to data protection. Reference is made to the Article 29 Working Party 
opinion663 on the Application of whistle-blowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal 
accounting controls, audit matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime. In the 
opinion, the Working Party insists that any whistle-blowing scheme must be subjected to data 
protection principles. The schemes must adhere to the duties of data collectors and rights of data 
subjects. In this case, the wrongdoer should have the same rights in relation to the processing of 
personal data for the whistle-blowing arrangement to be lawful. Such rights include the right to 
know the data held and purposes for its processing as well as recipients of the data. The 
wrongdoer also has the right to object the processing of personal data on legitimate grounds.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Data protection reforms in Africa and particular Senegal and Tanzania have been highly 
influenced by international data privacy policies/codes notably the EU Data Protection Directive 
as well as the CoE Convention on privacy protection. In both cases, international Agencies, as 
well as individual European countries, have provided financial and or technical support towards 
reforms. While there is no problem in transplanting a foreign law into African States, the 
question may arise on the relevance and applicability of such transplants in African contexts. 
This is mainly to the fact that, in Africa, there is an existence of multiple legal cultures and 
systems; an element lacking in the Western hemisphere where the laws/regimes originate. This 
could affect the transposed contents as they are met with different species of a host. Inevitably, 
this calls for certain adjustments in both legal structure and legal content for a successful 
adoption. 
In the two case studies, the reforms seem to have, at some point, considered the nature of the 
local systems. For example, the draft bill has, under Section 4 included data containing personal 
cultural and social identity as sensitive personal data. The draft bill prohibits the processing of 
personal data are if the processing would reveal the ethnic origin of the data subject.  On the 
other hand, the law has as its objectives statements to protect personal data and individual 
privacy as well as ‘community rights’ to privacy. Sadly, the law has neither defined what the 
‘community rights’ are nor established principles or authority to enforce the community rights. 
In fact, apart from the statement of objective, there is no other place within the law that the 
community rights are mentioned. The law also ousts its application to all processing activities 
involving personal data revealing, directly or indirectly, racial, ethnical, regional origins and 
parentage.  
The established enforcement authorities do not exhibit considerations to the local legal system 
with multiple legal cultures. They are established with a view of a State with a single legal culture. 
There is no inclusion of customary or Islamic personnel or personnel with knowledge of the 
customary and or Islamic legal culture. 
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Conclusively, in both case studies, the texts do not illustrate substantial consideration of the 
existing legal structures (apart from the ‘formal’ legal system) The exemptions, mentioning and 
special categorization of certain data considered to have cultural significance as an 
accommodation of existing legal structures is insufficient. Furthermore, reforms in data 
protection being more than just a legislative activity call for an establishment of a unique 
enforcement authority. The established authorities in the case studies do not illustrate a nature of 
a State with multiple legal cultures. One would expect the establishment of the similar authority 
as established in the Western transposed frameworks but modified to include existing legal 
cultures. 
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6. Conclusions and Future of African Data Protection Regimes 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The ‘Western’ notion of privacy is argued to have received resistance in Africa solely on the 
assumption that, this notion appraises the idea of individualism while Africa is identified with 
communalism. The evidence adduced to support unacceptability of privacy in the form of an 
individual right includes the fact that the right is excluded in the African Charter. Furthermore as 
illustrated in chapter three, more reasons includs lack of cultural legitimacy on the right to 
privacy among the communities who are to reap its benefits. As a result, Himonga664 speaking 
from an assessment of studies on enforcing the right to privacy in Africa says, this perception 
leads to the rejection of the right solely on societal values, i.e. “western” and “African” 
individualism and communalism respectively.  
The right, first adopted in the form of bill of rights was contested as reflecting Western values, 
giving primacy to individualism against the African traditional values favoring the 
community.665As a result, Abdullah An-Na’im believes that their application is a subject of a 
century-long trial and error,666as they lack the legitimacy of public consensus667 and perpetuates 
colonial institutions,668 culture and practice.669The result is non-enforcement of the right to 
privacy in almost all of the African States except two countries; Kenya and South Africa. The 
main problem most of the proponent of the African communalism status as explained by 
Shahadah670 is the idea that they wish to find African culture stuck somewhere back in the 
nineteenth century and want to apply and rearrange it to the present context. They fail to realize 
that culture itself must reconstruct itself in a system in which it exists. As Shahada once argued, 
the African culture is always changing and evolving because the context in which Africans live 
changes and evolves. Hence, what makes an African culture is its operation in the interest of the 
Africans to advance the Africans.671 The continued reliance on the ‘communalism culture’ 
argument does not; according to Anthony necessarily indicate a lack of its development rather a 
skilful survival-centred method of exploring sustainable legal arrangements.672 
The peculiarity of African legal cultural development as compared to Europe is noted. To 
elaborate, the African approach has been for the legal culture to follow human development on 
                                                          
664 Chuma Himonga (2013). The Right to Health in an African Cultural Context: The Role of Ubuntu in the 
Realization of the Right to Health with Special Reference to South Africa. Journal of African Law, 57, 2013, pp 165-
195 at p. 165. 
665 Keith, C.K and A. Ogundele., Legal Systems and Constitutionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical 
Examination of Colonial Influences on Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 29, Number 4, November 
2007, pp. 1065-1097 at p. 1067. 
666 An-na’im, A.A.,  African Constitutionalism and the Rule of Islam 171 (2006). 
667 Ibhawoh, B.,  Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the 
African State, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 838 (2000), p. 846. 
668 Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O., Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Paradox, in 
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Douglas Greenberg, et al. eds., 1993); 
supra note 2, at 69. 
669 Mutua, M., Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 96 (2001), 
p. 97 
670 Supra at p. 14. 
671 Shahadah (n 380) p. 21. 
672 Ibid. 
 122 
 
the creation of a legal culture called ‘customary law’, usually without the intervention of the 
central power.  Still, contrary to arguments, the African culture has an ability to both be created 
and can be changed very quickly. It has the ability to mutate, is fluid and flexible. To narrate this 
fact, Shahadah uses an example of urbanization. He says, urbanization in Africa most often leads 
to the formation of new customs; people abandon their traditions whenever they are ruled to be 
non-sensical in new modern situations. Eventually, the formation or acceptance of a new culture 
formally unrecognized or ignored by society or official powers.673 
In the globalized markets, demand has and continues to play a significant role in shaping African 
cultures. Accordingly, cultures adapt, evolve and reply to reality without affecting the ethics 
which remains rooted in the foundational paradigm which fosters them.674 Furthermore, culture 
becomes redundant when it fails to meet the needs of the people or solve their problems. It 
follows, therefore, the fact that Africa has been an unregulated continent in relation to data 
protection within tremendous technological development poses an imminent threat to personal 
privacy; and that forms a strong motivation for establishing a form of regulation to protect 
individual privacy and secure personal data regardless of underlying values and conceptual 
foundations. Globalization means interaction and cross-influence of legal systems and cultures; 
this precludes Africa from clinging on communalism to avoid alignment with the rest of the 
world in reforming or adopting on data protection regimes. 
Data protection legal reforms in Africa, given the delicate state of the African legal culture, 
cognizance to specific local situation owe to be considered. The reforms must not be made in 
isolation of the local contexts. Spătaru-Negură says, ‘legal transplantation is a massive 
engineering project; it is not simply transplanting a single law or institution, but also creating the 
circumstances and the legal framework to make sure that the transplanted law can perform 
successfully’.675 Furthermore, attention is owed to the legal culture; as Spătaru-Negură once again 
explains, ‘legal culture is usually based on social values, local customs and national feelings. A 
comprehensive understanding of not only the legal culture of the country of origin but also a 
scientific appraisal of the compatibility between transplanted laws and local legal culture, after 
making a rational choice is required.’676  
However, it is very important that the African States should not overly localize the data 
protection legal frameworks. If overly localized, may bring challenges in understanding and in 
interpreting by the rest of the world. African culture being peculiar to Africa may pose this 
challenge as the rest of the world lack education on African anthropology especially in relation to 
law making and interpretation. On the other hand, Africans have gone through formal legal 
education, they can understand a ‘formal’ law and can be able to interpret concepts, content and 
context of their application and apply them in specific context to yield expected objectives.  
The world is becoming a global community hence the need to follow some rules to co-exist. 
Consequently, developing worlds cannot avoid the effect of the developed world legal 
frameworks. However, given the development gap, cultural and ethical diversities, Kingsley 
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proposes that, before a country can transplant any law, it has to look at three important aspects 
to ensure that the law can work in the local environment. The first one is the legal culture, which 
looks at the structure, nature, forces, traditions, strengths, and deficiencies of a legal system. All 
of which forms a nation’s legal culture which impacts upon the interpretation and acceptance, or 
otherwise, of legal transplants. The second one is to establish core parameters in which the laws 
and possible deficiencies arising out of these laws are reviewed, with a focus on law reform 
efforts. In addition, the proposed reforms cannot merely be ambiguous “framework” statements 
utilizing vague propositions; rather, clear areas of reform need to be delineated in order to allow 
adequate review and preparation for detailed research. The third is the application of 
interdisciplinary research.677  
Tabalujan suggests, to overcome rejection of foreign legal transplant, every law reform proposal 
to change some substantive law or legal institution should include an analysis of what aspects of 
the local legal culture would support or inhibit such change. Every law reform initiative should 
be accompanied by concrete steps designed to make the local legal culture more amenable to the 
proposed change. If this is not done and legal culture continues to remain a neglected aspect of 
law reform, then the risk of failure is high.678  
In reality, the world has accepted the European framework for data protection as providing 
standard protection and to have universal applicability. This stance alone leaves no room for an 
African State to avoid reforming data protection regime in alignment. Furthermore, when one 
poses the question of cultural difference or cultural incompatibility, there is a vast of research 
confirming the non-static nature of cultures. Generally, as argued by Warren and Brandeis, 
culture would undergo continuing growth as society and culture develop entailing recognition of 
new rights to meet the demands of the society. More so, when societal changes are influenced by 
technologies as technology plays a large role in developing a new understanding of our rights. In 
their words, they said; 
‘The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence 
of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have 
become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, 
through invasion upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury’.679  
Although Gerety still insists on our intuition of what ought to be surpass what is,680 in this case, 
technology, human interaction and globalization endorse the inevitable adoption of accepted 
standards of data protection regimes. As long as African continent does not have any concept 
relating to privacy; and the fact that the European framework is considered as a ‘universal’ code, 
African States existence is more displaced unless they adopt similar Regulations as one provided 
by the European Union. 
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Africa has a serious lack of experts in the area. It needs more than just legal reform to be able to 
have a working law. Unlike other laws, data protection regimes are a framework which needs 
more than just a person with legal knowledge to interpret and apply the laws. It needs legal 
personnel with expertise in data protection laws to have it properly and objectively implemented. 
Africa is still very immature in this area, it requires more than just financial and consultative 
support, it needs more support on the substance and structural reforms, at least at the take-off 
phase. Training is also required to main sectors responsible for implementing the law is also 
necessary. The approach taken by the AFAPDP in reforming Senegal (and other Francophone 
African States) is recommended for Africa. 
In Senegal, the AFAPDP has continued to assist with the implementation of the law after the 
actual reforms. The AFAPDP sets up follow-up mechanism, gives a continuous assessment of 
the adopted framework on its compliance with international standards. AFAPDP hold regular 
seminars, conferences and training to teach and update knowledge on data protection regulations 
and discuss challenges in implementing the data protection laws. AFAPDP together with the 
Francophone African States discusses new strategies and resolutions to resolve new challenges 
posed by the ICTs development to data security. Through these meetings, States have an 
opportunity to discuss issues underpinning protection of personal data, share good practices and 
give visibility to the actions and positions of the AFAPDP and its members.681 The organization, 
knowing the lack of data protection expertise in Africa, also acts as a source of expertise for the 
Francophone African countries in regulating of data security. It is also the mouthpiece for these 
States in dialogue with international data protection institutions including the UN, EU and 
APEC.682 
This approach encourages dialogue and international cooperation which would not only help 
newly reformed African States to implement the adopted frameworks but acquire the necessary 
and practical knowledge to address data security issues posed by new technology. In Tanzania, 
reform process was initiated by Multi-National organizations. The financial and technical 
assistance ended with the adoption of the draft bill. Thereafter, the Ministry took over and 
continued the process behind ‘curtains’ with no public consultations or awareness programmes. 
This is different from Senegal where the adoption of the law was preceded with substantial 
public awareness.  
 
6.2 Future of Data Protection in Africa 
 
Authors suggest African communalism naturally rejects the idea of individual privacy. These 
arguments often lead to a conclusion that privacy right having being based on an individualistic 
approach is bound to fail. These arguments are in forgetful of the fact that, human beings are 
animals, and it has been scientific researched and verified that the desire for privacy is deep 
rooted in animal origin;683as such, they device different mechanisms to claim their privacy. These 
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mechanisms include territoriality against other animals. In this regards, we find the existence of 
rules of exclusion such as the tort of trespass, defamation which exists in African legal systems as 
evidence in that regard. 
In groups, animals set personal, intimate and social distance within their social organization. 
Furthermore, there are human activities summoning intimacy or privacy, such as sexual 
intercourse. These activities regardless of the communal nature of the society can never be 
conducted in groups/social organization. Yilma elaborates that, all communities have rules for 
concealment of female genitals, and on time and manner of their exposure. Privacy is also seen 
in sexual relations. Within a society, ‘there are rules limiting entry by non-residents and outsider’s 
conducts once s/he enters. Also, there are norms limiting family conversations or acts 
performed in the presence of outsiders’.684 Hence, the absence of the right to privacy in the 
African Charter and non-enforcement of the right by the Member States is nothing but lack of 
political will. It is incorrect to conclude from these acts as the absence of the need for the right 
to privacy within African communities and its people.  
There is a reason, despite colonization, African traditional legal structure and law continues to 
exist. A comprehensive reform or integration has never been achieved in a single African 
country. Change of law or reform in any African legal system requires an understanding of the 
core norms which specific African societies are ‘unwittingly’ to forego.  The African States are, 
unlike European and American, capable of hosting different types of legal systems and laws.  
These legal systems and laws have not only co-exists, but their co- existence is balanced to allow 
intended justice/outcome to prevail; a phenomenon unseen in the Western legal systems.  
The nature of the African States legal systems allows and welcomes changes. Cultural laws are 
even more predisposed to change.  The absence of written codes allows societies to be extremely 
dynamic. It means, what is law is imagined at a certain time and place as something with life; it 
changes on demand and societal agreement. A rule is acceptable as law as long as it supports and 
retains stability to core traditional norms. This is in line with of law as a social contract.  
African cultural laws aim at upholding societal interests. Societal interests change with time. 
Today, technology has infiltrated even into the crudest of communities; government activities 
affect even those who refuse to use technology. The effect is an invasion of natural rights and 
liberties which human being sought to preserve, such as territorial rights or intimacy. The change 
of times, technology and governance have an impact on the traditional norms and open doors 
for improvement. African cultural law does not enforce rules which are redundant to the society 
but rather adapts to new social challenges. This means reforms in data protection are potentially 
welcome and acceptable as long as do not unreasonably disturbs the traditional norms.   
It is crucial, in the African context, to consider local realities in any data protection reform 
programme. And as suggested by Stephen Toope,685 ignoring the local environment and cultural 
values can lead to resistance, unsustainability and ultimate failure. Data protection laws are aimed 
at regulating acts and providing rights of the society; hence, to be of value, they must provide 
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guiding principles that allows for regularity and rationality in a way in which disputes are settled 
and the way in which relationships are governed.686 In other words, the law should not only 
govern relations, rights and duties but the society should be able to relate to it. After all, the 
value of any legal system is derived from specific cultural, social and political contexts. It follows, 
therefore, ‘Naïve assumptions of congruence are often overthrown in the project 
implementation’.687 
The nature of African States requires consideration of different layers within a particular legal 
structure. This allows for a determination of overarching societal goals, existing frameworks and 
their effectiveness. This determination informs the decisions on the measures required for a legal 
reform and answers important questions such as what aspects of the existing structure; 
• complements the proposed reform,  
• conflicts with the proposed reforms, or 
•  are the missing in either the existing structure, the proposed structure or both (in light of 
the objectives of the reforms)  
A close examination of the existing structure is important in determining the type of 
enforcement authority to be established. In this case, whether the existing formal and informal 
authorities; 
• can interact harmoniously, or 
• have sufficient expertise to implement the proposed reforms 
Data protection reform by transposition, as was done in Senegal and Tanzania requires 
transposition of legal expertise. In this case, knowing the law or being a lawyer is insufficient. 
This is because, unlike other branches of law, reforms in data protection are not a mere drafting 
process; rather an establishment of a legal framework. 
Data protection reforms in Africa are deficient. Despite scholarly concerns and debate on what 
constitutes African privacy, none of the reforms, from domestic, Sub-Regional to Regional 
bothered to deal with this question. The process neither conceptualized nor contextualized the 
concept within an African context. It may seem like a trivia issue since privacy has already been 
defined in so many ways and by so many people. However, in the African context, it is necessary 
that privacy receives a formal baptismal. Whether it is by borrowing from existing meanings or 
through a construction of a brand new meaning, privacy needs its African meaning. Not only 
because privacy is ‘still’ a novel concept in African societies but because a lack of its 
understanding within local context sets any reforms to an inevitable collapse. 
Like building a house, conceptualizing privacy is the foundation for data protection. People need 
to understand what the concept means to them, to their interactions and their institutions. 
Failure to conceptualize the core right that led to the reforms makes the reforms a mere reaction 
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to globalization on data protection. This will, in the long run fall short of expected results or 
collapse the process altogether.  
Unfortunately, it is not the first time that Africa reacted and reforms its system blindly to align to 
global systems. In 1960’s after independence, the African Head of States adopted socialism after 
the Soviet Union and China. Similar to the ongoing reforms on data protection, the adoption of 
socialism lacked definite ideology. According to Firedland and Roseberg,688 the adoption of 
socialism was a political reaction which had no legs to stand on African soil for lack of ideology. 
As a result, African socialism collapsed with the fall of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. 
Chapter one elaborated how the data protection reforms in Africa are a reaction to somewhat 
modest threat by the DPD. Authors such as Bygrave, Greenleaf, Birmack and Makulilo have, in 
different occasion elaborated how Articles 25 and 26 of the DPD led to reforms in Africa and 
other regions such as Asia. This, in itself, is not a menace. In fact, it stimulates legal 
harmonization and hence international trade, market integration and economic development. 
The problem lies in the failure to localize the reforms. To begin with is the failure to 
conceptualize privacy within specific contexts. This threatens the very existence and 
sustainability of the established regimes. As was the African socialism, data protection regimes 
remain to be ‘mere reactions’ to the DPD. Like the African socialism, data protection regimes 
may end up depending on the survival of the EU data protection frameworks for their validity 
and survival. In case the EU regime collapses, so is the African data protection regimes. 
Although the established regimes can stand and function independently, their survival and 
validity depend on the survival, validity and relevance of the EU regimes. African regimes remain 
valid as long as the replica is unchanged, if and when the replica changes, the African regimes 
lose their validity in the global sphere unless they adopt to change. Eventually, the EU data 
protection regime continues to determine the validity and the life of the African data protection 
regimes. African regimes continue to ‘play catch’ in the area of data protection. In fact, this is 
already happening; with the GDPR coming into force in May 2017, many aspects in the data 
protection laws in Africa are rendered redundant.  
While African States and the African Union continue to ‘implement’ the 1995 DPD, the EU has 
undergone several developments to address challenges by technological development that came 
after the 1995 DPD. Most of African State laws do not reflect these developments; they are 
silent on issues such as breach notifications, data protection for minors, the status of IP 
addresses, cookies requirement, recognition of data transfer agreements, etc. It is not clear how 
African States will address new measures and requirements that come with the GDPR; because 
the 2014 Malabo Convention and the Sub-Regional data protection instruments are based on the 
soon to be replaced DPD. 
The African Union as an African institution needs to have its initiatives towards data protection 
within and beyond Africa. The African Union is failing its Member States by remaining dormant 
and a blind receiver instead of an active participant in the global discussion and processes. 
Scholars such as Mayer689 urge Europe should treat Africa as an equal and responsible partner on 
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issues of global challenge, not as a dominant and overbearing.690 An approach which Mayer 
suggests would look at ‘global good’; first by defining global responsibility and then address the 
question, what Europe or Africa as whole and EU or AU, in particular, ought to act on global 
affairs with its unique set of opportunities and instruments.691 Unfortunately, in this context, 
Africa does not seem to take up her position and act accordingly. Furthermore, despite the 
brilliance and parity in Mayer’s suggestion, the idea may not be forthcoming because of two 
dimensions that continue to define EU-Africa relations. First is the increased marginalization of 
Europe as a driver in world affairs, and secondly is the tainted Africa perception on Europe 
influenced by a history of colonization and which bring the feeling of dependency towards 
Europe.692 The nature of privacy, the discrepancy in its value and perception calls for an 
understanding of its value on the basis of ‘global public good’. Perhaps, Africa should, as 
suggested by Mayer, shift her perspective from inward looking and dependent Africa to one that 
places the continent firmly within the global context,693 and illustrate capabilities and 
contributions in the data protection reform agenda.  
 Data protection is a highly evolving and internationalized area of law. It requires commitment, 
cooperation, active participation and constant negotiations with other regions such as the EU, 
APEC, and ASEAN. It is only in such manner African Union can, on behalf of its Member 
States; establish an acceptable and sustainable data protection framework regardless of the vast 
cultural diversity of its Member States and different international legal values. The dynamics 
involving data protection regimes requires active participation because their trans-border rules 
are usually intrusive. These rules will force Africa to deal with a complex matrix in which various 
existing domestic and international legal principles interacts. Africa is soon to realize that, being 
dormant and ‘playing catch’ in the field of data protection is more costly economically, socially 
and even politically. That active participation, coordination and negotiations in data protection 
processes and development are inevitable; if not for individual rights, for socio-economic and 
political survival. 
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